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ABSTRACT 
 
The Europeanization of French, German and British China Policies: The case of the 
arms embargo on China 
 
by Vivien L. Exartier 
 
This study analyzes the impact of France, Britain and Germany on European Union 
sanction policy on China. The study argues that Britain, France and Germany affect the EU 
sanction policy on China through bottom-up and horizontal Europeanization due to their 
historic and strategic ties to the PRC and their predominance in the armament industry. The 
study specifically reviews the case of the handling of the lift of the arms embargo between 
2003 and 2005, imposed on the wake of the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989. The 
methodology combines a questionnaire, addressed to defense and foreign affairs officials 
from the three member states and EU officials, press articles, interviews and speeches and 
applies three theories about responses to Europeanization. The study found that The Big 
Three influence the agenda-setting and policy formulation by uploading their policy 
preferences but cannot implement those policies if they conflict with US interests. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
For the past twenty-five years, the People’s Republic of China and the European 
Community/European Union have been similar and different, compatible and incompatible at 
the same time1. The PRC always had a choice of dealing either with Europe as an ‘abstract' 
amalgam’ of industrialized West European nation states, or with the EC/EU as the “concrete 
yet fuzzy and at times yet frustrating technical framework of Europe”2. At first sight, due to its 
own political tradition of developing close relationships before developing partnerships, China 
felt closer to individual European countries. China however quickly grasped the importance of 
the European Community as an economic powerhouse and sometimes tried to play the former 
against the latter. It was a logical reaction since the EC was mostly dealing with trade issues at 
the time it started a relationship with China. Politically then, the point of reference for China 
was individual states, including Britain, France and Germany who all established relations with 
China prior to the EC.  
The EC only started its transformation into a political union (European Union) in 
1992 with the Maastricht Treaty by developing a stronger identity as a foreign policy actor. 
The Union is far from being achieved especially when it comes to common foreign policy 
where domestic interests might conflict with EU interests. Today, from a EU perspective, the 
relation with China is at a flourishing stage. Economically, EU-China trade in goods has 
                                                 
1 Kay Möller. “Diplomatic Relations and Mutual strategic Perceptions: China and the European Union”. The 
China Quarterly: 196, (March 2002), Special Issue: China and Europe since 1978: a European Perspective: 
10-33, 10 
2  Möller, 11 
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increased more than 30-fold, amounting to about €146 billion in 2003; European Commission 
President Barroso recently stated that the EU was at a dynamic moment in its relationship with 
China and that developing its relationship would be one of the Union’s top foreign policy 
objectives. In strategic domains, multiple agreements have been signed and levels of 
cooperation have certainly been expanding. The EU has been supporting China’s integration 
into global institutions in order to increase its stake in making them work more effectively. 
When it comes to the role of China on security issues however, Member States diverge and 
they have not seen any urgent need to develop  collective strategic thinking related to China3. 
The European Union imposed an arms embargo on China following the Tiananmen Square 
incident in 1989 and since 2003, there have been discordant voices for a possible lift of the 
embargo. European policymakers are also concerned by China’s policy of offering 
unconditional political support, economic aid and weapons to autocratic regimes that might 
otherwise collapse or be susceptible to international pressure (including Sudan, Iran, Burma, 
Zimbabwe, North Korea, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Angola). Of course, China’s support for 
autocratic regimes is not designed to upset the West: Beijing wants access to oil, gas and other 
natural resources, as well as support against Taiwan at the UN. Member States cannot reach 
consensus because they have conflicting economic and strategic interests. Ultimately, countries 
tend to compete against each other to be Beijing’s best political friend and trading partner thus 
undermining EU China policy. France and the United Kingdom for instance, as co members of 
the United Nations Security Council always took a more cooperative stance4 compared to 
                                                 
3 Anthony Sipri. “Military relevant EU-China trade and technology transfers: issues and problem”. (Paper 
presented at the Conference on Chinese Military Modernization: East Asian Political, Economic, and Defense 
Industrial Responses, organized by the Freeman Chair in China Studies and the Pacific Forum Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 19-20 May, 2005) 
4 Anthony Sipri. “Military relevant EU-China trade and technology transfers: issues and problem”. (Paper 
presented at the Conference on Chinese Military Modernization: East Asian Political, Economic, and Defense 
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Northern European Member States who always had a less conciliatory attitude because of 
Chinese records on human rights. Political ties and commercial interests justified then the 
Franco-German crusade for a lift of the embargo. There are top-down influences from Brussels 
to Member States as well as bottom-up influences coming from Member States to Brussels 
when it comes to EU policy-making.  This process is called ‘Europeanization’ and is defined 
by McGowan as the interactions and impact of the EU on domestic actors and structures5. EU 
China policy-making does not escape such process: Brussels tailors a EU China policy that 
member states’ behaviors might contradict.  
This study analyzes the impact of France, Britain and Germany on EU sanction policy 
on China. Sanctions are an instrument of a diplomatic or economic nature that seek to bring 
about a change in activities or policies such as violations of international law or human rights, 
or policies that do not respect the rule of law or democratic principles. Arms embargoes differ 
from traditional EU sanctions because their implementation ultimately depends on the good 
will of individual member states while dealing with the embargoed country.  The case of the 
handling of the lift of the arms embargo, imposed on the wake of the Tiananmen Square 
Massacre in 1989 illustrates how the EU was unable to formulate a common and coherent 
position in its China policy.  I argue that Britain, France and Germany affect the EU sanction 
policy on China based on their historic and strategic ties to the PRC.  
The study combines a questionnaire on China policy and sanction policy addressed to 
defense and foreign affairs officials from the three member states and EU officials, press 
articles, interviews and speeches from that period, applies the theory used by Tanja Börzel, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Industrial Responses, organized by the Freeman Chair in China Studies and the Pacific Forum Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 19-20 May, 2005) 
5 Lee McGowan. “Europeanization unleashed and rebounding: assessing the modernization of EU cartel 
policy”, Journal of European Public Policy 12:6, (December 2005): 986-1004, 996 
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who recognizes three kinds of reactions from the member states to Europeanization: pace-
setting, foot-dragging and fence-sitting combined with policy misfit theories by Cowles et al. 
and Falkner et al. to understand the responses of Europeanization and explain the goodness of 
fit between the three Member States and the EU policy. 
I expect to find that the three states set the agenda of the European Union, formulate 
policies and influence other Member States to follow their policy choices through a bottom-up 
and horizontal process of Europeanization but that their capacity to influence such processes 
might be hampered by domestic and external constraints. The Three Big States have a unique 
vision of the place of China in the international security system that they would like to see the 
Common Foreign Security Policy adopt, but that might conflict with EU cohesion strategy, 
domestic and US interests. Our findings will also show that external factors, such as US 
influence, may overpower the will of the Big Three to affect the sanction policy. 
 
1.1 Research Problem 
I am interested in comparing the impact of the French, British and German China 
policies on EU China policy dealing with foreign policy and security matters. Comparing a set 
of policies between the EU and the main Member States with regard to China is a somewhat 
difficult exercise for methodological, historical, and functional reasons. First of all, the field of 
comparative security study is fairly recent, and there are constant evolutions of the definition of 
security and foreign policy. Second, from a functional perspective, the three states belong to 
the EU, and I compare the policies of an organization they belong to and their own policies that 
might go beyond the policies of the EU. Finally, historical relations with China started at 
different moments. The formal relationship between the EU/EC and China began in 1975 while 
 5
the three states recognized the PRC much earlier (with Britain being the first European power 
to recognize the People’s Republic of China in 1950 and France the first to exchange 
ambassadors with the PRC in 1964, followed by Germany’s recognition in 1971).  
As I mentioned, the EU China policy in the field of foreign and security policy is still 
young and between 1975 and the early nineties, the relationship mostly focused on trade. Trade 
is the most cohesive EU policy, where the EU achieved the highest level of supranational 
coordination. However, a political union only took shape in the late eighties through the 
Maastricht Treaty that established a second pillar of EU policies dealing with foreign policy 
issues and the first European Security Doctrine which followed in 2003. The political union 
also occurred in the context of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. Records on human 
rights and the fact that the Chinese political system did not fit any traditional Western 
democratic regime model prevented Member States from adopting a common stance. Member 
States have conflicting opinions about tying deeper political cooperation with progress on 
human rights records or not. I established earlier that Britain, France and Germany had a very 
special interest in EU China policy. The three states have a historical relationship prior to the 
EC/EU and have prime strategic importance in shaping EU foreign policy. Britain, France and 
Germany are the most influential Member States when it comes to defense issues, because they 
have the largest defense resources (army, manpower and budget). As member states of the 
European Union, the Big Three participate in the European Security Defense Policy (ESDP); 
they also have an overlapping membership with NATO, another major security provider for 
Europe. The NATO membership brings up the importance of another actor outside the 
European Union regarding European security matters: the United States. The United States as 
 6
the only superpower always seemed a proponent of a more autonomous European Union 
provided that it did not conflict with U.S. interests.  
Based on their historical relationship with China, the three countries have been 
developing their own perception and vision of China’s role in world security which might 
conflict with US’s own perception of China. In particular, the three Member States’ leadership 
contributed to define the status of partnership with China: whether China was a strategic 
partner, a special partner, or just a partner to cautiously handle cautiously. I am specifically 
interested in how much influence the three Member States had in carving this partnership 
between the EU and China. Some scholars argue that individual European countries have been 
losing influence to the benefit of the EU as a whole6. There has been a top-down 
Europeanization of the three member states’ foreign policy vis-à-vis China and their policies 
have been converging.  However, the Franco-German initiative for a lift of the embargo 
showed that the big member states were very capable of shaping the agenda. I want to assess 
the process of Europeanization in EU policy vis-à-vis China. Is there a horizontal 
Europeanization on EU China policy where Britain, France and Germany pushed for ideas 
across the Union? Or did the EU supply much coordination leading to a convergence in their 
policies? Do individual member states pursue an individual strategy and try to upload their 
vision of a China policy at the EU level? Ultimately, the role of China in the world security is 
at stake: Do the bilateral relations, such as between France and China or the United Kingdom 
and China, and state-centered perceptions help or hinder the development of a coherent EU 
security policy? Do state interests prevail when it comes to China or is there a basis to develop 
                                                 
6 Reuben Wong. “Towards a Common European Policy on China” (paper presented  at the conference ‘The 
European Union and the World: Asia, Enlargement and Constitutional Change’, organized by IPSA Research 
Committee 3 on European Unification, in Beijing, 5-6 May 2005). 
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a common strategy? When it comes to building partnerships with the PRC, do other actors in 
the international system intervene e.g. the U.S.? 
Theory: Britain, France and Germany have a significant impact in shaping the EU 
sanction policy on China due to their strategic and historical bonds with the PRC and their 
key role in the EU. 
H1 or Null Hypothesis: The influence of the three member states is negligible, dissolved 
in EU because the EU dictates the strategic choices regarding China policy through the 
CFSP and downloads its policies, leading to convergence. 
H2: The Big Three influence the agenda-setting and policy formulation of EU policy vis-
à-vis China, and upload their policy preferences 
H3: The Big Three influence other Member States to have them follow their policy 
choices regarding EU policy by exchanging ideas through horizontal Europeanization. 
H4: The Big Three may influence the agenda-setting and the policy formulation of EU 
China policy but the implementation of the given policy is inherently tied to U.S. approval, 
due to its strategic interests in the region 
To test our hypotheses, I chose the case of the lifting of the arms embargo imposed on 
China following the Tiananmen uprising. Arms embargoes represent an original EU sanction 
since their implementation ultimately depends on the discretion and compliance of the 
individual member states. The lift of the arms embargo is an issue where the EU has been 
struggling in reaching common agreement. 
 
 
 
 8
Table 1.1 The Timeline of the EU arms embargo on China 
June 6, 1989: The European Council imposed a series of punitive measures on China for its violent 
repression of the Tiananmen democracy movement. 
 
May 25, 1998: Member States adopted the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, outlining principles 
and guidelines based on eight criteria for future exports of military equipment. 
 
December 2003: In visit to China, Chancellor Gerhard SchrÖder told Premier Wen Jianbao that “the 
time had come” to lift the embargo 
 
December 12, 2003: The European Council instructed its foreign ministers (General Affairs Council), 
under the initiative of President Chirac from France to ‘re-examine the question of the embargo on 
the sale of arms to China’. 
 
December 18, 2003: The European Parliament rejected the lift by a landslide vote (373 in favor, 32 
against) due to continuing violations of human rights 
 
January 26, 2004, EU foreign ministers failed to reach an agreement after discussing the issue. They 
asked two working groups, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the 
Political and Security Committee, to examine the matter further. 
 
January 27, 2004: President Chirac from France, at a joint conference with visiting Chinese President 
Hu Jintao, publicly called for the lifting of the arms embargo on China. 
 
April 26, 2004: The European Council discussed the embargo and called for further discussion 
 
October 11, 2004:  The European Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers reviewed the state of 
discussions on the embargo. It also took a series of decisions on the EU-China 
Dialogue on Human Rights. 
 
December 8, 2004:  The EU confirmed its intention to ‘continue to 
work towards lifting the embargo’. 
 
March 14, 2005 The PRC People’s Congress adopts the Taiwan Anti-Secession Law which inflicted a 
severe blow to the initiative 
 
March 14-19, 2005: A European Union defense team visits Washington to explain the proposal to lift 
its Tiananmen Square arms embargo on China without convincing their U.S. counterparts. 
 
April 14, 2005: The European Parliament approved a resolution that called on the European Council 
not to lift the arms embargo on China 
 
July 1, 2005: The UK takes over the EU presidency and does not put the embargo issue on the agenda 
 
November 2005: German Chancellor Elect Merkel opposes the lift  
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1.2 Timeline and background information about the embargo issue  
 
Following the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, the European Council meeting in Madrid 
issued a document imposing a number of EU-wide diplomatic and economic sanctions on 
China, including an arms embargo7.  The EU embargo is somewhat vague and, as a result, it 
has been interpreted differently by individual EU member states.  Because there was no 
common list of embargoed goods, the embargo never became EU coherent in its 
implementation and scope. Despite a general restraint with regard to signing new contracts8, 
EU member states continued to sell goods after June 1989, which could be used as weapons 
by China. Those goods were identified as ‘dual-use technology products’ or ‘non-lethal 
defense items’, i.e. s radar systems, aero-engines, communications systems, and even satellite 
technology. The commercial and military opportunities for European companies in China 
were huge. The European arms industry was attracted to China’s untapped defense market 
that was so far almost exclusively monopolized by Russian arms manufacturers: in 2002 
alone, Chinese purchases of foreign weapon systems were valued at $3.6 billion which 
Russian received.  
  Any decision to lift the arms embargo would need the unanimous agreement of all EU 
member states. The process itself could take place at the European Council, a meeting of EU 
heads of government, or at the monthly meetings of the foreign ministers9. At the European 
Council Meeting in Brussels in 2003, chief executives of the Member States invited their 
foreign ministers to reexamine the need for the arms embargo and the arguments for and 
                                                 
7 Eugene Kogan. “The European Union Defense Industry and the Appeal of the Chinese Market”. (Report, 
Studien und Berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, January 2005),  
12 
8 Kogan, 16 
9 Kogan, 12 
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again its removal10. A number of EU leaders made statements that China was very different 
politically from other countries on which the EU had imposed arms embargoes. EU leaders 
also recognized that China’s leadership had changed since 1989 and that there had been 
dramatic changes in Chinese society.11 
France and Germany were the champions of the lift and Britain did join the process. 
With other members, France and Germany claimed that the embargo hindered stronger EU 
political and economic relations with China. While visiting Beijing in December 2003, 
German Chancellor Gerhard SchrÖder told Premier Wen Jianbao that “the time had come” to 
lift the embargo. That same month, during a summit of EU member states, French President 
Jacques Chirac led European leaders in referring the issue to their respective foreign 
ministers (General Affairs Council), urging them “to re-examine the question of the embargo 
on the sale of arms to China”.12 However, in December 2003, the European Parliament 
rejected the lift by a landslide vote (373 in favor, 32 against) due to continuing violations of 
human rights. The European Parliament, before the Lisbon Treaty did not have any authority 
in foreign policy making and was only an advisory body, but the landslide result sent a strong 
signal to heads of government across the EU that the move was not the wisest and the most 
popular.   
At their first meeting of the year in Brussels in January 2004, EU foreign ministers 
failed to reach an agreement after discussing the issue. They asked two working groups, the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the Political and Security 
Committee, to examine the matter further. The day after the ministerial meeting, then 
                                                 
10 European Union Council. “Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions”, December 12-13, 2003 
11 Sipri, 9 
12 Frank Ching. “Changing dynamics in EU-China arms relations”. China Brief, Volume 4, Issue 5 (March 8, 
2004), 1 
 11
President Chirac, at a joint conference with visiting Chinese President Hu Jintao, publicly 
called for the lifting of the arms embargo on China. On April 26, 2004, the Council discussed 
the embargo, noting that “it had been imposed as a response to specific events in 1989 and 
that a solution for the matter had to be found which was in line with the current situation in 
China, the increasingly close bilateral relations and the EU’s intention to develop a strategic 
partnership with China”. The matter was further referred to the Permanent Representatives 
Committee and the Political Security Committee. The fact that the repeal could not be 
concluded prior to the 1 May 2004 accession of ten Eastern European and in some cases pro-
U.S. states into the European Union served as one of the greatest blows to a quick resolution 
of the arms ban.13 On 11 October 2004, the ministers reviewed the state of discussions on the 
embargo. The Council’s overall assessment was that there was a ‘mixed picture of progress 
in some areas and continuing concerns in others’. On 8 December 2004 in The Hague, the 
EU Council confirmed its intention to ‘continue to work towards lifting the embargo’. 
Throughout 2005, senior EU officials, especially Javier Solana, High Representative for 
Foreign and Security Policy continued to describe the arms embargo variously as ‘unfair’, 
‘anachronistic’ and ‘insignificant’ in terms of positive influence on the policies of the current 
Chinese leadership. But once again, on April 14, 2005, the European Parliament challenged 
the view of the member states and approved a resolution that called on the European Council 
not to lift the arms embargo on China, decision based on poor human rights and the large 
number of missiles in southern China aimed at Taiwan (431 in favor to 85 against)14.  
                                                 
13 Saalman Lora, Yuan Jing-Dong. “The European Union and the Arms Ban on China”. (Center for Non 
Proliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies, July 2004), p.5 
14 Austin Greg. “The 1989 China Arms Ban: putting Europe’s position to Congress”. The Foreign policy 
Centre, (April 2005), 6 
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Among Member States, there was a debate on the desirability and the conditions of the 
lift. On one hand, China did not belong to the same category of ‘pariah’ countries such as 
Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe – the three other countries against whom there were an EU 
arms embargo. On the other hand, the human rights record did not seem sufficient, and Member 
States feared the use of European technology by China. As a safeguard, the EU came up in 1998 
with the “Code of Conduct” on arms sales. The Code of Conduct barred the sale of equipment 
that could be used in regional conflicts or domestic repression, which would still be enforceable 
on sales to China. This meant that even if the EU did lift the embargo, sales of certain weapons 
would still be illegal,15 and the EU promised not to lift the embargo until it had strengthened its 
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and introduced a transitional regime for recently embargoed 
countries16. The Code of Conduct would prevent a radical change in the strategic balance in 
Asia-Pacific region. 
France, Germany, and Spain made the case that the ban should be lifted without placing 
conditions upon its removal, while Britain argued that a reinforcement of the Code of Conduct 
on Arms Sales would help.17The proposal for lifting the arms ban was partially driven by 
economic and political considerations. Expanding with China at all levels was an important part 
of European efforts to stimulate economic growth. In arguing for a lifting of the ban, French 
Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin stated “Our feeling is that the embargo is out of date as 
relations between Europe and China improve. ... [Beijing is] a privileged partner and a 
responsible one. ”18 The French stance also resulted from Chinese pressure on its French partner, 
                                                 
15 Ching, 2 
16 Eugene Kogan. “The European Union Defense Industry and the Appeal of the Chinese Market”. (Report, 
Studien und Berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, January 2005),  
14  
17 Saalman et al., .3 
18 Wolfe Adam. “France and Germany Move to Resume Arms Sales to China,” Power and Interest News 
Report, (11 February 2004). 
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and also pressure from domestic French weapon manufacturers. The main argument was that 
China had dramatically changed and improved in many areas since 1989, including human rights 
abuse. The arms embargo in President Chirac’s opinion was ‘a relic of the Cold War’19. At the 
same time, Germany suffered from a greater degree of domestic debate and opposition because 
of the Germany-Taiwan friendship group and the Green Party’s objections to perceived ongoing 
human rights abuses in China20. The UK showed an interest in reconsidering the ban, arguing 
that the European Union’s Code of Conduct on Arms Export, while not legally binding, with 
some enhancements would provide a solid safeguard against worrisome arms exports by EU 
states to the Chinese in the future21.  
        On the other side of the aisle, the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, Portugal and Sweden 
voiced concerns over lifting the ban without significant improvements in China’s human rights, 
but their position did not seem irreconcilable. The Netherlands and Denmark in January 2004 
demonstrated a willingness to agree to lift of the weapons embargo if it represented the will of 
the majority of states.  Several non-EU members also joined the chorus: Russia, as mentioned 
was China’s primary source of China’s military equipment since the imposition of the 1989 
embargo ($2.1 billion of China’s total arms purchases in 2002) along with Israel and both 
countries were not keen on giving up a significant market share. Yet by far the loudest opponent 
had been the United States. While much of the European rhetoric regarding the ban tended to 
focus on the economic implications, Washington was more concerned with the strategic 
implications of the lifting of the arms embargo. China demonstrated a particular interest in 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Berliner Zeitung “German Greens Criticize Government Arms Export Report, Urge Restrictive Exports,” 12 
March 2004  
Taipei Central News Agency  “CNA: Germany Urged Not to Support Easing of Arms Sales Ban  to China,” , 8 
April 2004. 
21 Grimmett Richard  et al. “European Union’s Arms Control Regime and Arms Exports to China: Background 
and Legal Analysis”. (Report for Congress,  March 1, 2005),  2 
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systems that could be used against U.S. forces in a potential conflict over the Taiwan Strait. The 
Transatlantic relationship was damaged from the rift about the invasion of Iraq and both sides 
were keen on repairing it. The passage on the Anti-Secession law in March 2005 was a severe 
blow to the initiative. China was warning that any move by Taiwan towards independence would 
be considered as an aggression against mainland China (See Appendix). 
Despite a EU diplomatic offensive to convince the US partners and the launch of a EU-
US Dialogue in China, the Anti-Secession Law comforted opponents to the lift in their opinion 
and contributed to convince skeptics. The weakening of France following the rejection of the 
referendum about the EU Constitution in the spring of 2005, the prudent attitude of the Blair 
government and the electoral campaign in Germany helped burry the issue.  
 
 
1.3 The US interference  in the debate 
 As soon as the U.S. got wind of a possible removal of the embargo by the EU, 
intelligence officers were sent to several EU member states to convince them that the 
embargo should remain in place. Following the January 2004 Foreign Ministers Council 
decision to look into the feasibility of the lift,  US diplomacy issued several complaints with 
the EU, arguing  that the EU embargo was complementary to the US embargo, and both were 
imposed for the same reasons.  
In an effort to mend fences after the tensions provoked by the Iraqi crisis, US 
President George W. Bush appeared resigned to the likely EU decision to lift the embargo on 
his February 2005 European tour. However, a couple of months later, the US House of 
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Representatives passed a bill in the spring that would restrict military exports and 
technology- I -sharing with those European countries that sell arms to China. 22 
The US lack of consistency reflected two schools of thought in the US strategy 
towards China: one believed that China should be better integrated into the international 
community; the other preferred to contain China militarily and economically.23 The latter 
seemed defiant of a closer relationship between the PRC and the EU and was wary of the 
notion of “strategic partnership”.  The US feared that the deepening of Sino-European 
political relations reflected a hidden agenda to create a multipolar world to counter US 
influence. 24 Given the US commitment to Taiwan, there were fears in Washington that 
balance of forces between China and Taiwan would be affected were the PRC to acquire 
sophisticated arms. 25  
 
1.4  Significance for the Literature and Chapters Overview 
The contribution to the literature is significant since there had not been many comparative 
studies on Europeanization applied to foreign policy. As the literature shows, studies of 
Europeanization in foreign policy cover one country and do not compare three member states. 
The study may also contribute to the literature through the use of policy misfits and adaptation 
theories. Most of the work in the literature (Börzel 2000, Falkner et al. 2005, Cowles et al. 2001) 
covers harmonization and compliance at the domestic level and did not include foreign policy. 
Chapter 2 starts by reviewing the key concepts related to the EU sanction policy, 
Common Foreign Security Policy, relationship between Member States and EU institutions and 
                                                 
22 Kreutz, 53 
23 Crossick et al., 17 
24 Crossick et al., 33 
25 Crossick et al. 16 
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an extensive discussion of Europeanization.  The chapter continues by presenting the 
methodology used in the study: a questionnaire combined with official documents, press articles 
and the application of three theories allowing us to understand responses from member states to 
the Europeanization of their China policy. 
Chapter 3, 4 and 5 analyze the countries of the study, i.e. France, Britain and Germany. 
These chapters follow the same structure. They start with a history of the relationship of the 
given country with China, then its impact on EU China policy, then its reasoning regarding the 
lift of the arms embargo and then looks into the level of adaptation to EU China policy in the 
case of the embargo. 
Finally, the last chapter offers a comprehensive review of the findings and opens the 
discussion on the role of China in the international sphere and how the transatlantic relationship 
gets affected by it. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Definition of Concepts 
 
2.0 Introduction 
I will now review the literature of the different concepts mentioned in the study: the 
role, attributes and functioning of the EU Common Foreign Security Policy, a definition of 
sanctions, a discussion of the concept of security, an analysis of the concept of 
Europeanization and its application to foreign policy, and finally the theories of Tanja Börzel 
and Cowles et al. and Falkner et al. on the responses to Europeanization 
 
2.1  Formulation and conduct of Foreign Policy in the European Union 
The study reviews the influence of member states on EU sanction policy. Sanctions or 
‘restrictive measures in force’ are adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign Security 
Policy. They are under the European Commission External Relations Directorate but decided 
by the European Council of Member States. Sanction policy illustrates the complexity of the 
EU foreign policy. The CFSP was recently modified under the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. For the 
purpose of our case study which was between 2003 and 2005, we need to review how the 
CFSP functioned then, meaning pre-Lisbon Treaty. 
2.1.1 Short History of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was the first to contain provisions on the EU's 
responsibility for all questions relating to its security, including the eventual framing of a common 
defense policy.  The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina had definitely been an impetus. In August 1991, 
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the twelve members requested the Western European Union (WEU) to assess options for 
deployment of a European interposition force of 30,000 troops without US or NATO support. But 
in September 1991, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom vetoed WEU involvement, 
arguing that military operations should exclusively remain a NATO competence26.  From the point 
of view of military capabilities, Europe’s ability was never questioned: it has always  been a 
political and ideological issue.  The Maastricht Treaty defined these tasks as part of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. But the idea of having cooperation in terms of foreign policy had 
been brought up as early as in the 1970s with European Political Cooperation (EPC), a mechanism 
for foreign policy coordination among member states.  EPC was transformed into the CFSP, like a 
caterpillar to a butterfly, during the 1991 EU Intergovernmental Conference (ICG). 
The CFSP was established as the second pillar of the European Union in the 1993 Treaty 
on European Union signed at Maastricht.  The Treaty envisaged that the EU, having no military 
capabilities of its own, would request the Western European Union (WEU) to elaborate and 
implement planned military measures on its behalf.   The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated 
into the Treaty on the European Union the Western European Union's (WEU) "Petersberg tasks", 
establishing which types of military operations the EU can undertake.  The most extended 
definition has been included in Article III-309 of the draft of the European Union Constitution: 
‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, 
conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces undertaken for crisis 
management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization.”27 This laid the treaty basis 
for the operative development of the European Security Defense Policy.  
                                                 
26 Sven Biscop, “Able and Willing? Assessing the EU’s capacity for military action”, European Foreign Affairs 
Review 9 (2004): 509-527, 512 
27  Biscop, 512 
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The project of developing an independent European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 
was officially launched by the 1999 Cologne European Council, which agreed to embark on a 
Common Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) within the overall framework of the CFSP.  The 
aim of ESDP was and still is to complete and thus strengthen the EU's external ability to act 
through the development of civilian and military capabilities for international conflict prevention 
and crisis management28.  With the 1998 St Malo Initiative, France and Great Britain developed 
"the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces in order to respond to 
international crises.29"  There was a stated desire for the EU to make decisions and approve 
military action where NATO as a whole was not engaged.  The two governments also agreed to 
develop within the EU institutional framework the ability to deploy a European Rapid Reaction 
Force within sixty days (up to 50,000- 60,000 men).  The German government, which occupied the 
rotating six-month presidency of the EU in the first half of 1999, welcomed the French-British 
declaration and quickly placed the strengthening of a common security and defense policy at the 
top of its EU agenda. 30   
  At the Cologne Summit on 3 June 1999, European leaders agreed on a common defense 
strategy.  Their stated desire to incorporate the dormant WEU into the EU by the end of the year 
2000 was effectively achieved by the Marseilles Declaration of November 2000.  The Finnish 
presidency included the St Malo initiative in the Headline Goal (HG) agreed at the Helsinki 
European Council (December 1999).  The Headline Goal aimed to make available to the EU 
necessary capabilities, including the necessary command and control, intelligence, logistics and air 
and naval assets, to enable the deployment of 60,000 troops within 60 days and for a sustainable 
                                                 
28  Euractiv.com “EU Security and Defence Policy”, Policy Summary,  last modified January 5, 2006 
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-117486-16&type=LinksDossier  
29 Franco-British Summit, Joint Declaration on European Defense, (St Malo: December 4, 1998) 
30 Constantine Pagedas (2001) “Post-Ismay Europe: Britain and the Rebalance of European Security”, 
Mediterranean Quarterly, (12-4, 2001), 8  
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year.  Given the need to rotate forces the HG would require a pool of some 180,000, allowing for 
forces on standby and standing down equal to the force deployed. As defined in the Capabilities 
Development Mechanism (CDM), follow-up of the Headline Goal is ensured by a working group 
of experts, the Headline Goal Task Force (HTF), with the support of the EU Military Staff 
(EUMS)31.  
The Treaty of Nice (2000) made the St Malo Initiative a reality, creating the Rapid 
Reaction Force.   Some Treaty amendments truly reflected the operative development of the ESDP 
as an independent EU project.  One could argue that France and Britain were true engines of 
Defense integration despite their different visions on the role of NATO. However, in the midst of 
the Iraqi crisis, the traditional Franco-British axis was strained. Instead of stopping European 
defense integration, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg took the lead to launch plans for 
a EU planning capability, also known as the Tervuren initiative32.  But because of its timing, and 
the strains in EU-US relations over the war in Iraq, the so-called Tervuren initiative was seen in 
London as a deliberate snub to Prime Minister Tony Blair.  German officials at the time said Mr. 
Blair dropped his earlier reluctance to the initiative in exchange for assurances that the club would 
remain open to other EU members at all times.  At a summit held in Berlin in September 2003 to 
mend fences, the three major powers confirmed their attachment to common initiatives.  An 
internal document approved by Britain, France and Germany said: “The European Union should be 
endowed with a joint capacity to plan and conduct operations without recourse to NATO resources 
and capabilities.  Our goal remains to achieve such a planning and implementation capacity either 
in consensus with the 25 (member states) but also in a circle of interested partners.”  About a year 
                                                 
31 European Council, “Helsinki European Council Summit: Presidency Conclusions”, Helsinki, Finland: 
December 10-11, 1999 
32 Benoit Bertrand et al.. “Blair backs EU plans for joint defense project”, The Financial Times,  September 22, 
2003  
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later, EU defense ministers agreed in November 2004 to establish thirteen so-called battle groups 
that would be deployable rapidly for crisis management around the world outside the NATO 
framework at the request of the United Nations.  The groups, each 1,500-strong (one battalion plus 
supporting units) can be deployed within ten days of the decision to launch an operation and are 
sustainable for 120 days until the termination of the operation or until relief by another, longer-
term force, deployed by the EU, the UN or regional organization such as the African Union. By 
2007, between seven and nine battle groups, either national or multinational, were to be made 
available, adding 10,500 to 13,500 rapidly deployable combat troops for high-intensity operations 
of the Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC).33  
The evolution of ESDP did not betray its original purpose, which was to provide military 
and civilian assets for international conflict prevention and crisis management. Since the EU 
sought to promote non-violent settlement of conflicts, alongside the military capabilities, the EU 
aimed to emphasize the development of civilian capabilities which focus on the four priority areas 
(police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection capacities) adopted at the June 
2000 Feira European Council.  US decision-makers always felt reluctant to see the ESDP expand 
though ESDP seeks to strengthen and consolidate the EU's alliance with the US and Canada within 
the framework of NATO, and also by complying with the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations. ESDP's purpose was not to replace but to complement NATO.  Member States armed 
forces remain under the control of their national commanders and will only be led by a military 
supreme commander for the duration of any EU mission.  
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Biscop, 517 
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2.1.2 Role and attributes of the EU institutions in the CFSP 
The EU's efforts to assume a political role have been handicapped by awkward 
institutional arrangements, designed to separate the CFSP from the usual EU decision-
making process with its greater limits on state sovereignty. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty 
addressed most of the institutional challenges and some decision-making unbalances. But 
whether it was before or after Lisbon,   the EU has multiple institutions to deal with foreign 
and defense policy. These institutional issues reflect the contradictions between the ambitions 
of EU member governments to play a larger international role and their reluctance to move 
beyond an intergovernmental framework in doing so.34  It resulted in a constant power 
struggle between the Commission and the Council, since Member States were (and still are in 
2010) the primary decision-makers despite a few responsibilities assigned to the 
Commission.  The CFSP was not like the Common Commercial Policy. Other forms of EU 
external action might rather be understood as being based on the ‘traditional Community 
method’. Trade policy, for instance, has been characterized by a considerable delegation of 
responsibilities to the Commission for developing and managing policies, instruments and 
agreements.35 The member states have not surrendered national sovereignty to supranational 
institutions for foreign and security policy, let alone defense policy in the EU.  Foreign and 
Security policy is neither an exclusive EU competence nor an area of mixed EU-member 
state competence. Foreign and security policy is one area where essential authority remains 
                                                 
34   Ann Deighton Ann  “The European Security and Defense Policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol.40, Number 4, (November 2002): 719-741, 730 
35 Paul Jonas “EU Foreign Policy After Lisbon: Will the New High Representative and the 
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with EU governments, although the European Commission and, to a lesser extent the 
European Parliament, are associated with the process.36  
The Commission since Maastricht has been ‘fully associated with the work carried 
out in the common foreign and security policy field’ (article 27 Treaty of the European 
Union) through its right of policy initiative (though not exclusive as it is in ‘core’ EU 
competencies in the then ‘first’ pillar), its budgetary powers and by representing the EU 
through a network of delegations. The Commission was still responsible for a big part of 
external relations: it had sole responsibility for Community actions in the areas of 
humanitarian, development assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction and sanctions 
regulations.   
Over the years, the Commission increased through informal and institutional measures its 
autonomy vis-à-vis the Council.  For instance, the Commissioners entrusted with foreign affairs 
have always tried to coordinate and focus their efforts.  The Council of Ministers meetings have 
been attended at least by six RELEX Commissioners (from the French Relations Extérieures).  The 
Commission has been participating in meetings at the working levels of the Council (COREPER 
and working parties).  On the international stage, the establishment of Independent General 
Directions, for instance, allowed the Commission to benefit from network of 150 embassies 
worldwide.  The creation of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism in February 2001 was another measure 
that allowed the European Commission to dispatch community funds rapidly in case of an 
emergency.  The creation of the RRM was a response to the new EWU development in crisis 
management, such as the Situation Center, within the Council. 
                                                 
36 European Commission. “Speaking with one voice: Overview”, http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm 
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 Before Lisbon, the European Parliament only had a consultative role on the 
developments of the CFSP. The European Parliament could ask questions to the Council and 
make recommendations to it.37 Through its Committee on Foreign Affairs, the European 
Parliament had regular contact with the EU’s High Representative for the CFSP, regarding 
member accession, international agreements with non-member countries.38 The main area of 
interest for the Parliament remained the human rights issue and that, often put the Parliament in 
conflict with the European Council. The Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs directly 
addressed the human rights issue outside the Union through annual reports on each of these 
countries and monthly meetings during which breaches on human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law were discussed and could eventually be followed by a resolution condemning 
governments in case of breaches. 
 Before Lisbon, the key role went to the European Council (which is actually still the 
case after Lisbon).  Member states had set up an elaborate system at the EU level in an 
intergovernmental pillar of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) to coordinate their 
policies more closely and to attempt to devise common strategies, reach common positions, 
and take joint actions on a wide range of issues.39  The Council was presided over for a 
period of six months by each member state in turn, in accordance with a pre-established 
rotation.  The Presidency was assisted by the Council Secretariat and the Secretary-
General/High Representative.  The High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana at the time, 
had three job titles.  First, he was the Secretary General of the European Council;   secondly, 
                                                 
37Shulz Stefan “Foreign Policy: Aims, Instruments and Achievements”, European Parliament, Fact Sheets on 
the European Union., July 2008 
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38 Shulz, “Foreign Policy”, 1 
39 Dinan  Desmond, Ever closer Union: an introduction to European Integration, (Lynne Rienner Publishers: 
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he was the Secretary General of the Western European Union, which is the quasi defense arm 
of the European Union.  And thirdly, he was the High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy.  He essentially had to deal with the political and military aspects 
of ESDP.  In other words, he had to integrate as much of the Western European Union into 
the EU as is possible, set up the structures, and make sure the member states are meeting 
their targets on capabilities. 
The Council of Foreign Ministers, also known as the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC) was the main decision-maker. It would meet monthly to discuss 
foreign policy and institutional issues and would define and implement the EU's Common 
Foreign and Security Policy on the basis of guidelines set by the European Council. The 
Council's formal positions were published as "conclusions" or "statements" of the Council. 
Declarations were also issued by the Presidency and the High Representative. Since the late 
1990s, EU defense ministers also got  somewhat involved. Although there was no formal 
Defense Council as such, at least one informal meeting of defense ministers is held during 
each presidency and defense ministers attend one session of the External Relations Council 
devoted to politico-military issues.  
The Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) and the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC) prepared the work of the Council, with COREPER preparing the 
work of the Council as a whole and the PSC dealing with political and security issues. 
Working parties dealing with CFSP, composed of experts from EU Member States and the 
Commission, met along geographical lines (covering, for example, Asia) and thematic lines 
(covering, for example, human rights) prepared PSC and COREPER meetings. They made 
joint analyses of the situation in third countries and of multilateral issues and they drafted 
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possible common positions. They drew up proposals for measures to implement the CFSP, 
such as declarations by the presidency on behalf of the EU, for approval by the PSC and then 
by the Council. They also formulated recommendations to the PSC for future initiatives in 
the field of the CFSP.40 
 In terms of decision-making, decisions before the Lisbon Treaty were taken 
unanimously except in the implementation of some joint actions.  Until 1997, each Member 
State had a veto right over the formulation of a common position.  The 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty sought to resolve that problem with the introduction of the concept of "constructive 
abstention."  Henceforth, a member state that did not like a proposal could abstain and not be 
obliged to apply the resulting decision.  But the abstaining government had to accept that the 
decision committed the Union and must refrain from doing anything that would conflict with 
the EU action.41  The unanimity requirement was criticized for limiting the field of action of 
the EU. In addition, other than in Pillar I policies, member states are fairly free to decide 
whether they want to use the EU at all for pursuing certain policies in the area of CFSP42, or 
whether they prefer to go ahead alone or in case-specific coalition which happened in the 
case of the embargo. One of the recurrent criticisms against the CFSP has been the lack of 
enforcement compared to first pillar policies: namely, the European Court of Justice’s 
jurisdiction is excluded from the area of CFSP43.  
 The institutional arrangement before Lisbon also suffered from some inconsistencies. 
Decision-making power and implementing capacity did not for instance match. CFSP is 
                                                 
40 Council of the European Union. “Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP – 
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decided by the Council and implemented by the Council presidency and the High 
Representative. However, the Council Secretariat which is the supporting structure of the 
Council, primary decisions-maker for CFSP, lacked manpower (roughly 400 and two offices 
abroad), technical and financial resources. Paradoxically, the Commission, a secondary 
decision-maker for CFSP matters, disposed of 2260 staff in the RELEX office in Brussels 
and 4755 personnel in its 123 delegations abroad. Indeed, it often fell to the Commission to 
implement parts of CFSP decisions; it also played a key role in long-term conflict prevention,  
an important concern of CFSP44. 
Naturally, the Commission wanted to see its prerogatives expand.  Following the German 
reunification, EU member states recognized the link between European Monetary Union, CFSP 
and Political Union.  Twenty years later, the link between those three did not necessarily lead to 
deeper integration. Euroskeptiks and intergovernmentalists argued that foreign policy must remain 
a matter for national governments. They refused to see some responsibility over foreign policy 
given to the European Commission and European Parliament.  This school of thought championed 
reinforcing the Council to give the EU more legitimacy, because elected member states politicians 
would take decisions. 45 The big member states traditionally resisted the Commission's ambitious 
demands for wider powers at the expense of the Council.  But smaller countries despised any 
proposal that appeared to challenge the power of the Commission and saw it as an attempt to 
undermine the body that protected their interests.  However, the perception that the Commission 
was a secondary decision maker in foreign policy was, as we proved earlier, entirely wrong.  The 
Commission was for instance highly involved in the conduct of EU’s trade related external 
relations.  The heart of the problem with the multi-faceted profile of EU’s foreign policy was that 
                                                 
44  Jonas, 11 
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the Commission had never been invested with a similar central role in the CFSP 46.  The 
Commission fought for a long time against its weak role in the CFSP, but lost all major 
engagements.   
But there is a constant feeling that the Commission might be left out and ignored by the 
Council.  The External Relations Directorate General – that coordinates all aspects of the Union’s 
policy towards a country to make sure it does not encroach upon Commission responsibilities47- 
under Commissioner Christopher Patten was not a DG trying to push for more Commission 
visibility in the field of CFSP but rather was a DG trying to protect the competencies acquired in 
the past and to deliver efficient and effective policies.  The Commission was extremely sensitive 
concerning any potential loss of competency in external relations.  However, in some cases, the 
Commission has been proactive and crises had been solved under its leadership.  For instance, the 
signature of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the Commission and the 
FYROM was a strong incentive that the High Representative Solana used to pressure the two 
parties to reach a deal48.  Indeed the SAA gives the FYROM the status of a potential candidate, 
thus opening up the possibility of future accession to the EU.  
The issue of representation prevented greater coherence of the CFSP but was addressed by 
the Lisbon Treaty. Externally, the EU often sent three representatives to international meetings, 
one from the Presidency, one from the Commission (either its President or the External Relations 
Commissioner) and the High Representative:  Secretary Kissinger always wondered whom to call 
when a European foreign policy needed to be discussed.  Internally and externally, it appeared 
that there was no clear political leadership - no single individual able to drive change and act as a 
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figurehead for the EU’s citizens.  The External Affairs Commissioner concentrated very much on 
financial and economic assistance, including trade.  Christopher Patten, former External 
Commissioner called himself the “quartermaster of the European Union” and the High 
Representative was a kind of general.49  The former President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, 
proposed taking some of the initiative in foreign policy away from member states, by placing the 
EU high representative in foreign affairs within the Commission.  The High Representative, not 
the states, would formulate policy, although EU leaders would decide to adopt it or amend it.  
Britain and France did not want a foreign minister drawn too closely to the Commission, and 
away from the control of member states.50  
 The 2009 Lisbon Treaty addressed most of inconsistencies of the CFSP mechanisms 
and might impact EU sanction policy in the near future. The new treaty formally abolished 
the pillar structure, merged all general treaty provisions on external relations into one title 
and provided the EU with a single and express legal personality51. A single legal personality 
should reinforce the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the EU on the world scene. 
Henceforth, all external action, be it CFSP, trade or development, will be governed by the 
same general principles and objective, which again could have an impact on issues such as 
embargoes. 52 The decision-making will however follow the “traditional”  EU decision-
making patterns: the Council will act by qualified majority with respect to agreements on 
most ‘Community’ matters, but by unanimity in CFSP affairs.53 The European Parliament 
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will be granted full co-decision rights and the Commission will lose its power of initiative in 
non-CFSP matters. 
The representation is the major innovation introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and 
should bring much more consistency and cohesion to the EU foreign policy. To remedy the 
challenge of the brevity of the rotating Presidency, the Lisbon Treaty established the office of 
a permanent president of the European Council, appointed for two and a half years and 
replacing the rotating presidency at the level of the European Council.  The President tasks 
include the chairing and preparation of European Council meetings and their follow-up.  
The creation of the office of the European Union's High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy combines the responsibilities of the CFSP High Representative 
and the EU Commissioner for External Relations. The High Representative, currently 
Baroness Catherine Ashton, is also the Vice-President of the Commission54The High 
Representative will act as the Union’s single foreign policy chief, share agenda-setting 
capacities with member states (the Commission loses its right to initiative for CFSP matters) 
This ‘double-hatted’ nature is the groundbreaking feature of the position. It is a bridge 
between former first and second pillar policies. With the ‘Council hat’, the High 
Representative chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and conduct the Union’s foreign and 
security policy as mandated by the Council. With the ‘Commission hat’, the High 
Representative exercises the Commission’s responsibilities in “external relations” and 
coordinate “other aspects of the Union’s external action” such as development or trade 
policy. The High Representative will be appointed by the European Council, acting by 
qualified majority. The Commission President has to give his consent to the nomination. In 
addition, the high representative will be subject to the European Parliament’s vote of 
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approval. His term of office (normally five years) may be ended by the European Council, 
again acting by qualified majority. The Commission president may also request the high 
representative to resign. This request, however, has to be confirmed by a qualified majority 
in the European Council. Finally, the European Parliament can dismiss the Commission as a 
college, (de facto) including the high representative.55  
The presence of the Union on the ground will now be reinforced: the Commission 
delegations became Union delegations and now carry a heavier workload, talking over some 
of the tasks previously handled by the rotating Presidencies.  The Foreign Minister, currently 
Baroness Catherine Ashton will also have at her disposal a corps of Diplomats, called the 
European External Action Service, a team composed of officials from the Council the 
Commission and the Member States, to provide back-up and support to the High 
Representative, in conjunction with the diplomatic services of the Member States, in the 
implementation of the CFSP56. 
Finally in the field of defense, The Lisbon extends crisis management tasks to areas such as 
disarmament and counterterrorism. A mutual assistance and a solidarity clause will be introduced 
into the EU treaties, the former relating to armed aggression, the latter to terrorist attacks and 
natural or man-made disasters.54 Furthermore, the treaties will provide for the first time for 
differentiation in the field of CSDP; notably by allowing that the execution of CSDP tasks may be 
entrusted to a group of member states (acting in association with the high representative), and by 
enabling a group of countries to enter into a ‘permanent structured cooperation’. The Lisbon treaty 
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will also create the express legal bases for the (already existing) European Defence Agency and a 
start-up fund for CSDP operations. 
We just reviewed the institutional set-up of CFSP, ESDP.  “Unless a beautiful butterfly, 
the CFSP/ESDP is cumbersome and colorless and has great difficulty getting off the ground”, 
summed up Dinan57.  Given the divergence of member states’ foreign and security policy interests 
and orientations and the weakness of CFSP instruments and mechanisms, the CFSP at the time of 
our study cannot be as formidable as its name implies. The case of the arms embargo illustrates 
this tension between supranational institutions and individual member states.   
 
2.1 Sanctions 
Our study analyzes the influences the Big Member States on sanction policy and reviews 
various arguments about the impact of sanctions on a country, in this case, China. We need to 
define sanctions, review the sanction literature and the EU record of its sanction policy 
Sanctions are an instrument of a diplomatic or economic nature which seek to bring 
about a change in activities or policies such as violations of international law or human rights, or 
policies that do not respect the rule of law or democratic principles.58 Sanctions usually target the 
perpetrators of human rights abuses, who may be individuals, non-state actors, government elites 
or the military59. Analysts continue to ask: “Do sanctions work?” Much has been made of the 
failure of sanctions to deter late Iraqi President Saddam’s efforts to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction and the devastating effects of those sanctions on the civilian population. On the other 
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hand, it is commonly accepted that economic sanctions contributed to bring down the South 
African apartheid regime and weakened Milosevic’s Serbia60. Proponents of economic sanctions 
argue that sanctions can be as effective as military force and are more humane and that they are 
often an efficient instrument for achieving an important goal.61   
               However, there has never been a clear consensus on the effectiveness of sanctions in 
the literature. The first major wave of research on the topic in the sixties and seventies argued 
that sanctions were not as effective as military force. A new wave of scholarship in the eighties, 
based on the utility of economic pressure argued that sanctions had been underrated by policy-
makers and scholars due to infamous fiascoes, such as the US embargo on Cuba.  
The key evidence supporting such evidence was the study by Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey 
Schott, and Kimberly Elliott (HSE), reviewing 115 cases of sanctions between 1914 and 199062. 
The study reported success in 40 cases or 34%. Pape however, after reviewing the HSE database 
and theory argues that economic sanctions did not achieve any major foreign policy goals and 
that the HSE is flawed (since most of the case were solved by direct or indirect use of force or do 
not qualify as economic sanctions).63 The persistent failure of sanctions suggests that states’ 
reasons for employing them must lie somewhere else. Pape offers three hypotheses. First, 
economic sanctions should be most effective in disputes involving minor issues that do not affect 
the target country’s territory, security, wealth or the regime’s domestic security. Pape predicts, 
for instance, that an oil boycott of Libya would urge Colonel Qaddafi to surrender the men 
suspected of bombing Pan Am 103. Second, one might expect that economic sanctions would be 
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more effective agents target states whose trade is completely on the coercer. Regarding this 
hypothesis, the evidence is not strong, the only available evidence being Lesotho conceding to 
South Africa’s demands in 1983 and Nepal conceding to India’s demands in 1989.64Third, it is 
plausible that economic sanctions may be more effective against societies with extremely uneven 
income distributions than those with more income equality: that would explain the fall of the 
apartheid under the weight of sanctions and the strong resistance of Iraq to sanctions65. Pape 
argues that even if future research discovers under which conditions, economic sanctions can 
achieve foreign policy goals, sanctions might not be as liberal an alternative to military force as 
their advocates suggest. Economic sanctions often inflict significant human costs on the 
population of target states regardless of whether they ultimately succeed or fail (567,000 Iraqi 
children died due the UN embargo imposed on Iraq following the Gulf War while the war 
claimed a much smaller number of lives, 40,000)66.  
 Shen argues that international economic sanctions can be effective as long as four criteria 
are met: the legitimacy of sanctions through international law or moral standards, the effect of 
the sanctions on the senders, the degree of international participation, and the sanctions’ strength 
as a deterrent.67 Shen gives the example of the example of the sanctions against the apartheid in 
South Africa which fitted the ‘profile’. The Apartheid regime violated human dignity and 
equality; the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was the legal and the moral reference 
against such violations; a majority of countries boycotted the South African government which 
made the sanctions deterrent. 68 Shen gives a counter-example where all conditions were not met, 
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such as the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, which did not affect the military involvement 
of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.  
 Shen also reviews the evolving attitude of China regarding sanctions. The PRC does not 
generally support the concept, seeing it as an ‘unacceptable approach’ to resolving disputes. 
China believes that state sovereignty should not be violated in any shape or form. China did 
however adapt its position, reflecting its changed perspectives and interests. China denounced 
the abuses of the Apartheid regime based on human rights abuses and the fact that the anti-
apartheid movement was part of a larger independence and political liberation trend in Africa. 
China’s views on sanctions are also shaped by its experience of the EU and the US embargo 
following the events at Tiananmen Square. Given the involvement of foreign powers in its 
domestic affairs in the case of the embargo, China tends to find international sanctions 
objectionable. The PRC believes that sanctions render nations unequal and tend to suppress less 
developed countries. 69 
 To Hansen and Borchgrevink, the international support is the most important element to 
determine whether a sanction is going to be effective, as well as for McLean and Whang. 70  
McLean and Whang review the existing literature according to which without a sufficient level 
of international cooperation, the impact of economic sanctions will be limited and undermine the 
sanctioning state’s abilities to obtained concessions from the targeted state71. Elliott goes further 
by saying that globalization brings about a greater flexibility for the targeted state as it can use 
alternative sources and trade with others and that a sanctioning state should take into account the 
target’s ability to utilize these outside options. The sender might disregard these alternative 
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providers available to the target only when the latter significantly depends on the sender’s 
goods72. McLean et al. focus on the international cooperation for the target instead of the sender, 
and argue that increasing trade for the sanctioned countries an indicator of international 
cooperation73. The authors find that international support for economic sanctions is not the only 
factor that influences sanction effectiveness but also international assistance to the target. The 
sanctioner is considerably more likely to succeed in obtaining concessions from its target when 
the sanctioned country trading partners support the sanctioner’s coercive action and decrease 
trade exchanges with the target. In our case, it is particularly relevant since the PRC imported 
weapons from other countries besides the US and the EU member states. Hansen and 
Borchgrevink illustrate their argument with the case of Norway which suspended aid to Ethiopia 
during the 1998-2000 war with Eritrea without international coordination, the aid suspensions 
did not have impact on the course of the war and seemed primarily motivated by domestic 
constraints. At the time, Norway had been lobbying for a seat at the Security Council and wished 
to demonstrate its concern for peace-building in Africa.74 The authors however show that other 
countries based their domestic factors explained policy choices towards Ethiopia based on 
domestic constraints: Germany cut its aid budget to Ethiopia against the advice of the German 
diplomats posted in Addis Ababa. They conclude by stating that the fact that countries make 
decisions largely for internal reasons shows that they have a few incentives for consulting with 
other countries and coordinating their decisions. This means that coordination is less likely, even 
though it is a necessary condition to make a sanction effective.75 
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Baldwin offers an alternative explanation, arguing that the premises of the debate on 
sanction policies are false. Scholars and policy-makers need to clearly separate the question of 
whether sanctions are likely to work from that of whether sanctions should be used76. Answering 
one does not automatically provide an answer to the other. Second, the importance of costs must 
be acknowledged. Regardless of whether one is trying to determine the absolute utility of sanctions 
or their utility in comparison with alternative policy options, costs must be considered77. Third, the 
need for comparative evaluation of policy instruments must be acknowledged. The wisdom of 
using economic sanctions cannot be determined by studying the costs and benefits of sanctions in 
isolation from the costs and benefits of alternative techniques of statecraft such as military and 
diplomacy. Fourth, the complexity of ‘success must be acknowledged: both literature on economic 
sanctions and military statecraft cannot use simplistic definitions of success that imply zero-sum 
games’78. In the context of German-Soviet relations, Newnham demonstrates that states can use 
economic power to gain political and security advantages in international relations, and to support 
arguments in favor of positive sanctions or “linkage.” Newnham argues persuasively that positive 
sanctions succeed more often than negative sanctions because they are psychologically easier for 
the target state to accept, they have positive spillover effects on other aspects of the two states' 
relationship, they have a positive impact on groups within the target state, winning allies for the 
initiating state, and they offer little economic incentive for outsiders to work to break the 
sanctions.79  
Moore and Early in two different pieces explain the behavior of ‘busting sanctions’ 
states, or in other words, why some state would ignore a sanction on another country by continuing 
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to trade80. Moore specifically looks into the application of arms embargoes. The use of embargoes 
has increased from two in 1990 to eleven by the end of 2006, despite fewer arms conflicts.81 The 
study of arms embargoes focuses on the behavior of the embargoed state and whether the weapons 
get through. Studies regarding the impact of the embargo on the sanctioned state showed that the 
achievement of policy goals was limited.82 The increasing use of arms embargoes as a policy 
makes the understanding of the motivations of the senders an important contribution to the 
literature, and the scholarship on sanctions busters and their motivations has been 
underdeveloped83. Embargoes provide test cases of collective action problems and an opportunity 
to understand the causes of collective failure at the international level. Moore argues that states 
breach embargoes due to the benefits of arms exports and to advance their strategic interests. 
Embargoes create an incentive for violations by increasing the utility of an arms transfer from an 
exporting state.84 Moore shows that, first, exporters use arms as a form of influence to garner 
future concessions from the buyer and that, second, import dependence can be an indicator of 
similar political interests and political alignment. The current focus on the utility of arms 
embargoes as a tool of the international community to change the behavior of sanctioned countries 
ignore the benefits incurred by the exporting country.  Early develops a measure to identify 
sanctions-busting behavior for a dataset covering 77 sanctions cases from 1950 to 1990 using 
liberal and realist explanations. Early uses the simple definition of an economic sanction by Askari 
et al. as “a restriction placed by a sender on commercial activities with the intent to inflict 
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economic losses on others.” 85 This definition focuses on economic sanctions as a coercive policy 
tool used by a country against another, but the tool is not necessarily tied to the type of policy 
changes being sought.86 Early finds that the liberal theory provides a better account of sanctions-
busting, assuming that if the opportunity to sanction-bust arises, states would uniformly seek to 
exploit it. Early also finds that a sender state’s closest allies are more likely to breach sanctions 
than its rivals. Finally, Early identified some predictors of sanction-busting among third parties and 
over which the senders have little control: the third party’s GDP, trade openness and strong pre-
existing commercial relationship with the sanctioned state.87 
Although there had not been an official EU sanction strategy till 2004, the EU has been 
implementing them since 198288. Little attention has been given to EU sanctions in the literature 
and in those studies it is argued that ‘if there is any European sanctions policy, it would be a 
preference to use positive rather than negative measures, or carrots over sticks’89. There is no 
common agreement among researchers about the appropriate date of when to begin studying EU 
sanctioning policies, based on the legal and institutional developments of the EU: 1957 (Ginsberg 
1989, 2001), 1970 (Nutall 1997), 1987 (Kalbermatter 1999, Hazelzet 2001) or 1992 (Anthony 
1991, Edwards and Nutall 1994, de Vries and Hzelzet 2005). The early proponents support their 
argument based on Article 57 in the Treaty of Rome stating that ‘any member state may take such 
measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security, which 
are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material…’90 The EU 
does not like using the term ‘sanction’ and prefers the concept of “Restrictive Measures’ due to an 
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EU culture that focuses on incentives and multilateral approaches.91 Sanctions have certainly been 
frequently imposed, either on an autonomous EU basis or implementing binding Resolutions of the 
Security Council of the United Nations. The EU presented an official document on the use of 
sanctions in June 2004 entitled: “Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures” established 
an approach to sanctions as a useful foreign policy instrument, emphasizing their ability to 
maintain and restore peace and security in accordance to the principles of the UN Charter and the 
CFSP.   It revolves around three principles: respect for international law (including the UN 
Charter), the physical security of EU territory (including promoting peace and international 
cooperation, and norms and values, such as democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Those same three themes are the guiding principles of the ESDP, enunciated in the European 
Security Strategy.92 The Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures93 argue that the 
primary sanctioning actor is the UN, but that the EU is also willing to employ sanctions, preferably 
with broad international support. In the advent of EU sanctions, these should be considered part of 
a more comprehensive policy ‘including political dialogue, incentives, conditionality, and could 
even involve, as a last resort, the use of coercive measures”94.  
Since the mid 1990s, the EU made an effort to sanction in a ‘smarter’ way, targeting key 
actors to avoid effects on the civilian population. Smart sanctions include arms embargoes, travel 
bans and financial freezes, as well as prohibitions on trade in lucrative natural resources (timber, 
diamonds and oil is)95. Restrictions of admission have consisted of refusing individuals or groups, 
the right to enter the Union. The implementation depends on the immigration authorities of the 
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member states. Diplomatic sanctions, sporting and cultural boycotts, and suspension of 
cooperation are largely symbolic measures traditionally employed by states to signal disapproval 
of other actor’s behavior. There are very few examples of such. As mentioned earlier, the EU has 
managed to create approaches combining carrot and stick techniques through the programmatic 
use of suspending cooperation with third countries, such as in the conditionality clauses in trade 
arrangements96.  
The legal basis for EU sanctions depends on the exact nature and scope of the restrictive. 
Where Community action is required, a Common Position, defining the approach of the EU to a 
particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature must be adopted under Article 15 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Union. As an instrument of the CFSP, the adoption of a new 
Common Position requires unanimity from EU Member States in Council. If the Common Position 
provides for the reduction or interruption of economic relations with a third country, i.e. introduces 
economic and financial sanctions, implementation at Community level is governed by Article 301. 
Once it is adopted, the Member States must ensure that their national policies conform to the 
approach that has been established97.  
 In practice, it includes both embargoes on EU products and a ban on the import of 
products from the targeted country. Furthermore, the EU can restrict diplomatic contacts and 
instigate restrictions on the admission of individuals in EU territory. Once it is adopted, the 
Member States must ensure that their national policies conform to the approach that has been 
established.98. In these cases, the Commission is required to make a proposal for a Council 
Regulation, which the Council can adopt by a qualified majority:99 The Commission is then 
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responsible for the implementation, since a sanction consists of a restriction on the common 
market where restrictive measures target persons, groups and entities which are not directly linked 
to the regime of a third country. However, when it comes to national security, Article 57 (currently 
Article 296) in the 1957 Treaty of Rome includes several restrictions on EU authority, including its 
legal ability to impose arms embargoes. A consequence of this is that the implementation of all 
arms embargoes is the responsibility of the individual member states.100 Although trade in 
manufactured goods falls under exclusive Community competence, issues regarding the member 
states’ national security have been excluded from the common regulations. In this case, adoption 
of the Regulation by the Council requires unanimity and prior consultation of the European 
Parliament. Such is the case with arms embargoes. It is, therefore, common practice that arms 
embargoes are imposed by a Common Position and enforced on the basis of export control 
legislation of Member States (although the prohibitions on providing related financial or technical 
assistance are implemented through a Regulation). The Presidency or one of the Member States, 
usually assisted by the Council Secretariat, or the Commission, first prepares a proposal for a 
Common Position. This proposal is examined and discussed by the relevant Council groups, 
typically, the Council group responsible for relations with the third country concerned and, in all 
cases, the Foreign Relations Counselors Working Group (RELEX) and the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which refers the Common Position proposal to Council 
for adoption. Following the adoption of the Common Position by Council, the text is published in 
the Official Journal of the European Union.101 Recent Common Positions related to particular arms 
embargoes have given more precise guidelines to the Member States on how the embargo should 
be implemented. The language used in recent Common Positions has made clear that restrictions 
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not only apply to physical items but also services of different kinds (such as technical training or 
assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items on the list).  
The specific issue with arms embargoes becomes the reliability of individual states, and 
both the UN and the EU have had problems in ensuring compliance of their member states with 
embargoes102. The forms of domestic measures to implement embargoes vary greatly from state to 
state. These measures can include primary legislation (Acts and Statutes), secondary or 
subordinate legislation (regulations), as well as administrative orders, decrees, government orders 
or rules103and depend upon whether the state’s legal system is common law (Act), as in the United 
Kingdom (UK), or civil law, as in France and the Netherlands. EU member states refer to the 1996 
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies for guidance on which equipment should be controlled through export control lists. 
However the Wassenaar list is only a minimal common standard which can be interpreted 
differently in national lists of controlled exports. The 1998 EU Code of Conduct on arms exports 
remedies these approximations and constitutes a modern version of the Common Criteria for arms 
exports adapted in 1991 and 1992 and covers the  Common Military List of the European Union. 
The Code applies criteria against which member states must evaluate applications for export 
licenses by would be purchasers and outlines reporting procedures and mechanisms for 
intergovernmental denial notification and consultation. The evaluation of licenses takes into 
account respect for human rights in the applicant country and threats to peace by it.104 The EU 
reviews the performance by its member states against the Code’s criteria on an annual basis, and, 
quite comprehensively, public reports on the granting of export licenses to any country for military 
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related technologies are made annually both by the EU and member states.105 The Code was 
revised on the eve of enlarging to ten members and is regularly revised. In addition to the Review 
Process, the Conventional Arms Exports Working group (COARM) took additional decisions and 
made the EU member states agree that they will ‘fully apply the Code of Conduct to license 
applications where it is understood that the goods are to be incorporated into products for re-
exports’.  
Institutionally, the RELEX sanctions formation is in charge of monitoring and evaluating 
the technical implementation of arms embargoes and sanctions in general. The RELEX sanctions 
formation is a type of sub-committee where delegations discuss and compare sanctions of all 
kinds. In comparison, the Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM) is where 
delegations endeavor to harmonize their arms export policies on the basis of the 2000 EU Code of 
Conduct.106 The RELEX group provides the following on a regular basis: first, exchange of 
Information and experience between member states and with international organizations and third 
countries relating to the application of sanctions, breaches of sanctions and international sanctions; 
second, the evaluation of results and difficulties encountered in implementing sanctions, and third, 
development of good practice. In general, the RELEX group addresses horizontal issues (legal, 
administrative and so on) linked to the preparation and implementation of the decisions of the 
Council. 107 The RELEX group specifically monitors activities in ancillary services, which include 
financial freezes; bans on technical assistance related to arms; bans on finances for the acquisition 
of arms; denials of export credit; and bans on equipment that could be used for internal repression. 
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Unlike politically binding Common Positions that establish arms embargoes, legally binding 
Regulations establish the prohibition of ancillary services. 
Regarding the China case, the arms embargo does not have a solid basis in EU law. As I 
said earlier, the embargo was declared before the creation for the CFSP. There has not been any 
decision to reform to revise the form of the embargo after 1989, and the form remains vague, 
unlike other embargoes decided post-1989 with strict guidelines and explicit Common Positions. It 
could be argued that there is no one arms embargo on China but a series of domestic arms 
embargo.  In 1995 for instance, the United Kingdom government made clear that the embargo 
applied to weapons, and equipment which could be used for internal repression, license 
applications to export other defense articles and services as well as dual-use goods and 
technologies intended for military applications have been considered on a case-by-case basis in the 
light of the criteria that govern all defense exports. Under this policy, the UK export control 
authorities have approved exports of equipment with military applications—such as the 
Searchwater radar—to China. In the same fashion, in 1997, the then French minister for Defense, 
Charles Millon, observed that the embargo on equipment sales did not mean that no forms of 
military cooperation with China were possible. Under the policy adopted by France, it has been 
possible to export, for example, the AS-365N Dauphin-2 helicopter after the 1989 Declaration. 
The absence of a clear basis in EU law has created implementation and enforcement difficulties for 
a number of the countries that joined the EU in the latest round of enlargement. Several faced the 
possibility that exporters could question the basis for state decisions to deny export licenses to 
China. If faced with such questions, state authorities would not be able to make reference to any 
EU legislation or decision in explaining license denial.108  
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2.2      Security 
The issue of the arms embargo brings up conflicting and complementary visions of 
security within the EU, outside the EU, in terms of the transatlantic relationship, the role of 
China and the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. 
The subject of security has been at the heart of the study of international relations for the 
past fifty years. Its political significance has been enormous during this period Security is a term 
widely used in both the analysis and the practice of international relations. Issues such as war and 
peace, the balance of power, arms race, arms control, and disarmament have been at the heart of 
the discipline of international relations. The beginning of a debate about security and perhaps its 
emergence as a contested concept are developments that only occurred in the early 1980s109. 
“National security” signifies protection of the state’s people and territories against physical assault 
and in that narrow sense is equivalent to the term defense.  But “national security” also implies 
protection, through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which 
could threaten the fundamental values and vitality of the state110. Since power is widely distributed 
among the world’s many actors and is of limited projectability, none of the participants is entirely 
sufficient; none is perfectly capable of fully satisfying its perceived security needs111.  Therefore at 
one time or another, all have found it necessary to resort to one of several devices or approaches to 
compensate for state inadequacies.  States then use collective security (League of Nations, UN), 
alliances and coalitions and international law at one time or another, sometimes simultaneously, to 
meet their perceived security needs or as means to advance domestic goals.  Each approach can 
count both successes and failures in avoiding armed conflict.  
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New thinking on security confirms the influence of different spheres.  The Copenhagen 
School of international relations goes beyond the traditional state-centric focused definition in 
attempts (e.g.) to integrate economic, social and environmental threats, along with the political 
one112.  This school of thought moves down to the level of individual or human security, and then 
up in the other direction to the level of international or global security.  Another school of thought 
has remained within a state-centric approach, but deployed diverse terms as modifiers to security 
in order to assess different forms of inter-state security co-operation.  According to Karuse, 
however, these different approaches seem to confuse ‘problems’ and ‘threats’.  To the social 
scientist, the concept of security is an essentially contested one with multiple meanings and 
methodological, ontological, and epistemological underpinnings.  The concept of security is linked 
to the concept of identity.  To Ernest Gellener, identity is a multi-faceted phenomenon derived 
essentially from a Western conception of civilization.  Identity is a ‘more or less fluid, more or less 
constraining resource through which actors identify themselves, with its fluidity or constraints 
depending on the facts of history and societal opinions’.  New identities emerge as potential rivals 
to the state generated outside its control, thus changing the nature of security in a wholly new 
context of political behavior113.  
Comparative defense or national security policy cuts across such traditional divisions as 
international politics and economics and comparative and economic systems114. The first studies in 
the field were done in the early seventies by scholars such as Horton, Warner and Rogerson115. In 
1975 and 1987, Baileys and others published comparative essays that examined the defense 
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policies of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom and France116. A 
related enterprise has been the study of comparative military-political sociology117. Some scholarly 
journals deal with comparative defense studies such as Armed Forces and Society, International 
Security, Defense Analysis and Comparative Strategy. Finally, credit must be given to works 
produced primarily in the 1950s and 1960s that examine military elites, particularly in the Third 
World, where they have been seen as agents of modernization and political development, but by 
others as obstacles to democracy. Murray builds upon these early studies to develop a 
methodology to study it118. Several approaches to comparative defense studies can be taken. One is 
to select recurring issues such as military doctrine, force posture, the decision-making process, and 
weapons acquisition and then to compare and contrast how different countries deal with these 
issues. An alternative approach is to focus upon the budget119. Murray and Viotti chose a country-
study approach on defense policy. This is a useful framework for the study at hand, where a 
country or an organizational approach for its foreign / defense policy on China is analyzed. Murray 
looks at four different parts: (1) the international environment as it is perceived by the state, (2) the 
particular state objectives, strategy and military force employment doctrine of that state. (3) The 
state’s defense policy-making process: and (4) various recurring issues-force posture, the use of 
force, weapons acquisition, arms-control and civil-military relations.  
The European Security arrangements have undergone a period of rapid transition since 
1989.  The demise of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the movement towards a 
common foreign policy in the EU, and the triumph of western liberal democratic values have been 
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much commented upon on both sides of the Atlantic120.  Pagedas121 argues that between 1991 and 
2000, Europe witnessed not only the end of the Soviet threat to Europe and its replacement by 
lower level, less intensive crises in the Balkans but also the sharp reduction of U.S. forces in 
Europe and Washington's reluctance to engage in European affairs militarily. But many of the 
certainties characterizing the Cold War were based on fragile underpinnings.  There were tensions 
on both sides.  On the Soviet side, Eastern European countries’ economies demanded lots of 
attention from the Kremlin.  On the Western side, there were tensions between Atlanticism and 
Europeanism and how the United States related to the Wet Europeans and vice and versa.  All of 
those scars impact the current state of European security.  Bipolarity has now given way to 
multipolarity and the fragmentation of the Eastern bloc has presented new problems for the EU.  
The EU’s foreign policy project is unsettled in the sense that it lacks definitive goals. 
 The need to counterbalance an economic power with a political one is the main argument 
put forward by the proponents of a truly European common foreign, security and eventually 
defense policy.  The European Union has steadily grown as an actor in international affairs, but its 
power and influence are predominantly of soft security argues Fraser122.  ‘Soft security’ is basically 
looking at security in its widest context, that is, trying to promote democracy and the rule of law, 
protect minorities, and sustain economic development.  The EU is by far the main provider of 
humanitarian assistance to the former republics of Yugoslavia and of economic aid to Russia, the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the Palestinians.  That has been the focus of EU 
external policy over the last several years. Fraser argues that the EU has to move on from soft 
security to take part in hard security.  That is at least partly a reflection of the fact that the EU is 
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much more credible as a commercial and economic power on the world stage than as a political 
player. There is a need for the EU to speak with a ‘single voice’.  It is in the Union’s interest to 
create strategic space for itself in a world in which US strategies and tactics begin to seem very 
different from those that have been cultivated within the Union over time.  An increasing disregard 
for European participation in strategic decisions that will affect Europe as well as the international 
system makes it harder to pursue European policies alongside the United States.  American policy 
and its own shifting perceptions of its interests123 could become a major strategic restraint on the 
success of the ESDP if the Europeans do not manage “to negotiate their way through the rapids” 
with skill and speed, and also with the courage of their convictions.  The 2003 European Union 
Security Doctrine124 was drawn up by Javier Solana following the Iraqi crisis to addresses the need 
for a more muscular foreign policy to deal with weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and the 
conflicts of the post-cold war era125.  It is the first time in fifty-five years that the EU was able to 
draw up a common doctrine.  The Big Three immediately endorsed the doctrine: Britain was 
anxious to deal with weapons of mass destruction, Germany strongly supported it because it was 
under an institutional umbrella, and France did so because the doctrine spelt how countries, 
including the US, could not act alone and expect to be effective.  The ten candidate countries at the 
time, the which, for the majority, were pro-US, welcomed the doctrine because of the explicit 
support for the US and NATO.  The doctrine specifies how the EU must put teeth on its traditional 
“soft power” tools of political, diplomatic and economic pressure. It also focuses on spending more 
on defense.   
The creation of Western institutions such as the European Community and NATO was 
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inspired by a notion of security that was both economic and military.  The European Coal and Steel 
Community was created to bind France and Germany in an economic partnership and reduce the 
possibilities of a military conflict. NATO was also established to protect Western Europe from the 
Soviet Union.  The security provided by the EU was facing inward, while the security provided by 
NATO was facing outward126.  But both notions of security formation stress the importance of a 
‘border of order’ provided by the two, which ran through the center of Europe, argue Fierke and 
Wiener.  The ‘iron curtain’ represented a border of order for the EU and NATO, in so far as it 
played an important role in the process of identity formation for both organizations.  Through 
political practice, NATO and EU member states have created a notion of belonging to a community 
with a particular order127.  This order was built on liberal democratic principles that were, to a large 
extent, established and sustained by negative perception of the communist East.  The collapse of the 
Soviet Union profoundly challenged the specific institutional identities.  Enlargement was not 
simply a means to extend membership to member states from the other bloc; it also involved 
incorporating what was the ‘Other’.  During the Cold War, the self-definitions and normative ideals 
of both NATO and the EU were defined in the opposition to the East.  
David Calleo envisions three pan-European models,128 projecting a different relationship 
between the EU and NATO in each case. In a bipolar Pan-Europe, the West claims its Cold war 
victories, and Western institutions enlarge; NATO and the EU include most of the CEECs, and 
financially helped a crippled Russia while keeping it under watch. In the second model, unified 
pan-Europe, the old East and West of Europe join to create a closely integrated Eurasian system.  
The EU and NATO extend eastward, and eventually embrace rather than exclude Russia.  In the 
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third model, tripolar pan-Europe, the EU, Russia and the United States form three distinct but 
articulated poles.  Each, while tied to the others, remains sufficiently distinct so as not to undermine 
its own cohesion.  Neither the EU nor NATO becomes itself pan-European.  Instead, each remains 
a critical Western element within a larger and looser pan-European superstructure.  The EU for 
instance extends full membership only to Central and East European countries whose political 
economies are sufficiently convergent with the West to be absorbed successfully129.  The EU does 
not imagine including Russia but nevertheless develops close economic relations with it, and also 
with former Soviet States.  The US remains present in Pan-Europe through NATO but less as the 
ultimate guarantor of Western Europe against a resumption of Russian aggression or against an 
explosion of violence in the Near and Middle East.  The US and Russia cultivate their common 
security interests in the Far East. NATO grows more European and less American-dominated, as 
the EU develops autonomous diplomatic and defense institutions, capable of acting effectively 
either inside or outside NATO.  Russia does not actually join this more European NATO but 
cooperates closely with it through some overarching pan-European security structure130.  
The tripolar pan-Europe model seems to fit the timeframe of our study (2003-2005) and 
afterwards. The case of the lift of the embargo shows a EU with increasing influence with some 
aspirations in Asia, the US, as involved as it is in Europe and in Asia, reluctant to see Europe 
trading weapons with China and finally Russia, though not included in our study, sharing the US 
mistrust of a closer relationship between the US and the EU. There are certainly several possible 
models of European security based on ideology, culture or vision of the world.  The relationship 
between the ESDP and NATO is the best illustration of which actors should be involved and how 
defense and security policies within the EU should be led.  The absence of a tradition of an 
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independent European security structure combined with those ideological debates and the change in 
World Order affected the creation of European Union Security institutions.  It seems there is a 
constant struggle of what European Security needs to achieve and how. Concretely, there are sharp 
differences over the ESDP-NATO relationship among France, Britain and Germany.  True, the 
confluence of British and French foreign and defense policies have helped to create a European 
Security structure that promised to bridge the long-standing NATO-EU divide, but the proposals for 
a common defense before the Convention of Europe in November 2002 made by France, Germany 
and UK illustrated fundamental tensions over what kind of links ESDP should have with NATO. 
The proposals revealed the inherent ambiguities over the St Malo initiative launched by Britain and 
France in 1998.  This was supposed to complement the EU's economic power with a defense and 
security arm.  Instead, London saw it as an attempt to improve Europe's defense capabilities under 
the umbrella of NATO.  Paris, on the other hand, saw it as an opportunity for the EU to develop its 
own security policy, with the US-led military alliance kept at a distance.   
True, it is often argued that the enlargement of both the EU and NATO will bring strategic 
advantage but functional loss.131  There is a greater sense in having the two organizations with 
closely overlapping memberships, but that the practicalities of politics within these organizations 
will make them less manageable over time.  However, a close membership overlap must overtime 
be the loss of one or other of these organizations, unless they become functionally different from 
each other.  The revival of the Franco-German axis during the Iraqi crisis was a surprise, since, 
historically, defense is one of the rare topics where France and Germany have different 
conceptions132.  The 1963 Franco-German Treaty of Friendship (also known as the Elysée Treaty) 
strengthened the links between the two countries in terms of security and diplomacy. However, one 
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of the French proposals brought up during the discussion was the creation of a European Defense 
Union, which was rejected by Germany, stating that the treaty should not affect Germany’s 
commitments to NATO133. Similarly, when the French thought up the Eurocorps in 1992, they 
wanted it autonomous; but the Germans insisted on placing it in a NATO framework.  When their 
security was at stake previously, the Germans always chose the US rather than France, though their 
overall policy was to be friends with both and a mediator between them.  But the Iraqi crisis 
showed that Germany deliberately broke this historical pattern- and chose France over the US. 
For the purpose of this study, security is defined as the protection of the Union’s people 
and territories against physical assault and the protection, through a variety of means, of vital 
economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten the fundamental values and 
vitality of the state134. The ESDP / CFSP is the enabler of this protection, using military and 
civilian assets for international conflict prevention and crisis management.  
 
2.3 Europeanization  
Europeanization is a key concept of our study and needs to be thoroughly reviewed. 
The concept started emerging in the nineties135. Within the political science literature, most 
of the authors define it as the interactions and impact of the EU on domestic actors and 
structures136. Olsen lists several definitions of Europeanization: Europeanization as changes 
in external territorial boundaries, as the development of institutions of governance at the 
European level, Europeanization as the central penetration of state and sub state systems of 
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governance, Europeanization as exporting forms of political organization and governance 
that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory and finally, 
Europeanization as a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe137. 
Bulmer and Radaelli define Europeanization as a process consisting of a) construction b) 
diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy 
paradigms, styles, ways of doing things, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined 
and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
(national and sub national) discourse, political structures and public policies138. In the past 
few years, the concept has been applied to the study of an increasing range of EU activities. 
However, the concept is a contested one since there is a split between authors who perceive 
Europeanization as a process and those who see it as an outcome. The absence of agreement 
among scholars and a lack of consistent and systematic frameworks accounting for the 
varying patterns of adaptation across countries and sectors, makes testing Europeanization 
potentially problematic139. Clearly, at the very least, there are analytical difficulties in 
separating 'cause' from 'effect' as well as risks of confusing Europeanization with ‘European 
Integration140’. European Integration focuses on what happens to the state and its sovereignty 
whereas Europeanization analyzes what happens to domestic institutions and actors141. 
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Europeanization is just one mechanism within the broader construct of European 
integration142. 
The effects of Europeanization are also widely debated in the literature. Rather than 
talking about effects and causes, Hitz and Goetz distinguish between direct and indirect impacts of 
Europeanization143. Direct impacts are outcomes that require domestic policies to be changed to 
conform to new European-wide norms144. For example, the regulatory regime has forced the 
liberalization of domestic markets. To them, the indirect impact of European governance is more 
interesting. The creation of planning authorities at the regional level produces in turn demands for 
a democratization of these requested structures, and hence the creation of elected regional 
assemblies and governments145. Those outcomes either reinforce existing trends or serve as 
catalysts for reforms. When member states already have regional authorities (such as Italy or 
France), EU regional policies have reinforced their demands for further delegation of policy 
competences away from central government. In contrast, when there are no such regional 
institutions, the EU acts as a catalyst in creating such institutions146. Scholars refined the concept 
of impacts by saying that Europeanization is a two-way process in which member states 
governments both shape European policy outcomes and adapt to them. The top-down approach 
refers to how member states respond to a growing European impact on their domestic level of 
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policy147. The top-down studies consider ‘the consequences for national structures, policy-making 
and outcomes that result from the development of institutions and policies at the EU level’148.  
The “bottom-up” refers to how successfully a state ‘uploads’ its institutional models, 
policy preferences and ‘ways of doing things’ to the EU level149. Uploading is also a way to 
minimize the costs, which the implementation of European norms and rules may impose on 
member states’ constituencies. Therefore, member states have an incentive to upload their 
domestic policies to the European level in order to minimize the costs of EU adaptation150. 
Member states seek to shape European policy-making according to their interests and institutional 
traditions151. Uploading may also enable state governments to address problems, which preoccupy 
their constituencies but can no longer be dealt with effectively at the domestic level (e.g. organized 
crime, environmental pollution)152.  
Tanja Börzel recognizes three kinds of reactions from the member states to 
Europeanization: pace-setting, foot-dragging and fence-sitting153. Pace-setting means that Member 
States actively push policies at the European level, reflecting policy preferences and minimal 
implementation costs. Downloading would then create fewer problems for the pace-setter, who can 
easily incorporate it into existing arrangements. Pace-setting not only presupposes established 
domestic policies but also the capacity to push them through the European negotiation process, 
very often against the opposition of other member States with diverging policy preferences. To the 
contrary, foot-draggers block or delay costly policies in order to prevent them altogether or to 
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achieve at least some compensation for implementation costs. The foot-draggers usually show a 
poor level of compliance154. The fence-setter is a neither-nor:  neither systematically pushing 
policies nor trying to block them at the European level but building tactical coalitions with both 
pace-setters and foot-draggers155. Fence-setters tend to take an indifferent and neutral position, or 
they build changing coalitions with pace-setters and foot-draggers, depending on the issue 
involved.156 Börzel’s theory applies well to our case. The issue with the EU China policy is that 
the relationships started prior the EC. Most of the policies emanated from Member States 
themselves, especially the big ones. There might be then some leadership on policy initiatives and 
policy formulation based on the density of the relationship but also some reluctance to see adopt a 
policy which might be contrary to a Member State’s interests.  
Very few studies applied the concept of Europeanization to foreign policy. 
Europeanization has been mainly used for first pillar policies (pre-Lisbon or also called 
community method post Lisbon) as an interactive, ongoing and mutually constitutive process of 
‘Europeanizing’ and ‘Europeanized countries, linking national and European levels157. As 
mentioned earlier, foreign policy is mainly intergovernmental, governed by treaties not 
legislation. It is then more challenging methodologically to measure EU impact on the state level 
since these processes are not as clearly detectable in the second pillar as they are in the first 
pillar. “Coordination generating EU input and domestic change” exists, but when compared with 
the level of institutionalized integration evident in the first pillar, it is rather weak. Major argues 
then that there is a risk of overestimating Europeanization as an ‘all explaining factor’, 
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neglecting the importance of other domestic and international spheres158. Due to those 
methodological challenges, Europeanization of foreign and security policy is less a clear-cut 
domestic adaptation and more a gradual transformation. The lack of supranationalism in EU 
foreign policy leads to a ‘horizontal pattern of Europeanization’ marked by an exchange between 
governments and the resultant learning of shared policy principles’ as opposed to the hierarchical 
vertical governance usual in first pillar policy areas159. Europeanization can be considered a 
learning process about good policy practice for elites for which the EU sets the scene, offering a 
forum for discussion and a platform for policy transfer’160. The idea of cross-loading refers to 
these horizontal patterns and socialization as mechanisms of Europeanization in foreign and 
security policy. Domestic change might not only be generated at the EU level but might come 
indirectly through the transfer of ideas and norms form European neighbors, domestic entities. 
Bulmer and Radaelli remind that national governments are the key actors, where the policy 
process is not subject to European law. It does not mean that Europeanization does not take place 
but it means that it is much more voluntary 161and non-hierarchical. When member states cannot 
reach an agreement such as during the Iraqi crisis, the policy is not Europeanized. On the other 
hand, if there is an exchange of practice, leading to ‘cross-fertilization’ of idea and learning, 
there is Europeanization, for instance in the case of the Palestinian issue162. Ben Tonra defines 
Europeanization in foreign policy as”…a transformation in the way in which national foreign 
policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in 
the consequent internalization of norms and expectations arising form a complex system of 
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collective European policy making”163. This ‘transformation’ usually translates as adaptation to 
EU norms and standards, an ‘incremental process orienting Member States’ politics and policies 
towards the EU. Wong argues that the weight of the acquis of EPC/CFSP/CESDP should 
increasingly have some impact on the foreign policies of the EU states, leading to convergence 
of foreign policies towards China164. 
Three examples of Europeanization applied to foreign policy illustrate these 
theoretical challenges. In his book ‘Europeanization of British Defense Policy”165, Robert 
Dover argues that European security and defense integration can be best explained in liberal 
intergovernmentalist terms. Dover conceptualizes Europeanization as a process whereby EU 
member states upload their state preferences to the European level. This process occurs either 
‘formally’ when supranational provisions become codified at intergovernmental conferences 
(IGCs or ‘informally’ in the formulation of day-to-day EU politics). Dover’s study is based 
on fifty elite interviews. Dover argues that the initial definition and adoption of the ESDP 
reflected core British defense preferences. Thus Dover points out that from 1997 onwards the 
Europeanization of British defense policy was part of a deliberate strategy, developed and 
implemented by a small group of officials and politicians under the aegis of Premier Blair, 
which aimed at ensuring a continued US engagement in the European security architecture 
and a strengthening of the pan-European military capabilities following the Kosovo 
debacle’.166 
The British government was successful in invoking political, military and economic 
power during the Anglo-French Saint Malo negotiations and several subsequent bilateral 
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negotiations with French and German officials, as well as the 2000 Nice IGC to impose its 
preferences. However, Dover shows that past attempts to upload British preferences have not 
been always successful and even harmed further Europeanization through the case of Iraq. 
Dover also examines the acceleration of the Europeanization of arms production and trade in 
recent years (see chapter 4).  
Another case involving the UK shows how a Member State this time drew upon its 
increasingly close relationship with the EU to supplement its own bilateral (an other 
multilateral) efforts to achieve its foreign policy objectives167. It may qualify as an example 
of convergence. In the case of Zimbabwe, Britain used the EU as a mechanism to advance 
state interests and the promotion of human rights. Britain certainly took some bilateral 
initiatives, including attempts to bring ZANU-PF delegations to London, but involved the EU 
and other international organizations to impose targeted sanctions. The outcome has been a 
strong signal sent to President Mugabe and showed a high degree of convergence between 
the British government and the EU. Both the EU and Britain promote good, liberal 
governance within Zimbabwe. 
Finally, Irondelle brings up a scenario where Europeanization occurred without the 
European Union. Irondelle analyses the impact of European integration on the transformation 
of the French military policy between 1991 and 1996168. Irondelle shows that the integration 
of the French military occurred without the European Union. The French elites and indirect 
pressures led to the reform of the military. French elites wanted a development of the 
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European defense and the 1996 reform was presented as a response to the European 
integration challenge. Jacques Chirac declared at the time that ‘the European ambition affects 
first and foremost, our conventional forces’.169 However, the Europeanization of French 
military policy was paradoxical since defense was the least integrated of European policies in 
1996 and France had implemented the most independent and nationalist military policies 
within the EU, following a Gaullist tradition. In his case study, Irondelle analyses the 
military reforms laid out in the 1994 Livre Blanc sur la Defense (White Paper on Defence) 
and bases his analysis on the consultation of official and unofficial documents from working 
groups on the topic and hundred of confidential interviews with French policy-makers and 
high-ranking officials. Irondelle concludes that there has been a Europeanization in the 
transformation of the French military in a normative way and not from a top-down 
perspective proved by the non existence of a common European Security Defense Policy at 
the time (between 1991 and 1996). But it qualifies as an example indirect adaptation pressure 
to conform in advance to EU standards 
To conclude, the issue raised is not what Europeanization is but how the term can be 
useful for understanding the dynamics of the evolving European polity. That might help scholars to 
give better accounts of the emergence, developments and impacts of a European, institutionally-
ordered system of governance. Olsen argues that the different conceptions of Europeanization 
complement, rather than exclude each other. Olsen acknowledges that despite the empirical 
complexity and conceptual confusion, scholars need to double their efforts in modeling the 
dynamics of European change. One of ‘the immediate challenges is to develop partial, middle-
range theoretical approaches that emphasize domains of application or scope conditions and that 
are empirically testable. A long-term challenge is to provide a better understanding of how 
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different processes of change interact and make institutions co-evolve through mutual 
adaptation’.170 Bulmer and Radaelli explain the fact that Europeanization is a popular topic of 
research because it is a model-building  exercise171. 
 
2.4 Policy Convergence 
Policy convergence is a central concept in comparative public policy and closely linked 
to Europeanization. Many studies emphasize the development of similar policies across countries 
over time172. Knill argues that the booming research on globalization and Europeanization affects 
the current research on convergence. ‘Does the strong growth of economic and institutional 
interlinkages between nation states lead to increasingly similar policies across countries? Or is the 
search for convergence emerging from the domestic impact of globalization and European 
integration, as domestic responses to global or European challenges are strongly influenced by 
existing domestic structures and institutions173? The accepted definition of policy convergence is 
read as ‘the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, 
processes and performances’174. The literature on convergence and its related concepts offers a 
broad range of causal factors in order to explain changes in the similarity of policies across 
countries: first, the result of similar but independent responses of different countries to parallel 
problem pressure; second the imposition of policies (from international organizations), third 
harmonization of national policies through international or supranational law, fourth, regulatory 
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competition emerging from the increasing economic integration of European and global markets, 
finally, by transnational communication175. Knill also points out that there are facilitating factors 
leading to convergence in terms of similarities between states, level of institutional similarity, 
cultural and socio-economic similarities, and also the terms of the policy at stake: policies 
involving high distributional conflicts among domestic actor coalitions will diffuse and hence 
converge to a lesser extent that regulatory policies with comparatively small redistribution 
consequences176. 
Some argue that there has been ‘no significant convergence towards a common 
institutional model, homogenizing the domestic structures of the European states177. 
Europeanization does not mean a homogenization across boundaries, since varying state political 
and cultural structures lead to different adaptations. Schmidt warns against the temptation to 
believe that European Member States are all converging towards a single EU regime. European 
policies have tended to follow domestic policies changes as much as lead them, with national 
policies having shaped those of the EU as often as EU policies have shaped those of the Member 
States. Especially when it comes to economic policies, adjustments are state specific and ‘path 
dependent’. Member States have responded to the pressures of Europeanization at different times, 
to different degrees, with different results argues Schmidt.178 Schmidt proposes to look at 
adjustment pressures and mechanisms related to EU decisions: it includes vulnerability to global 
and economic forces, and political institutional capacity to alter their policies and policy-making 
institutions as necessary, the extent to which the proposed policies went against their policy 
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legacies and preferences, and the discourse that may have enhanced their capacity to respond by 
changing perceptions of vulnerabilities and legacies and, ultimately, therefore, preferences. 
The enlargement literature seems however to show the opposite, arguing that 
membership in the EU has led to the gradual transformation of nation-states from 
‘autonomous actors in the international sphere to embedded actors within regional networks 
of exchange’179. Those states undergo a process of transformation in which they adapt their 
domestic institutions and policies to meet the EU requirements of membership.  
Such convergence can be observed in more regionalization, more flexibility, strong 
sectorization and high administrative coordination180. The most common approach that best 
fits the new entrants is convergence for various reasons. First, since the democratic transition, 
post-communist countries have undergone an ‘imitative transformation’, emulating Western 
market economies. Second, the simultaneity of transformation in coping with the EU 
requirements exerts high adaptation pressures on applicant countries. Third, the EU has a 
strong bargaining position in the accession process, imposing EU rules and standards. It 
forces the candidate countries to comply with the ‘acquis’ without a say in its negotiation181. 
It goes back the to the main methodological challenges of our study: applying 
Europeanization to foreign policy and dealing with a EU policy with a non-EU member 
which started after the relationship among Member States and that non-EU member. In other 
words, might we expect convergence in initiatives launched after 1975 (when the European 
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Community started working with the PRC) or a conflict between existing bilateral 
agreements (Member States-China) with EU-China agreements? Our next section looks into 
this issue of adaptation and compliance. 
Wong gives an interesting response: the impact of EU institutions on state foreign 
policy behavior towards China was more significant than was commonly imagined or 
admitted. Wong compared the positions of France, Britain, Germany and the Commission on 
China in the three issue-areas of economics, political-strategic interests and human rights and 
found  that there was a more coordinated position on China in 2003 compared to 1985 in 
those three areas. The policies of the three counties had undergone a significant level of 
convergence182. Wong argued that convergence happened by default rather than design. First, 
Europe’s influence in China had been on a steady and rapid decline after 1945. “On military 
and political issues, only Britain and France have had some residual diplomatic influence in 
the ‘grandes negociations politiques’ (major political negotiations)183. Second, the EU’s role 
and presence in East Asia had grown, in contrast to the diminishing profiles of individual 
member states and former colonial powers. From 1991, France and Britain were unable to act 
as individual actors in there own right (witness their failure to obtain separate seats in the 
ASEAN Regional Forum)184. One may argue that the EU policy toward China had been 
‘Germanized’ in that Germany has succeeded in exporting its model of discreet diplomacy, 
change through trade and non confrontation on human rights to the EU level. In other words, 
Germany had ‘Europeanized’ what was originally a member state’s national policy in the 
political-diplomatic field. 
 
                                                 
182 Wong Reuben (2005), 17 
183 Wong Reuben (2005), 17 
184 Ibid. p.17 
 67
2.5 Adaptation and policy misfits. 
We just reviewed different kinds of Europeanization. There has been some research about 
compliance and how well Member States adapt to EU law. The research focuses o on domestic 
areas. In Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Chang, Cowles, Caporaso and 
Risse explore the impact of European institutions on the domestic structures of the member states 
by reviewing ten different issue areas185. The impacts of Europeanization have varied across 
countries, because policy regimes and structural arrangements vary across national cultures and 
issues.186. The authors found that all countries, including the big ones, encounter adaptational 
pressures due to policy or structural incompatibility with the EU. The findings suggest that 
structural convergence (convergence of basic domestic institutions) is modest as opposed to 
policy convergence which takes place more frequently. Member States have leeway on how to 
implement a particular objective. An example is EMU which has led to similar central bank 
statutes but has not yet produced real convergence in fiscal policy. 
One intriguing finding of the book is that partial convergence is taking place even in 
situations where the EU does not dictate any targets or end goals. All member states engage 
in some learning and tend to appropriate arrangements that seem to guarantee a good fit with 
the EU goals. 187 
It is worth describing thoroughly the Cowles et al. model since I will use its basic 
premises as part of my methodology. Cowles et al. built a three-step approach model to 
predict how a country would respond to a new EU policy.188 First, they identify the relevant 
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Europeanization processes, formal and informal, norms, rules, regulations, procedures at the 
European level189.  The second step in the framework is to identify the “goodness of fit’ 
between the Europeanization processes and the institutional setting, in other words between 
what Europeanization of China policy entails and the institutional setting of the member 
state.  The degree of ‘fit’ constitutes what the authors call ‘adaptational pressures’. In 
principle the degree of adaptational pressures determines the extent to which domestic 
institutions would have to change in order to comply with European rules and policies.’190 
The lower the compatibility fit between European institutions and national institutions, the 
higher the adaptational pressures. Based on different political, economic legal and societal 
institutional systems, the degree of adaptational pressures varies according to member states. 
European rules can be easily incorporated because they match the domestic system of rules 
and regulations or because the member states changed their settings before the setup of those 
rule, which corresponds to the case of export regulations for weapons systems for instance. In 
other cases, European norms and practices ran completely counter to national rules, practices 
and administrative traditions. Finally, the degree of adaptational pressures also varies based 
on the perception of the role of nation states within the process of European integration.  
 Finally, the third piece of the framework is the mediating institutions and actors’ 
practices to account for domestic change. The authors identify a series of mediating factors 
which will determine adaptation or convergence:  
1. Veto points in the domestic structure. The existence of veto points has been identified 
as a major factor preventing structural adaptation. The more power is dispersed across the 
political system and the more actors have a say in political decision making, the more 
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difficult is to foster the domestic consensus  or ‘winning coalition’ necessary to introduce 
institutional changes in response  to Europeanization pressures. For example, multiple veto 
points in the Italian political system blocked the country’s structural adaptation to 
Europeanization pressures in transportation policies. 191  
2. Mediating formal institutions provide actors with material and ideational resources to 
bring structural change. For instance, the British Equal Opportunities Commission was 
crucial in providing women’s organizations with the means to use EU equal Pay and Equal 
Treatment Directives in furthering gender quality. Multiple veto points and facilitating 
institutions exert their effects on the capacity if actors to induce change in opposite 
directions.192 
3. A country’s organizational and policymaking cultures also affects whether domestic 
actors can use adaptational pressures emanating from Europeanization to induce structural 
change. A culture based on consensus for example would overcome veto points. 
4. The differential empowerment of domestic actors and learning:  Structural 
changes lead to retribution of power capacities among the relevant actors in a political, social 
and economic system. Milner and Rogowski argue that exposure to international trade and 
increased economic interdependence leads to a shift in societal interest coalitions in favor of 
export-oriented sectors. More generally, Cowles et al. argue that Europeanization leads to a 
redistribution of power among  whole range of actors: legislatures, courts, regional 
governments to interest groups and companies.193 
5. Learning: Differential empowerment enables actors to further given interests and 
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to induce structural change. Learning that results in change of actors’ interests and identities 
occurs rather rarely194.  Elite learning however occurs especially when there have been 
critical policy failures or in perceived crises when actors reassess their set of preferences.  
The authors expect structural change in response to Europeanization to occur if and 
when a) it generates significant adaptational pressures in the domestic environment: and b) 
facilitating factors  are present, enabling actors to induce or push through institutional 
change. 
The model would be applicable to our study as long as we identify different factors. I 
will explain in the methodology section which factors might be suitable to predict adaptation 
or convergence between EU sanction policy and the Member states.. situation.  
Falkner et al.  identify misfit between EU demands (application of directives in that 
case) and member states as the main explanatory factor for implementation performance in 
much of the Europeanization literature. The adapation to a EU directive should be smooth if it 
entails only small changes at the domestic level.195A directive will be difficult to implement if 
significant adjustment is necessary in the domestic structures. Falkner et al. recognize however 
the methodological challenge of having to conceptualize potential misfits in such terms as to 
allow a direct comparison to be made between countries, and even between different policies. 
The authors argue that the misfit can be either substantive, i.e. content and policy 
related, or be an issue of procedure. The misfit means that EU law differs from domestic law 
gradually (the example of the duration of parental leave) or substantially (e.g. no parental 
leave). Europeanization would be then either quantitative (strengthening or weakening of an 
existing policy) or qualitative (creation of a policy). A high degree of misfit in the polity would 
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occur when a crucial domestic institution is challenged196. Falkner et al.’s study applies to 
social policy but seems suitable for our case. Member States had some rules as for the 
procurement of weapons prior the 1989 embargo  (existing policy) and the embargo was in 
some cases not as rigorous as the domestic legislations. The cancellation of the policy and the 
possible replacement by an upgrade of the Code of Conduct on Weapons sales represents an 
innovation on the EU part.  
 
2.6 Methodology 
 2.6.1 Introduction 
To analyze the case of the lift of the arms embargo between 2003 and 2005, and to 
measure the influence of Britain, France and Germany on the European Union China policy, 
the study combines a questionnaire on China policy and sanction policy addressed to defense 
and foreign affairs officials from the three member states and EU officials, press articles, 
interviews and speeches from that period, the application of Tanja Börzel’s theory, who 
recognizes three kinds of reactions from the member states to Europeanization: pace-setting, 
foot-dragging and fence-sitting and finally the application of Cowles Caporaso Risse model 
to understand the responses of Europeanization and explain the goodness of fit between the 
three Member States and the EU policy. 
2.6.2 The Questionnaire and the Interviews 
A questionnaire on China policy and sanction policy addressed to defense and foreign 
affairs officials from the three member states and EU officials was created. The questionnaire 
was divided in four parts: general questions about the embargo, institutional questions about 
the role of the EU institutions, role of EU member states in the debate, influence of the Big 
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Three, impact of the bilateral relations and finally the perception of the place of China in the 
international security sphere. The time frame is the  2003 to 2005 period, which corresponds 
to the time of the debate on the lift of the arms embargo. The questionnaire was a useful tool 
for data collection but above all an opportunity to lead a discussion. I understood that the 
success of hearing back from busy government officials was slim but I wanted to guarantee 
some sort of answer at minimum to an interview at best. To contact the respondents, I sent an 
email to see whether we could set up a meeting to discuss the issue and go over the 
questionnaire. An interview allowed a more open discussion and could include ‘off the 
record’ comments. If the addressees were too busy, they might send some information about 
the issue (speeches, press articles) or redirect me towards other possible contacts with 
expertise on the issue. In the case of an interview, a recording device would be used unless 
the respondent did not feel comfortable having his / her comments on tape and especially 
since some respondents chose to have their identity kept confidential.  
The email request and questionnaire were drafted in English, French and German. 
Some of those respondents might have been contacted in one language but responded using 
another. Here is a sample email sent to a member of the Defense Committee of the House of 
Commons (The British Parliament) 
More specifically, the questionnaire/information requests emails have been sent to the 
following three groups: 
France, Germany, Britain officials/advisors responsible for foreign and defense policy for 
the 2003-2005 period (or afterwards of they had some perspective about the events). That 
included, Premier Blair’s government, the Chirac Presidency, Chancellor Schröder’s and 
Merkel’s administrations.  
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France, Germany, Britain members of Parliament, sitting on Foreign Affairs, Defense and 
European Affairs Committees. 
 Questionnaires or Interviews with European Commission officials (Directorate General 
Relex) 
 Questionnaire or Interviews with European Council Officials (including CFSP) 
 Questionnaires or Interviews with COREPER and Permanent Representations Officials 
(the members of the representations constitute COREPER)  
 Questionnaires or interviews with Members of the European Parliament sitting on Foreign 
Affairs and Defense Committees. 
Here is a summary of the response rate. In the appendix, the list of people contacted is 
mentioned for each country. 
Table 2.6.2: Positive respondents from the Three Member States and the EU 
Case Number of Respondents (interview or 
correspondence) 
France 7 
Britain 7 
Germany 13 
EU 16 
 
2.6.3 Press and journal articles, media interviews and speeches 
A useful tool to trace the different steps of the debate is the press. The issue has been 
followed in all the countries of the study, as well as in the US and China. I used predominantly 
the archives of The Financial Times, a British newspaper that has an excellent coverage of 
European Union issues and international issues in general. The keywords used in various 
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combinations for the search were ‘embargo’, ‘arms ban’, ‘China’, ‘France’, ‘Britain’, 
‘Germany’, ‘U.S.’ and the ‘EU’. I included other daily publications. As for speeches, I looked up 
the websites of the executive branches’ offices, legislative branches and European Union 
institutions. I also used some more scholarly work of folks who studied the EU-China 
relationship among the Big Three and China and might have used the arms embargo as an 
example. 
 
 
3.3   Tweaking three theories to apply to our study. 
The goal is to evaluate the overall pattern of the three Member States’ institutional 
responses to Europeanization of China policy. In the literature review, I summed up the work 
by Tanja BÖrzel on the three types of attitudes (pace-setter, fence-setter, foot-dragger) and 
the research about EU laws adaptation misfits (Cowles et al., Falkner et al.). All of this 
research is applied to domestic policies (competition, social policy, transportation…). I 
would like to apply it to foreign policy and use those theories to test our hypotheses. The 
Europeanization of a China policy means the development of European policy on China, the 
enactment of legal procedures such as the embargo, the transfer of competences and the 
creation of norms and identities at the EU level, in other words as the emergence of European 
governance. What is the goodness of fit or the mismatch between the EU and the Member 
States on China policy and do they respond?  
First, I identify the relevant Europeanization processes and in this case I expect to see 
bottom-up, top-down and horizontal Europeanization. The China policy implies a certain set 
of processes including the arms embargo. These Europeanization processes necessitate some 
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adjustments on the domestic level of the member states so that states can be in compliance 
with EU rules (rules of weapons sales) or necessitate some EU adjustments coming from the 
member states’ existing policies.  
The second step in the framework is to identify the “goodness of fit’ between the 
Europeanization processes and the institutional setting, in other words between what 
Europeanization of China policy entails and the institutional setting of the member states.  
The degree of ‘fit’ constitutes what we identify as ‘adaptation pressures’. We are trying to 
explain whether there was adaptation or convergence; whether the French, the German or the 
British would adopt the EU policy on China easily or not. The goal of the study is to show 
how significant adaptation pressures are in the case of Europeanization of China policy at the 
domestic level and at the EU level. When adaptation pressures are high, European 
institutions challenge the identity, the constructive principles, core structures and practices of 
national institutions. And when Member States create those pressures on European 
institutions (to lift the embargo for example), the identity, principles, core structures and 
practices of EU institutions are challenged (defense of human rights in the European 
Parliament for instance). The institutional, material and cultural adaptations can be 
challenging either for the Member States or the EU institutions.  
In cases of high adaptation pressures, the presence or absence of mediating factors is 
crucial for the degree to which domestic change adjusts to top-down Europeanization or EU 
change adjusting to bottom-up Europeanization should be expected. I use five mediating 
factors adapted to our case  to predict whether reform will take place:  
1. Veto points in the domestic structure. The existence of veto points has been 
identified as a major factor preventing structural adaptation. The more power is dispersed 
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across the political system and the more actors have a say in political decision making, the 
more difficult is to foster the domestic consensus or ‘winning coalition’ necessary to 
introduce institutional changes in response to Europeanization pressures. In our case, we 
might expect that coalition governments might have more difficulties to comply with a EU 
policy versus a one party government. The public opinion might be another veto point 
preventing a EU law to change. 
2. A country’s organizational and policymaking cultures also affects whether 
domestic actors can use adaptation pressures emanating from Europeanization to induce 
structural change. A culture based on consensus for example would overcome veto points. A 
head of State keen on expanding the relationship with China or who has been an influential in 
EU-China relations will have an impact on the EU China policy. The leaders of the Big 
Three all belong to that category. 
3. The Human Rights issue is another defining issue in the relationship with the EU 
and the Member States. Some Member States try to depoliticize human rights and dissociate 
progress in that area with trade. The German and the French leadership seem to belong to 
that category. However, for some countries, traditionally the Northern European Member 
States or for some institutions, such as the European Parliament, human rights ought to be 
considered as the primary policy under consideration when doing business with. 
4. The trade issue could be considered as the ‘rival’ issue of human rights in terms of 
importance in the EU-China and the three big States-China relationships. Trade has been the 
original field of action for Member States and the European Community and now the 
European Union. Trade between the two amounted to some €210 billion in 2005, with 
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European exports to China valued at €52 billion and imports from China at €158 billion.197 
Tapping the huge potential of the Chinese market represents a boon for sluggish European 
economies. 
5. The empowerment of external actors: Cowles et al. argue that Europeanization 
leads to a redistribution of power among a whole range of actors outside the policy-making 
process. In our case, the United States has been a determining influence in the debate and so 
has China. The United States carefully watched the debate of the lift from its beginnings and 
heavily lobbied Member States against it. 
Using this mixed model allows us to explain the response of the Member States to the 
Europeanization of China policy based on the mediating factors and attitudes which enabled 
or disabled policy change. 
 
2.6.5 Expected findings 
Based on my understanding of Europeanization, the analysis of articles, speeches and 
the questionnaire, the BÖrzel classification and the Cowles et al . and Falkner et al. theories, 
we expect that France, Germany and Britain significantly affect the EU China sanction 
policy.  The issue of the arms embargo has not been resolved, but the three members have 
been key players in putting and keeping the arms embargo on the top of the agenda one way 
or another. I expect to find that France and Germany did upload their preferences and 
influenced other member States to follow their policy choices. Britain was also influential in 
the debate but more as swing state: originally in favor, but ended up switching positions. The 
findings should also show that domestic factors (opposition parties, media, public opinion) 
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and external factors (importance of the transatlantic relationship, influence of the US in Asia 
and China’s attitude towards Taiwan) had  a key impact on the outcome of the initiative and 
empowered the will of the Big Member States.  
          The underlying premise of the debates on whether to lift the arms ban on China was 
strategic, relating more to the implications for regional and in particular cross-Strait security 
and stability. The US for instance worried as far as China’s intentions and capabilities to 
make use of prospective arms imports following a lift. However, such concerns were likely to 
be mitigated as continued and targeted U.S. pressure, compliance with the Wassenaar 
Arrangement and the EU Code of Conduct, and supplier states’ own judgments in deciding 
the types of armament and defense technologies for transfers would  prevent sales of direct 
lethal military significance. China’s own capabilities to absorb imported equipment and 
technologies and integrate them into its own existing order of battle would also suggest that 
the transformation effect will take years, if not decades, to materialize.198 
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Chapter 3 
 
The influence of France 
 
 
3.0     Introduction 
Although France does not have the same historical ties with China as does Britain or 
the strong commercial ties as Germany does, France maintains a special political relationship 
with China. As previously mentioned, France was the first country to establish full 
diplomatic relations with the communist regime of China. President Jacques Chirac (1995-
2007) always nourished a particular interest in China and during his political career 
developed personal and warm relationships with the Chinese leadership199. France has always 
been a pioneer or a pace-setter when it comes to EU China policy-making. In 1989, France 
was one of the main architects of severe sanctions against China following the Tiananmen 
Square massacre, and almost ten years later launched a bilateral ‘strategic partnership’ with 
China ahead of the EU and other big member states. In the issue of the embargo, once again, 
France seemed to spearhead the plans. First, I will review the track record of France in EU 
Asia policy. Then I will focus on the embargo and explain the reasoning of the French 
diplomacy based on the interviews. Then, in order to assess the French responses to 
Europeanization of China policy, I will use the classification by Börzel 200 to establish that 
France was a pace-setter by convincing the EU to put the issue on the agenda and then by 
trying to convince its partners, and  then apply the three-step approach and domestic 
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structural change from Caporaso, Risse and Cowles201 and show that there was no mismatch 
between the EU policy on China and France policy on China, but a mismatch between France 
and other member states. 
 
3.1      France’s relations with China 
Historically, France and China have always been close sharing similar views of the 
world. France was the first Western country to exchange ambassadors with the PRC in 1964. 
De Gaulle and Mao Zedong both wanted to free their nations from the constraints of the 
bipolar world. Mao at the time talked about “intermediary zones”, comprised of developed 
countries that can side with developing ones in order to isolate the two superpowers202. In the 
1970s and 1980s, Sino French relations developed steadily as China was starting separating 
itself from the Soviet Union. France then developed military relations with China (as the 
United Kingdom and the United States also did) and started selling small quantities of 
weapons and military equipment. After the cold shoulder following the Tiananmen Square 
incident, France was the first major country to resume normal relations in 1991203.Despite the 
development of military relations with Taiwan, France closely cooperated with China on 
several international issues, including the settlement of the Cambodia question in 1991. The 
end of the Cold War, the return to power of a neo-Gaullist majority in 1993, the acceleration 
of economic reforms in China in 1992 and a French government pledge not to authorize 
French companies to sell weapons to Taiwan anymore (after a severe decline in these 
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relations) led to an unprecedented rapprochement starting in 1994204. In 1997, as President 
Chirac was visiting China, both countries established a “comprehensive partnership”. This 
was the second country to establish such a relationship after Russia (which in 1996 
concluded a ‘strategic partnership’ with China), and the first Western state to do so. Again 
one of the main points of agreement was a certain conception that following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the world was unbalanced because it was overwhelmingly dominated by a 
sole power.205 Since then, Paris and Beijing have shared similar stances on a large number of 
issues such as Iraq, disarmament, non-proliferation, North Korea, promotion of 
multilateralism, and most importantly, the sensitive Taiwan issue. Visiting China in April 
2005, Premier Raffarin declared that the “anti-secession law” that the Chinese Parliament 
had adopted a month earlier was compatible with France’s ‘one China’ policy and the ‘one 
country, two systems’ formula was the most appropriate one for solving the Taiwan issue.  
This close relationship has been institutionalized through regular bilateral meetings, 
an alliance on many issues on the Security Council, and rich cultural exchanges. In 1997, 
France became the first democratic nation to push to abandon attempts to condemn China in 
the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, opting instead for a “constructive dialogue 
with the Chinese authorities on this delicate issue.” However, today, Paris and China have 
been having a few difficulties on more recent issues such as Tibet, Iran, Sudan or more 
generally Africa. Those difficulties have somewhat bridged the gap between Chirac’s neo-
Gaullist policy and the EU’s common foreign and security policies. France, as a founding 
member of the EU, has considerable influence on EU foreign and China policies, but it also 
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must take into account the member states’ majority opinion on these matters, including on 
China. 
More generally, when it came to international relations in a post Cold War environment, 
France and China believed that a multipolar and culturally plural world had already taken shape. 
In addition, being both independent nuclear powers, ‘notably with second strike capability 
against any bigger nuclear power (Russia or the US)’, Paris and Beijing believed that they have a 
regional role to play that may, on occasions, conflict with American interests.206  
 
 
3.2.    Track record of Europeanization of French China policy 
Under Gaullist (conservative) leadership since 1993, the French used the EU quietly and 
gradually to increase their presence in Asian political affairs through a process of discrete 
diplomacy aimed at institution building. French policy makers such as former minister for 
Foreign Affairs Hubert Védrine, recognized that ‘in this immense zone…where we are not 
the principal partner, interlocutor or protagonist, we do our work with perseverance to make 
links, create habits of consultation  which did not exist before…and slowly but surely, I 
expect that it will bear fruit.’207 
The creation of the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) was a classic example of bottom-up 
Europeanization where France used the EU as a platform to advance its interests and cooperation 
between the EU and Asia. Following a tense period of relations between France and China 
from 1989 to 1994, France started to develop a dense network of contacts between French 
and Chinese leaders. This network not only included diplomatic contacts but also some in the 
trade, defense and cultural cooperation sectors. The EU followed suit and also established a 
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similar system of bilateral meetings. During his 1994 visit to France, President Jiang Zemin 
proposed ‘four principles on Sino-European ties’: stable, long-term and friendly cooperation 
for the 21st century, respect for each other and seeking common ground while putting aside 
differences, engaging in complementary trade and economic cooperation, and consultation 
and cooperation in international affairs.208 French Premier Balladur seized upon Singapore 
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s proposal of a regular meeting between EU and Asian 
leaders, based on the  APEC model. The French saw an opportunity to re-start their 
relationship with the Chinese after five years of bilateral difficulties. The creation of the 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) institutionalized regular contacts with Chinese leaders in a 
multilateral European framework without the US and Taiwan. France worked closely with 
Singapore to convince its European partners to put the initiative on the EU agenda, working 
through its EU presidency in the first half of 1995 and through its presence in the troika in 
the second half of 1995. Despite an initial lukewarm response from the British and German 
governments, France used the offices of former European Commission President Francois-
Xavier Ortoli (President of the European Communities in 1973) and the 1995 French EU 
presidency to push the idea in European circles.209 It managed to use EU institutions to build 
a coalition of support from the other member states and the Commission towards the idea, 
which led the way to the inaugural ASEM meeting (a summit of EU and East Asian countries 
in ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea) in Bangkok in March 1996.210 The ASEM 
has been a success in facilitating contacts between European and Chinese leaders. The 1998 
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ASEM II allowed Chinese Premier Zhu Ronghi to make his first visit abroad in London and 
Paris. The first EU-China summit was held in London immediately after ASEM II211. 
During the same period France also pushed for increased political dialogue with 
China under the EU framework. In 1996, for instance, France established a high-level 
strategic dialogue involving defense ministers and senior officials.212 The 1997 France-China 
Declaration on a Global Partnership inspired the 1998 EU Commission’s ‘Comprehensive 
Partnership with China’. Based on the French template, the Commission initiative laid out 
the principles of a comprehensive partnership, including political consultation, annual 
summits, dialogue on human rights, support for China’s access to WTO, and the promotion 
of bilateral trade and investment.  
In terms of human rights, France followed different models of Europeanization. Three 
different periods can be distinguished in this rollercoaster on human rights. After the 
crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen protests, the socialist French government vigorously 
pushed for sanctions and led the EU into doing so. With a Gaullist majority voted into office 
in 1993, France became much softer on human rights and successfully convinced some of its 
partners (horizontal Europeanization) to boycott the 1997 UNCHR resolution. France’s lead 
was decisive in reaching a consensus the following year on a common EU position on the 
resolution, but still had to fall in line with the general EU position (combination top down 
and horizontal Europeanizations.)  
With the 1989 Tiananmen crisis, France played a leading role internationally in 
supporting the student demonstrations and condemning the Chinese government. Until that 
point, France had not been too interested in human rights in China except when that involved 
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its own citizens. The French Socialist government strongly reacted to the crackdown and 
infuriated the Chinese government by offering political asylum to the dissident student 
leaders and gave them a special place in the bicentennial Bastille Day parade. 213 The French 
authorities even authorized the dissidents to create an organization, the Federation for 
Democracy in China.214 France initiated the Madrid’s European Council sanctions at the EC 
level and held China accountable in international forums such as the CHR. France had 
become the leader in the human rights improvement crusade on behalf of the EC.  
With a change of majority in 1993, the human rights issue became a secondary one, a 
culturally relative one. The Balladur government was more interested in catching up on the 
trade relationship, following the German and Japanese model, (where the bilateral 
relationship rests above all on trade).215 It certainly did not happen overnight and as early as 
1991, France had breached EC sanctions on financial aid. With the election of Jacques 
Chirac, a connoisseur of Asian civilization, this ‘semantic-philosophical’ approach became 
established foreign policy. Responding to a question on the French Senate floor, Hervé de 
Charette, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time characterized it as ‘constructive and 
dynamic, preferring constructive dialogue to confrontation’ .216 It did not take long for the 
Chinese government to realize that there was a window of opportunity. At the ASEM 
Inaugural summit in March 1996, Prime Minister Li Peng urged Chancellor Kohl and 
President Chirac to drop the annual United Nations Commission on Human Rights resolution 
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criticizing China’s human rights record, a resolution the European Community had sponsored 
six times since 1990.217 
In 1997, one month before a state visit of President Chirac to China, France broke 
ranks with the EU practice of sponsoring the human rights resolution on China at the 
Commission on Human Rights. This reversal was quite stunning, based on the fact that 
France was the key player in sanctioning the Chinese following Tiananmen. However, the 
reversal might have been anticipated through different declarations on both sides before the 
French President’s visit. Unsuccessful in convincing its EU partners and the Dutch 
presidency to drop the resolution criticizing China, France decided to withdraw from the 
traditional EU support of the resolution and  led the ‘Airbus Group’, including (Germany, 
Italy and Spain) in defecting from the common position. With the split in EU ranks, the 
resolution did not pass. Many Western governments criticized French leadership on 
sabotaging the resolution: according to its partners, France had put short-term economic 
interests before long-term EU interests, therefore undermining the EU’s credibility. During 
the state visit of President Chirac, the common declaration stated that both parties would 
‘respect diversity’ and take into account the ‘particularities of both sides.”218 
The following year, EU Member States agreed upon a common position: the EU 
would ‘neither propose nor endorse, either by the organization as a whole or by individual 
member states, any resolution criticizing China’. The French position had won the day and 
the ‘hardliners’ found themselves trapped in a position projected by France. Since 1998, the 
EU has systematically not cosponsored the resolution. The 1998 position represented an 
intergovernmental compromise, reconciling various preferences into a common position that 
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was not altogether coherent. France brought change to the EU’s CHR policy of China, and 
France had Europeanized its human rights on not confronting China policy by a process of 
‘exporting its national policy model, ideas and details to the EU’219. However, France was 
also affected by some top down Europeanization (from Brussels) or horizontal (from some 
other members) and had to coordinate and harmonize its position with the other member 
states in favor of a resolution. The French stance helped resume dialogue on human rights 
between China and the EU: the dialogue had been interrupted with the CHR resolution, and, 
following the French coup and the newly defined EU position, the Chinese deemed 
acceptable to restart the discussion220. 
How was the case of the lift of the arms embargo unique compared to other instances 
of Europeanization of French policy in China? France probably thought it had the necessary 
influence to see the lift go through based on a successful track record of recent French 
initiatives in EU-Asia relations. 
 
 
3.3      The Reasoning of the French diplomacy to lift the arms embargo 
In the next two sections, I will justify the position of the French diplomacy and establish 
the French response to the Europeanization of the China policy. I contacted representatives 
from the executive and legislative branches, based on the timeline but also sometimes though 
recommendations and…chance.  
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The French case to lift the embargo rested on four points: the flaws of the embargo, 
the tightening of current export rules, the transformation of China and finally the economic 
potential. 
 First of all, the current system was not satisfactory. The 1989 recommendation did 
not constitute an embargo per se since armament licenses exclusively depended on domestic 
legislation and state authorities.221 When the EU arms embargo was announced in 1989, the 
European Community had no formal foreign and security policy. The decision was taken, 
along with other temporary steps, such as suspending bilateral ministerial contacts and 
reducing scientific and cultural cooperation. There was no formal mechanism to govern the 
embargo enforced by member states until 1998, when the EU introduced a Code of Conduct 
to regulate its arms sales to the rest of the world. The EU never agreed to make the Code of 
Conduct legally binding. Instead the rationale was that the increased transparency it 
established for member states’ arms sales would ensure they abided by its other provisions, 
such as taking into account human rights, the security of friends and allies, and regional 
stability.222 Despite the initial purpose, the embargo did not stop the exportation of weapons 
or sensitive technologies to China, since it did not cover dual-use technologies (civilian and 
military). The embargo, which only covered lethal weapons, was incomplete in any case, and 
its lift would have minor consequences on the transfer of sensitive technologies. Dual-use 
technology was already under strict national controls, and the European Union had proposed 
tightening its code of conduct on sensitive exports if it lifts the embargo against China.223 
Other countries such as Canada and Australia did not apply or no longer applied such 
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restrictive measures and did lift their embargo in 1992. Ultimately, the export license refusal 
depended on the national export control regime and dual use technology was already under 
strict state controls.224  
The second reason motivating a lift was a strengthening of export modalities: the 
1998 Code of Conduct was to be tightened, including a revision of the tool box, revision of 
the military list of the EU, the inclusion of brokering operations, transit and transfer of 
intangible goods,  the mandatory publication of a government report, and specific 
transparency measures set for countries coming out of the embargo such as notification to the 
rest of the EU member states of the exports from the last five years, reexamination of the 
refusal of licenses during the embargo and  reporting once every three months of the 
delivered items). The 1998 EU law was a great guarantee of earnest regulations. The 
argument was that the EU arms business remained tightly controlled under the code barring 
the sale of equipment that could be used in regional conflicts or domestic repression, which 
would still be enforceable on sales to China.225  
Since the 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms 
and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, listing which equipment should be controlled 
through export control lists, practices had been refined and French exports were strictly 
regulated. Indeed, the Wassenaar list was only a minimal common standard which could be 
interpreted differently in country lists of controlled exports. French diplomacy thought there 
was a misunderstanding of their strategic reasoning: despite the lift, high tech products would not 
be exported, since there might be an issue of counterfeiting the technology:  there was a robust 
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internal ruling at both the state and EU level.
226
 “Lifting the embargo doesn't mean at all that 
we are going to sell more arms to China," declared Michelle Alliot-Marie, French Minister of 
Defense from 2002 to 2007.227 As China continued to direct some 450-plus missiles at 
Taiwan, there is little chance that any long-range missile technology could be sold to the 
country. The French and other proponents of the Code argued that this code would provide a 
safety net to the easing of the embargo -- that would prevent the sale of any technology that 
could be used to threaten another state.228 The embargo was largely symbolic and the same 
effect could be obtained with strict export controls.229 
The third argument from France was that China had changed a lot since 1989: there 
was new leadership and a genuine willingness to integrate with the international community. 
The French noted Beijing’s inclusion in the World Trade Organization and help bring North 
Korea to the negotiating table. These efforts had thawed relations and reintegrated China in 
the international order. China was very different from the other embargoed countries such as 
Sudan, Zimbabwe or Burma. The relationship was from one major power to another230. 
China was also more inclined to perceive this measure as discriminatory, especially since 
Iran and North Korea were not included. The French government noted some positive 
developments in the Chinese stance vis-à-vis international standards in nonproliferation. The 
implementation of Chinese policy in terms of import control of weapons had been 
strengthened, and France was pleased with Chinese efforts to comply with the existing 
norms. French diplomacy saw the embargo as anachronistic as relations between Europe and 
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China improved, Beijing was a privileged partner and a responsible one.231 Defense Minister 
Alliot-Marie, among others in the French leadership, argued that it was unfair to maintain an 
embargo that sent a powerful negative signal. She said that denying weapons sales to China 
could even accelerate the country's own weapons programs.232The embargo became a 
stumbling bloc to normalization. French officials were constantly harangued by the Chinese 
on the issue at almost every bilateral meeting.233  
The French certainly recognized that there was room for improvement as far as 
human rights were concerned. France, however, noted some positive progress from the 
Chinese authorities such as the inscription of human rights in the Chinese constitution and 
the recent creation of a working group in charge of preparing the ratification of a United 
Nations pact on political and civil rights. Furthermore, the EU continued a dialogue with 
China on human rights, which helped to make progress. France did not believe that 
maintaining the embargo was an effective solution to sustain progress on the human rights 
issue: it was more a political issue than a trade one.  The Chinese did not necessarily need the 
French to build a tank or a missile, but they were not as advanced as far as helicopter 
technology, for instance. It was not through the embargo that progress could be obtained in 
terms of human rights, argued the French.234 
A non-official reason to lift the embargo was an expansion of the commercial and 
industrial relationship between the EU and China in a variety of non-defense related sectors 
that would automatically benefit the French. This was in view of the very significant political 
                                                 
231 Wolfe Adam Wolfe. France and Germany move to resume arms sales to China. Power and Interest News 
Report, (February 11, 2004).  
232 Craig  Smith. “In US visit, French envoy seeks support on arms issue” New York Times, March 29, 2005 
233 Daniel Dombey and Peter Spiegel “Up in arms: why Europe is ready to defy the US and lift its weapons ban 
on China,” The Financial Times, February 10, 2005 
234 Bonnardot Gérard, Army controller / Advisor to the President of the Defense Committee / French National 
Assembly, Interview by Vivien Exartier, Paris, France, December 13 2007 
 92
weight that such a decision would carry in Chinese eyes, and the lifting of the embargo 
would actually lead to a string of major Chinese purchases of European products.235 
According to the European Union, French export licenses for armament to China were valued 
at $228 million in 2003, the most of any member country, and up from $140 million in 2002. 
236 At almost every bilateral meeting, purchase agreements were discussed. When President 
Chirac argued strongly in favor of the lift of the embargo and an EU recognition of market 
economy status (MES) to China during his 2004 trip to China, he knew that internal divisions 
within the EU were too deep to reach a quick decision. Yet, by telling his Chinese 
counterparts what they wanted to hear, he generated $4-5 billion worth of business contracts. 
During the visit of Prime Minister Raffarin in China in April 2005, forty purchase 
agreements were signed237. 
 
 
3.4     The French response to Europeanization of China policy in the case of the arms  
embargo 
The French EU policy decision making pattern238 theoretically includes four aspects: 
the EU’s inner decision-making patterns, France’s domestic policy patterns, a process of 
interest conciliation with other member states, and a process of conciliation between the 
national and the Community levels. The formulation of French national interest is multi-
layered and the decision process is more diffuse and under Commission and European Court 
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of Justice scrutiny, since EU law supersedes domestic law (mostly in pillar I domain). The 
EU’s policy formulation is then often the result of a cumulative process of micro-
negotiations and micro-decisions by countless actors, public and private over which the 
central government has little control. However, in the case of foreign policy this does not 
hold true and in the specific issue of the arms embargo, the top of the leadership formulated 
and tried to have the policy implemented. The French Parliament does not have much 
authority when it comes to foreign policy despite a special commission dealing with 
European Union issues and could only request hearings with government members and EU 
officials as for China sanction policies.  
The goal is to evaluate the overall pattern of French institutional responses to 
Europeanization, which is defined as the development of European policy on China, the 
enactment of legal procedures such as the embargo, the transfer of competences and the 
creation of norms and identities, in other words as the emergence of European governance. 
What is the goodness of fit or the mismatch between the EU and France on China policy? In 
previous chapters, we identified the relevant Europeanization processes, formal and informal, 
norms, rules, regulations, procedures at the European level for member states.  The China 
policy implies a certain set of processes including the arms embargo. They necessitate some 
adjustments on the domestic level of the member states so that states can be in compliance 
with EU norms, rules and procedures. Whether these policy adjustments (transposing EU 
rules into domestic law) lead to domestic structural change is our central research question. 
We use Börzel’s classification of the three types of responses from member states to EU 
policy on China. I argue there is no mismatch between France and the EU China policy 
especially in the case of the lift of the arms embargo on China since France has been a pace-
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setter and did upload its preferences at the EU level. We then review the five mediating 
factors to explain France’s adaptation pattern. 
It is ironic to see that France has been a pace-setter on the embargo policy in general:  
from the set-up of the arms embargo on China to the lift. We explained earlier that France 
has been a pace-setter on several episodes of the EU China policy and profoundly shaped EU 
China relations.  France has been an instigator of a push to lift the embargo as early as 1997. 
The issue was first discussed by Robin Cook, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and 
Hubert Védrine, his French counterpart239. The issue was never brought on the agenda by the 
army or the defense industry. It always has been at head of state level: a defense matter could 
be discussed within the Defense Council level (composed of the President, the Prime 
Minister, the Defense Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister, and the Minister for the Economy) 
or between the SGDN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale_General Secretariat of 
National Defense) and the President.240 The issue came back to the fore on 30 June 2003, 
when the French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie visited Beijing and publicly 
declared a willingness to urge the EU to relax arms restrictions on China. At the time, her 
comments passed largely unnoticed, as the move was widely perceived as a general attempt 
to increase French-Chinese trade in all areas, only possibly including arms sales.241 A few 
months later, both leaders of France and Germany declared their intention to lift the embargo. 
France and other proponents of the lift used different ways to promote their agenda: public 
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speeches, press conferences, interviews in newspapers, requests to discuss it in Brussels 
meetings, and, of course, private meetings. 
While visiting Beijing in December 2003, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder 
told Premier Wen Jiabao that “the time had come” to lift the embargo. On December 12 and 
13 at an EU summit, French President Jacques Chirac led European leaders in referring the 
issue to their respective foreign ministers, urging them “to re-examine the question of the 
embargo on the sale of arms to China. The foreign ministers would reexamine it in January 
2004.242 On December 17, the European Parliament rejected such a proposal in a landslide. 
China’s continued human rights abuses were a valid reason not to lift the ban for the 
European Parliament. The European Parliament has only a consultative role in foreign policy 
matters, but the strong reaction against the proposal which gathered the support of all of the 
Parliament’s party groups, would probably influence the foreign ministers. 243 
At the first EU General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting of the year in 
Brussels on January 26, 2004, France suggested that the embargo should be lifted at the next 
EU Council meeting in March. Foreign Affairs minister Villepin declared: ‘Our feeling is 
that the embargo is out of date as relations between Europe and China improve’. However, 
Villepin recognized that a lift was not possible yet without further discussion, especially in 
the area of human rights.244 As expected, EU foreign ministers failed to reach an agreement 
after discussing the issue. They asked two working groups under the European Council, the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Political and Security Committee, to 
examine the matter further. The day after the ministerial meeting, President Chirac, at a joint 
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conference with visiting Chinese President Hu Jintao to kick off the celebrations of the year 
of China, publicly called for the lifting of the arms embargo on China.”245 Chirac qualified it 
as ‘outdated’ and that such an embargo did not make any sense today. Chirac said he hoped 
the ban on Beijing would be scrapped in the coming months. It is interesting to note that 
there was not necessarily a consensus within French political class at the time. During 
President Jintao's speech at the French National Assembly, almost half of the delegates 
boycotted the event and some were involved in demonstrations with human rights activists 
outside.   
At the EU level though, it appeared at the time that the vast majority of members 
favored lifting the arms embargo, arguing that China does not belong in the same category as 
Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe – the three other countries against whom there is an EU 
arms embargo. Even the Netherlands, which had been reluctant to act, indicated in late 
January that it was willing to go along if the majority of EU members were in favor of ending 
the embargo246 On February 4, Javier Solana, the E.U. foreign policy chief, was quoted in the 
Geneva newspaper ‘Le Temps’ as saying, "It seems to me, after discussions we had a few 
days ago … [that] the E.U. is ready to do it."247 During the spring, on March 20, as an early 
result of the aspiration for closer military cooperation with China, the first participation of a 
European state (France) in joint maneuvers with the Chinese navy took place. That was the 
largest exercise with a foreign navy in the history of the People’s Republic.248 
By the fall of 2004, France had about half of the members on its side. EU officials 
estimate that 16 of the 25 member states favored lifting the embargo (led by France, Italy, 
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Spain, and Germany), while Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Ireland, Portugal, Poland and 
perhaps one or two other new Eastern European members opposed lifting it. France had 
planned on having the embargo lifted before the accession of ten new members in March249 
and that not being the case complicated the campaign. In September, the UK and the 
Netherlands were studiously neutral on the issue although both were key actors to swinging 
the balance, given Britain’s prestige and the fact that the Dutch held the presidency of the 
EU. All European states seemed to agree that the embargo was anachronistic, given the 
overall health of Sino-European relations and the agreement on a ‘strategic partnership’.250 
While conducting an October 2004 state visit to Beijing, President Chirac declared that he 
would personally strive to end the embargo, the continuation of which was “motivated purely 
and simply by hostility.” Now, expectations were high both on the Chinese and much of the 
European side that the ban would be lifted by December 8, when EU and Chinese leaders 
would hold an annual summit in The Hague.251 
A couple of days before the crucial EU-China summit at The Hague, France came to 
the fore with its arguments. Through the voice of the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Cecile 
Pozzo di Borgio, French diplomacy repeated that  the embargo no longer corresponded to the 
reality of the European-Chinese strategic partnership, that member states of the EU agreed on 
this and that the discussions were focused on the time table and the modalities for the lifting 
of the embargo.252  
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At the expected seventh EU-China summit on December 8, 2004, in the Hague, the 
E.U. “confirmed its political will to continue to work towards lifting the embargo.”253 During 
the summit, France and Germany pushed for and achieved in principle an agreement for the 
EU towards lifting the partial arms embargo. The agreement, however, did not specify the 
timeframe. The chance to see the issue resolved by the end of the Luxembourg presidency 
(first semester 2005) were null, and even the following UK presidency (second semester 
2005) was exceedingly unlikely to bring about a firm commitment. Some pessimistic voices 
contemplated the next window of opportunity as early as mid-2006.254 Two weeks later, 
though, the Council of the European Union approved the Joint Statement and called on the 
E.U. presidency to “finalize the well-advanced work in order to allow for a decision [on the 
embargo]” and “underlined that the result of any decision should not be an increase of arms 
exports from E.U. Member States to China, neither in quantitative nor qualitative terms.”255 
The Council further stressed that the E.U. should move to adopt a revised Code of Conduct 
on arms exports and a new instrument on exports to post embargo countries, known to as the 
“Toolbox.” Sensing a window of opportunity to advance the French agenda, President Chirac 
had strong words on the issue during his State visit in China right after the summit. On 
December 10 in Hong-Kong, President Chirac again characterized the embargo as ‘totally 
obsolete’ and that, based on Chinese military production,  nothing justified it. Chirac saw the 
question as somewhat symbolic and thought it was absurd to maintain it. ‘I think this is 
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becoming the majority feeling in Europe and, in the next few months, I think the matter will 
be settled, at the European Union level.’256 
February 2005 marked the visit of both Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and 
President George W. Bush to Europe. The visit was supposed to help mend fences after the 
Iraq crisis and following President Bush’s reelection. The US was strongly opposed to the lift 
of the embargo. The visits were a good opportunity for French officials once again publicly 
to call for the lift. The French minister of Defense, Michelle Alliot Marie, in an interview 
with ‘The Financial Times’, before a trip to the US to try to persuade the US partners, stated 
that since China’s domestic military industry will be capable of producing ‘exactly the same 
arms’ that France has within five years, maintaining the embargo is pointless and ‘lifting it 
could be better protection for us than maintaining it.’257 President Chirac also took into 
account US concerns by beefing up security guarantees. 258 The Head of State always worded 
it in a way that Europe intends to lift the ban, not just France: “Vis-a-vis China, Europe 
intends to lift the last obstacles to its relations with this great power of the 21st century, in a 
spirit of responsibility and transparence with its allies’’259Mr. Chirac called China “a 
strategic partner” of the European Union and the arms embargo “unjustifiable”. President 
Chirac pledged that the embargo would be lifted in such a way that both Europe and the 
United States could be assured that the strategic balance would be preserved.260 
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The EU summit in Brussels on March 22-24, 2005, showed a shift of the coalition. 
The embargo issue was not on the formal agenda for the two-day EU, but the issue was 
discussed in private sessions and at news conferences.261 France and Germany used the EU 
summit to reassert their credentials as the leading proponents of lifting the embargo. ‘There 
is no reason to think that there has been a change in this area,” said Chirac, the French 
president.262 While Chirac remained committed to resuming weapons sales, EU officials said 
the leaders of Britain and several other European countries were backing away from making 
an immediate decision. The EU consensus had fallen apart under increasing pressure from 
the United States, a new Chinese threat to Taiwan, and intensified criticism at home from the 
opposition socialist party and the media. French officials believed that the UK had used the 
controversy over China’s anti-secession law as a pretext for meeting US demands.263 EU 
leaders, however, emphasized that they still wanted to lift the bloc’s arms embargo on China, 
while avoiding giving any guarantees on when the controversial move would take place. At 
the end of the summit, the prospect of a lift of the embargo during the first half of the year, as 
once planned, seemed out of reach. 
Following this failure, the French politicians did not give up. April saw more 
lobbying from the French to win over reluctant partners. When on the road, Michel Barnier, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, always brought up the issue either with his counterparts or 
during press conferences. In April, Barnier publicly stressed the importance of Europe's 
burgeoning relationship with China, hoping to see the EU return to the issue in June. "We 
will continue to work for a lifting of the ban. It is an important element in our relations with 
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China.264" A few days later, Barnier met with Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moller to 
discuss several issues, including the lift of the arms embargo. On the eve of a visit to 
Washington, Barnier made the argument that the EU had a different understanding of the 
way in which China was evolving on the international stage.” There is a real, fundamental 
difference of perception that we have about China on both sides of the Atlantic, and it gets 
back to the classic argument that one cannot treat China like Zimbabwe."265 The US 
opposition had a déjà vu reminiscent of the rift caused by the invasion of Iraq, with Barnier 
in the front line rebuffing US criticisms of the European Union's plans to lift its arms 
embargo on China saying that "warnings or threats" were not "useful" at a time when both 
sides were trying to improve transatlantic relations.  
The French had two difficulties to overcome: not only did they have to win the 
argument within the EU but they also needed to deliver the lift to the Chinese. As mentioned 
earlier, the issue was brought up at every Franco-Sino bilateral meeting. During those 
meetings, government officials needed to remind the Chinese of their commitment to this 
issue and their dedication to succeed. Such commitment also contributed towards furthering 
the trade relationship. On a visit to China to sign commercial deals, including the purchase of 
four Airbus super jumbos worth of $4Bn, Prime Minister Raffarin reaffirmed to Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao his support for the lift. Raffarin characterized the embargo as 
“anachronistic, wrongfully discriminatory and in complete contradiction of the current state 
of the strategic partnership between Europe and China”266. France seemed to lose patience 
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over the non-resolution of the issue; Premier Raffarin’s words showed certain astonishment 
in the slowness of the process: “France continues to require the lifting of the embargo and 
does not see what could lead the European Council to change its position on the subject”267 
The French suffered a severe blow to their credibility as an EU leader in the fiasco of 
the French population’s rejection of the EU Constitution project through a referendum in 
May 2005. There was a vacancy of leadership in the weeks following this astonishing defeat 
when diplomats and the military were waiting for the instructions from the President on the 
topic. Some personnel was also starting having second thoughts. At the Defense ministry, 
there was the feeling that persisting in that direction was not such a good idea. The US could 
set some retaliatory measures against French manufacturers (major and middle sized 
ones).268The situation with Germany and Britain also evolved: Chancellor Schröder was 
getting involved with the general elections, Premier Blair, before the European Parliament, 
on June 23, 2005, did not mention the issue and did not seem willing to deal with it either 
during upcoming Britain EU presidency (second semester 2005).  
December 2005 saw the first visit of Wen Jiabao to France as Prime Minister. It 
concluded an exceptional series of exchanges between both countries. Two thousand and 
four was the year of China in France and 2005 was the year of France in China. Both visits of 
President Chirac in China and President Hu in France contributed to the launch of the 
strategic partnership between the two countries. The strategic partnership certainly helped to 
deepen the political dialogue and further cooperation in several domains. The visit was a new 
chance to renew the call for a lift of the embargo. Prime Minister Villepin stated that 
France’s position was well known and had not changed. ‘We consider the arms embargo an 
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anachronism and that it doesn’t reflect the real state of relations between China and the 
international community…We will continue to work for it to be lifted.’269 France was, 
however, more isolated on the EU stage since Britain disengaged from the debate and that 
there was new leadership in Germany that was not so sympathetic to French views on the 
issue. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Philippe Douste-Blazy, detailed again the French 
position in a press conference and recognized the difficulties to further a strategic partnership 
on the one hand and to maintain an arms embargo on the other. The French case rested on the 
conclusions adopted by the European Council in December 2004. There was not so much 
optimism on the issue, however, even if France wished to continue working on this question 
in order to reach a European decision despite the difficulties.  The important point that 
France constantly repeated, as mentioned in the conclusions of the European Council, was 
that a lift would not lead to an increase in arms exports to China, quantitatively nor 
qualitatively. This was  stressed repeatedly both at the national level, through the French 
interministerial committee on the exports of sensitive materials, and at the European level in 
the European Code of Conduct which defined a number of principles and then an addendum 
added to the Code of Conduct for countries emerging from the embargo. Douste-Blazy 
summed up the argument by saying that there was above all a political will to lift the 
embargo which does not reflect the real state of relations between China and the international 
community, but at the same time a responsible attitude in not increasing increase arms 
exports by maintaining very strict control over these exports. ‘270 
The issue was not brought up again until the ninth China-European Union summit in 
September 2006, when the Chinese Premier received a pledge that Europe would continue 
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efforts towards lifting the embargo. One month later, French President Chirac declared his 
opposition to the embargo in a joint communiqué: “The moment has come for the EU to 
make the most of the expanding partnership between the EU and China, most notably by 
lifting the arms embargo which is no longer pertinent to the present situation.”271 
A couple of months later, at the External Relations Council on December 11, 2006 
France linked the lifting of the arms embargo with an update of the European code of 
conduct, recalling that it had been decided to update the European Code of Conduct in order 
to put an end to the sanctions against China. Catherine Colonna, the Minister for European 
Affairs insisted that the Code could not be adopted until the embargo had been lifted. At this 
meeting, a large majority of member states were still opposed to lifting the embargo. 272  
Two thousand and seven saw a vacancy in the champions of the lift and gave a coup 
de grâce to the initiative. Following Chancellor Schröder’s departure from office, President 
Chirac ended his term in May and did not seek reelection. His potential replacements on the 
French side publicly declared their opposition to the lift273. These contrasted to the repeated 
calls once again by Minister Alliot-Marie on a final trip to Asia. The new team in Germany 
also publicly opposed the lift through the voice of the new Defense Minister Jung on a visit 
to Japan. When Nicolas Sarkozy took office, the official position from the French diplomacy 
was the same as under Chirac except that the issue is no longer a priority274.  
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4.5     Goodness of Fit 
 The Cowles, Risse and Caporaso theoretical model aims at explaining adaptation or 
convergence275. The model does look into the presence or absence of mediating factors to 
predict whether reform is going to take place and how much domestic change adjusting to 
Europeanization should be expected.  Based on Cowles Risse and Caporaso original 
mediating factors, the questionnaire and the response of France to the EU China policy, I 
identified the following factors: veto points, the country’s organizational and policymaking 
culture, the human rights issue, the trade issue and  the empowerment of external actors. At 
this stage, we already established that there was no mismatch between EU policy and French 
policy on the embargo policy and that French and EU policies converged. However, in the 
end of the day, the lift did not go through and it is interesting to review those mediating 
factors to understand the goodness of fit between French and EU aspirations, but the 
mismatch with other member states. 
The existence of ‘veto points’ in the domestic structure has been identified as a major 
factor preventing structural adaptation276. The more power is dispersed across the political 
system and the more actors have a say in political decision making, the more difficult is to 
foster the domestic consensus or ‘winning coalition’ necessary to introduce institutional 
changes in response to Europeanization pressures. In the case of the lift of the arms embargo, 
the French lobbying was led by the Presidency and the government. There is in the French 
system a traditional division of labor where the Presidency is the main agenda-setter and 
decision-maker in foreign policy, and the government mostly in charge of domestic politics. 
The dynamic of the initiative was successful because the agenda was exclusively controlled 
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by the Presidency and not really questioned within the political framework. The initiative did 
however fail and did not reach the necessary majority to go through at the EU level. The veto 
points become then the other member states who blocked the initiative in the European 
Council.  
 ‘The country’s organizational and policymaking cultures’, seen as a third mediating 
factor, also affects whether domestic actors can use adaptation pressures emanating from 
Europeanization to induce structural change. A culture based on consensus, for example, 
would overcome veto points. The French organizational and policymaking cultures favored a 
pro-Chinese policy but did not serve it well vis-a-vis its partners. Gaullist France has been 
historically close to the PRC since the beginnings: President de Gaulle was the one who first 
recognized the PRC in 1964. When the Gaullist party won by a large majority in the 
parliamentary election in 1993, there was quite a reversal on China policy and a much more 
favorable attitude vis-a-vis the PRC, considering the tougher stance under Socialist President 
Mitterrand (including the setup of the embargo following the Tiananmen Square massacre). 
President Chirac gave his full attention to the relationship with the PRC as soon as he was 
elected in 1995 and had been cultivating ties with the Chinese leadership in his precedent 
positions. President Chirac’s conception of a multipolar world implied that China be treated 
as a peer with its own political and democratic values, with no expectation to follow a 
Western society model. The French political culture and conception of China’s role however 
did not necessarily match its partners’. There is traditionally a wide range of opinions within 
EU members when it comes to the relationship with China because it is a multiple-faceted 
one. In terms of the Franco-Chinese relationship, President Chirac had emphasized a 
partnership with China based on the economic potential but also for geopolitical reasons. 
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Both China and France agreed on the concept of multipolarity to constrain US influence 
through the establishment of alternatives poles of power. Their joint opposition to the 2003 
Iraq War strengthened their ties, and President Chirac was often seen as the most pro-
Chinese among European leaders. For some other Europeans, China is a huge threat because 
it does not comply with social and environmental criteria, intellectual property rights, and of 
course human rights. “The very positive point of view of Chirac did not suffice to convince 
the other Europeans to reach a consensus” according to French former Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Hubert Védrine. Védrine estimated that the idea of a strategic partnership was mostly 
words and premature, and translated more as aspirations than anything else. A partnership 
had been signed but that did not prevent China from increasing its military spending. A 
consulting mechanism to discuss these questions was essential to set up, but China can 
certainly not be called as a partner yet.277  
The stance on human rights was a key factor to determine whether a country would 
follow the EU policy. The issue separated the pros and cons of a closer relationship with the 
PRC and ultimately of a lift of the embargo. The French could not obtain consensus within 
their partners, despite numerous attempts to distinguish between the embargo and the human 
rights issues.  To French diplomacy, these were not questions of the same order. When 
questioned on the topic, the French leadership always asserted its commitment to the defense 
of human rights. Chirac, during his visit in China, even called it as a “personal point of 
pride”. The French were probably not as confrontational as other European powers on the 
issue, and they believed that it helped them in deepening their relationship with China.  
France was always encouraged by small steps in the right direction rather than look at a 
grimmer general situation. President Chirac much appreciated the fact that it was at the 
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French National Assembly that President Hu Jintao chose to elaborate on his ideas about the 
development of human rights in China. “It was a very strong gesture by this great old nation 
of China, whose culture is different from ours and where any developments naturally take 
time”. Likewise, France was truly pleased to see that China included the recognition of 
human rights in her Constitution. From this point of view, the cooperation initiated between 
specialists in French and Chinese law – French legal experts, professors and technical experts 
working constantly with their Chinese colleagues to draw up legislation, reforms, codes –was 
by far the most positive way of moving forward. The French leadership always believed that 
it was through dialogue, certainly not confrontation, that changes which ‘seem desirable for 
tomorrow’s world” would occur.278 The embargo was a political question related to the state 
of relations between China and the international community, and then there was the issue of 
human rights, but that separation was invisible to the most of the EU members. Chirac’s 
approach to human rights in China was pragmatic and accommodated the Chinese 
government for cultural relativism.279 
The trade motivation is essential to understand why France would respond positively 
to further Europeanization of China policy. Despite a strong showing in the armament market 
at the time_ French export licenses for armament to China were valued at $228 million in 
2003, the most of any member country, and up from $140 million in 2002_ 280  the French 
economic presence was still lagging behind Britain and Germany. Three sets of factors 
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explained this lackluster performance. First, traditionally, attempts to increase economic 
presence were driven by large scale ‘grands contrats’ signed by the French and Chinese 
governments. The French had failed to coax small and medium sized enterprises. Unlike their 
British and German counterparts, French businesses were unconvinced of making China a 
priority in their strategy281. France’s Foreign Ministry qualified the trade relationship as 
‘modest and imbalanced’. French companies only supplied 1.4% of Chinese imports, and the 
share had shrunk in recent years. The trade deficit with China had been France’s largest 
deficit. Second, French economic initiatives in China tended to shadow policies spearheaded 
by Germany and to a lesser extent Britain and the European Commission. French 
governments made a strong political push to catch up with the Germans and tried copying the 
German model of strong political and economic relations with China. That might explain this 
unexpected common Franco-German front on the issue of the embargo.  Unlike in Germany, 
however, the social effects of French companies relocations, and human rights questions 
championed by the French intelligentsia, prevented large scale transfer of French production 
to China. Third, French economic policies were hamstrung by domestic politics and 
competing industrial interests. This is no doubt true of French economic strategies in the rest 
of Asia, but they were worsened in the case of China as a result of especially strong pressures 
on French government exerted by high-tech military industries, which found a lucrative 
market in Taiwan, and the demands of aerospace, infrastructure and communication 
industries, which found in China their most important potential market.282 
Fourth,   the ‘differential empowerment of external actors and learning’ mattered, 
whereas Cowles, Caporaso and Risse considered the domestic level only. Structural changes 
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lead to a redistribution of power capacities among the relevant actors with interests in this 
policy. The possibility of the lift empowered first the USA who strongly opposed the 
initiative. The general context was certainly not favorable to a lift,283 especially based on the 
nature of the transatlantic relationship at that time due to the Iraq issue. The American 
misgiving towards the proposed lifting of the embargo had been well known in official 
circles ever since France and Germany started the process in late 2003, but it blew up to a 
major crisis between the US and Europe in February 2005, on the eve of the official visits to 
Europe by Secretary of State Rice and President Bush. The explosion should be blamed 
squarely to the appalling ineptitude and inefficiency of the respective bureaucracies and 
diplomacies, which could have seen the approaching storm well in advance and navigate 
their political authorities well clear of it.284 The American reaction was also rather emotional, 
preferring threats over a rational analysis of the issues. The Chinese diplomacy also lacked 
finesse and turned out to be counterproductive, giving extra ammunition to the opponents285. 
The potential rift was too reminiscent of the Iraq crisis and created cracks in the coalition.   
The U.S. opposition rested on two arguments. On the one hand, Congress feared that 
American soldiers serving in the region might one day find themselves facing European 
weaponry in a showdown over Taiwan, while on the other, there was the fear that American 
technology or weaponry sold to Europe could leak out and end up again facing American 
forces in the Asia Pacific region. In February 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives 
adopted a resolution stating that it deplored increased E.U. sales and moves to lift the 
embargo, and declaring that those moves “place European security policy in direct conflict 
with U.S. security interests.” The resolution, which passed by a vote of 411-3, further warned 
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that, if Europe did not change course, the Congress would have to consider “limitations and 
constraints” on transatlantic defense-industrial ties. Britain looked at their commercial 
interests and cooperation programs and would rapidly abandon the ship. But even within the 
French armament industry, some officials were sympathetic to the Bush administration’s 
concern about the transfer of technology to China. Most of the European defense firms that 
were doing business with the Pentagon would lose more than they would gain from selling to 
the Chinese.  
The Chinese also involuntarily tanked the initiative when the March 2005 session of 
the National People’s Congress passed the China’s new anti-secession law. The law certainly 
called for peaceful solutions to the Taiwan question. But it also included a ‘trigger 
mechanism’ that would lead to the use of military force if Taiwan took steps towards 
independence. The British Foreign Minister at the time warned that the law created a 
‘difficult political environment’ while his German counterpart Joschka Fisher talked about a 
setback in EU-China relations286. It fueled the US rhetoric that arming China would have 
serious consequences for the cross-strait security of the island. The US had been instrumental 
in building Taiwan’s defense and was committed to defending it in case of an attack. 
Geopolitically, the US was also opposed to see China challenge the distribution of power in a 
region that the U.S. currently controls with an accompanying  fear that   the effects of a 
potential realignment could occur around the world.’287 
There was no mismatch between France and the EU when it came to a policy to lift 
the arms embargo.  The French weapons export system was compliant and well regulated. 
France had been a pace-setter in China policy for years and the lift of the embargo followed 
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that trend. The French leadership was a key actor in setting the agenda for a EU policy, as the 
successful outcome of the 2004 The Hague summit showed. Germany was also a heavy 
weight in the debate as well as some other member states (Italy and Spain) but not to the 
extent of France, and this partly due to the personal commitment of President Chirac. 288 
There was more of a mismatch between the French and other member states’ aspirations. The 
failure of the initiative was not an issue of effectiveness on the account of the French or the 
EU, but more of timing, sensitivity and some clumsiness on the part of the Chinese 
diplomacy. The context prevented a prompt resolution due to a fragile transatlantic 
relationship, an unconvincing human rights record, and the antisecession law on Taiwan. 
France was certainly effective in the way the government used every possible means to 
communicate about the benefit of lifting the embargo: press conferences at bilateral 
meetings, interviews, agenda-setting in EU meetings (at the Council level and COREPER). 
Indeed, the initial discussions took place in December 2003 and went on for almost three 
years without a clear resolution even if it got close to reaching a consensus in several 
instances. A drawn-out process harmed the French and the Germans, who originally wanted 
the EU to take action before the 2004 March entrance of ten new members289. France 
probably promised the Chinese that the lift would not be an issue and that it would easily 
convince its partners, but France did not have the expected influence on the outcomes. 
France’s credibility suffered and showed the Chinese that France did not have the leadership 
and expected influence within the European Union. 290 The issue festered due to some 
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hesitations from undecided members but also suffered several blows. The anti-Taiwan 
secession law and the swift and vigorous American campaign crippled the initiative in the 
Spring 2005291. By March 2005, most of the members were having second thoughts about 
ending the embargo by June as initially planned and a loyal US ally, the United Kingdom, 
would not put the issue on the agenda for their presidency in the second half of the year. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The influence of Britain 
 
 
4.0     Introduction 
 
 Among the three European States, Britain probably has the most developed 
and extensive ties with China. Britain was in disagreement with the US isolation 
policy of the PRC between 1949 and 1971 and was the first Western country to 
recognize the PRC in 1950 (although ambassadors were not exchanged until March 
1972292. In the UK’s relationship with China, the colonial past in the form of Hong 
Kong-still looms large. The ‘other elephant in the room’ is the US: London’s close 
ties with Washington have at times complicated its relationship with China. The issue 
of the embargo is a perfect illustration: the UK initially supported the Franco-German 
initiative but started delaying it when US opposition emerged. I argue there is a not 
necessarily a mismatch between the UK and the EU China policy but more a lack of 
consistency. The UK would have had the means to comply with the ban but, 
politically, switched its mind: the UK was a fence-sitter, then a follower and then a 
foot dragger on the issue by taking the lead on delaying the initiative. Just as for 
France and Germany, we will review first UK-PRC relations and the track record of 
the Europeanization of UK China policy, then examine the reasoning of the British 
diplomacy in the issue of the embargo before we examine the specific response and 
finally analyze the goodness of fit between EU and China policy. 
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4.1    Relations with the PRC and Track record of the Europeanization of UK-
China policy 
Hong Kong was historically the most important political issue between London 
and Beijing. The return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty dominated the bilateral 
relations between 1979 and 1997. The Joint Declaration on the question of Hong 
Kong signed by the two governments on 19 December 1984 ushered in a period of 
sound development in Sino-British relations, as evidenced by important two-way 
visits and many agreements signed for cooperation in various fields293. However, the 
fallout from the Tiananmen incident and the appointment of a British activist 
governor, Chris Patten, in Hong Kong in 1992, disrupted smooth relations otherwise. 
Following the 1997 handover, the relationship improved since the UK294 received 
guarantees from China that Hong Kong would keep a large degree of autonomy and a 
high level of democratic freedom under the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, as a 
Special Administrative Unit. The UK watched closely developments in Hong Kong 
despite an increased EU involvement in China-UK relations295: the future of Hong 
Kong has increasingly become a EU issue rather than solely a member state one. 296 
But the British often criticize China for the state of the democracy in Hong Kong, 
which resulted in heated exchanges in 2004. To this day, every semester, the British 
Foreign Office sends update to the British Parliament and every time, the Chinese 
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protest it is an interference in their internal affairs297.  The British worked hard to win 
assurances from China that basic democratic freedoms and rights would be respected 
after Hong Kong was transferred to Chinese sovereignty in July 1997. 
While the UK government is still more likely to speak out about democratic 
shortcomings in Hong Kong than one other EU governments, it does not make too 
much of an issue about human rights in China. The foreign office website states that 
‘the human rights situation in China continues to be a matter of serious concern” and 
it expresses particular concern about the treatment of Falun Gong members (a small 
handful of whom set up a permanent vigil outside the Chinese embassy in London.) 
But when Premier Blair visited with his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao in May 
2004, human rights were not included in the agenda. In its political dialogue with 
China, the UK has been trying to engage Beijing specifically on African 
development, climate change, and non-proliferation.298 
It seemed that ensuring a good relationship with the Chinese partner was a 
priority in the Blair years, 1997 through 2007. Under Blair’s leadership, there was a 
significant effort to deepen the relationship between these countries through regular 
consultation and exchange at the leadership level. A comprehensive agreement was 
signed between prime ministers Zhu and Blair in 1998 to intensify their political and 
military dialogues and to work together towards a more peaceful and secure world. In 
October 2003, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo met with William 
Geoffrey Eheman, director general of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
and pledged  efforts to develop a "comprehensive strategic partnership" to benefit 
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both countries. The goal of such a partnership was to establish a consultation 
mechanism on strategic security conducive to exchanges and cooperation in security 
and arms control and, ultimately, to promote bilateral relations.299 
A year later,  at a 2004 December  UK -China summit in London, both 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and British Prime Minister Tony Blair reaffirmed their 
ties and their common interests in working together on bilateral, multilateral, and 
global issues and also pledged to develop a "comprehensive strategic partnership". At 
the time, both countries saw the relationship as a top international priority. Progress 
had been made since the original discussions in 2003 with the establishment of task 
forces, aimed at stepping up the development of bilateral relations, which had 
produced new proposals in trade and investment, finance, energy, education, science 
and technology, environment and sustainable development during a Blair visit to 
China in July 2004. In order to consolidate the bilateral relationship and to reinforce 
and extend political co-operation in fields such as strategic security and non-
proliferation, both leaderships agreed to step up the exchange of annual visits. For 
instance, the UK was pleased with the leadership role taken on by China in the Six-
Party Talks on Korea. At the same summit, both governments also agreed to stick to 
the "One Country, Two Systems" principle and the Basic Law concerning Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. The UK’s position on Taiwan had been consistent since the China-
UK Communiqué of 1972, in which the UK acknowledged that Taiwan was a 
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province of the People's Republic of China and recognized the Government of the 
People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China," 300 
 As for France and Germany, trade had also been an important issue that 
influenced the British approach. In terms of trade with China, the UK ranked behind 
Germany, some way behind the Netherlands, and about the same as France. In 2004, 
the UK imported four times more from China than it exported there (£10.6 vs. 2.4 
billion). The UK remained however one of the most important foreign investors in 
China ($19 billion) at the end of 2002.301 It has been even argued in the literature that 
the key actors in UK-China relations since 1997 are non-state economic ones. In 
developing a framework for relations with China since 1997, official UK policy 
towards China has had two main aims: to develop commercial opportunities for UK 
companies and to promote 'positive' social and political change in China302.  In 
theory, economic engagement should create a dense network of transnational 
interactions that would generate political change in China as it becomes deeply 
enmeshed in the global economy. In order to achieve this goal, the UK government 
has transferred much of the power from traditional diplomatic agencies to 
governmental economic agencies. More important, individual companies, whilst 
pursuing their own commercial activities, are effectively carrying out government 
policy in relation to China. Thus, the key actors in post-diplomatic relations with 
China are increasingly non-state economic actors303.  
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The aftermath of the case of the embargo is an example of an ambivalent 
British leadership: was Britain totally innocent in trying to clarify the scope of the 
embargo or was it purely based on trade appeal?  The UK was the first one to give a 
clarification of its interpretation of the arms embargo. 304The manner in which the 
embargo has been interpreted at the state level had always been less than full scope, 
because the EU embargo was not legally binding, each member state had been free to 
interpret its scope differently. In June 1995, under the Major administration, the UK 
decided to enforce an embargo on the sale to China of “weapons, and equipment 
which could be used for internal repression”305. The UK then identified the kinds of 
items for which licenses would be denied, including the following categories: lethal 
weapons such as machine guns, large calibers weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets 
and missiles; specially designed components of the above, and ammunition; military 
aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armored fighting vehicles and other such 
platforms: any equipment likely to be used for internal repression.  
The 1998 Code of Conduct introduced by Robin Cook, the British foreign 
Secretary was part of the Labour government's "ethical foreign policy"306.  The Code 
of Conduct prohibited EU partners from selling arms to countries that may use them 
for internal repression, in places where there have been serious human rights 
violations, and for provoking or prolonging conflicts.307 The UK would not permit the 
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export of goods “if there was a clear risk that they could be used for..external 
repression or to introduce new capabilities in the region”.308  
 While the UK blocked the transfer of lethal items and major weapon 
platforms, license applications to export other defense articles and services as well as 
dual-use goods and technologies intended for military applications were considered 
on a case-by-case basis against the CoC criteria309. Under this policy, the UK export 
control authorities approved exports of equipment which could serve commercial as 
well as military purposes.310 Britain’s interpretation of the embargo would not extend 
to avionics and radars.311The UK has reportedly supplied China Rcal / Thales 
Skymaster airborne early warning radars and Spey jet engines for the Chinese JH-7 
fighter bombers,  Searchwater, an airborne early warning radar system, which is  
produced in the UK, while the University of Surrey has cooperated with China in 
micro-satellite technology that could be used in anti-satellite weapons. 312,313. France, 
Italy and the UK continued to be the leading arms exporters to China whereas other 
EU states interpreted the embargo more strictly. In 2002, the UK sold arms to China 
worth of 79.5 million Euros out of a total for the EU of 209.8 and in 2003, 112.46 
million Euros out of a total of 461.2 millions314 
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4.2   Reasoning of the British Diplomacy 
In the next two sections, I will present the position of the British diplomacy and establish the 
British response to the Europeanization of the China policy.. As I mentioned in our 
methodology chapter, I contacted representatives from the executive and legislative branches, 
based on the timeline but also sometimes though recommendations and obtained eight 
positive responses. (See APPENDIX). 
The reasoning of  British diplomacy used French and German arguments but 
also developed its own.  Similar to the French position, the UK believed that China 
could not be treated the same as Zimbabwe and Burma since China was an important 
partner. Technically, the embargo did not have the force of law, unlike EU embargoes 
on Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burma, Zimbabwe and Bosnia315. 
The embargo was obsolete and ineffective because of the noncompliance issue and 
also based on the fact that the EU Code of Conduct governing arms exports was a 
better instrument for arms control than the current ban. Like the Germans, the British 
argued that since the CoC would stop arms transfers anyway, a review of the embargo 
should take place. But mainly, the British were more interested in modernizing the 
embargo rather than removing it and did show some sensitivity to possible US 
reactions to the process316 The reinforcement of the Code of Conduct became the key 
argument of the British diplomacy. EU experts agreed to a series of steps to 
strengthen the code, as well as special transitional measures to increase transparency 
about arms sales to countries previously the subject of embargoes. Among the 
changes were controls on the resale of arms, as well as on software that could be used 
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for weapons. The two outstanding decisions concerned whether to make the code 
legally binding and the duration of the transitional regime.317 
In early January 2005, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw told a Commons Select 
committee on Human Rights that the embargo was likely to be lifted in the following 
six months, despite his personal concerns on human rights and US objections. Straw 
thought that it was wrong to put China under the same embargo as countries such as 
Zimbabwe and Burma. Straw testified before the Joint Committee on Strategic Export 
Controls”  "I have long understood China's argument, that to lump them in with, say, 
Burma and Zimbabwe is not appropriate and I don't think it is,". At the time, Straw 
foresaw a likely lift of the ban before the beginning of the British presidency of the 
EU in July 2005. The point of view of Britain was that a strengthened EU Code of 
Conduct would prevent an increase in the number of arms being exported to China 
and that the arms control regime would be as effective as it was at the time. The 
embargo did not cover the sort of high-tech defense equipment that the Chinese 
military was seeking to acquire. Export of those technologies was controlled by the 
EU Code of Conduct (COC) on conventional arms, which is the primary means of 
controlling arms sales. Since May 2004, the COC has had the status of binding 
statutory guidance in the United Kingdom under EU law. All United Kingdom export 
licenses were considered strictly on a case-by-case basis against the COC’s criteria 
and the United Kingdom would not permit the export of goods if there was a clear 
risk that they could be used for internal repression, external aggression or to introduce 
new capabilities into the region. The United Kingdom did take very seriously the 
concerns that the United States government had about the effectiveness of the EU’s 
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system of arms control and shared the aspiration for continued stability in the East 
Asian region.318 
British diplomacy clearly pushed for an upgrade of the Code of Conduct. 
British diplomats believed that the arms embargo was clearly ineffective in 
preventing arms sales to China and that a revamped Code of Conduct would take care 
of the transparency issue. In the UK, more export licenses were refused under the 
existing European Union arms code than under the embargo. The new Code of 
Conduct, which was also non-binding, had almost been agreed the year before and 
included provisions on arms-brokering and intangible transfers of technology319  "The 
code of conduct is much more effective, it's a more powerful tool of and we intend to 
strengthen it as a pre-condition of lifting the embargo with China," mentioned Straw. 
320 Mr. Straw believed that many of the objections from the US, a major opponent to 
the lift, were based on a "lack of information and understanding" of how export 
control guidelines worked in EU countries.321The only reason why the new Code of 
Conduct not formally approved was because the UK wanted to wait until a 
transitional post-embargo export regime for China, which was also almost ready. 322 
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4.3     British Response to the Europeanization of China policy: the case of the 
arms embargo 
 
Britain never opposed the principle as long as the Code of Conduct was 
reinforced, that the situation on human rights was improving, and that the timing was 
right. The US knew they could pressure the UK to oppose the lift. In the beginning of 
2004, the UK was slightly reluctant to nail its colors to the mast and just wanted to 
ensure to ‘get the policy and the timing right’. There was agreement that the embargo 
needed to be reviewed but that was as far as British diplomacy would go for the 
present. 323 The possible British interest to lift the embargo raised some concerns in 
the Bush administration as early as April 2004. The administration expected Britain 
to block the initiative and was alarmed by the fact that, to the contrary, they supported 
a review of the lift. The US expressed unease at what it viewed as Britain's 
equivocation.324 In September 2004, Britain was still cautious. At the time, EU 
officials estimated that 16 out of 25 member states favored lifting the embargo (led by 
France, Italy, Spain and Germany), while Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Ireland, 
Portugal, Poland and perhaps the Czech Republic opposed lifting it. The UK and the 
Netherlands were the most watched countries since their impetus might tip the scale 
in favor or against the decision. For Britain, it was due to its prestige and influence, 
for the Dutch, it was due to the fact they were scheduled to hold the rotating 
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presidency of the EU in the second half of 2004325 and therefore become agenda-
setters on behalf of the EU. 
During the lead-up to the European Council meeting in June 2004, signals 
were increasingly coming from the UK that they were in favor of a removal of the 
embargo but wanted to postpone the decision until after the US Presidential elections 
later in 2004.The UK insisted on two key arguments before moving forward.   The 
EU Code of Conduct on arms exports needed to be upgraded and improvements to 
China's record on human rights had to be noticeable. "We are not in any sense against 
the lifting of the embargo, but it has got to be done in a proper and sensible way… As 
agreed by the whole of the EU," declared Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary at 
the time. At a private lunchtime discussion with other ministers, he added it was 
"likely" that most of the arms exports currently prohibited by the embargo would be 
caught by the Code of Conduct.326    
The human rights situation was an obstacle to going forward. An influential 
report by Britain's Foreign Office published in the fall voiced "serious concerns" 
about China's record on human rights. The report supported the British argument that 
improvements on China’s human rights were necessary, but in the light of those 
announcements, Mr. Straw sidestepped questions at a press conference on whether he 
wanted the embargo lifted, saying it was under EU discussion.327  
But the most vibrant opposition came from the US. Once the Hague European 
Council summit decided to review the lift, the US started applying greater pressure on 
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their British ally. The US began threatening to withhold military technology 
considered crucial to the health of the UK defense industry followed by an expected 
powerful reaction, particularly in Congress, if the embargo were to be removed.  
Defense officials said that the most likely reaction would be a withdrawal of Bush 
administration backing for new measures to improve military technology transfers to 
European allies and acknowledged that recent efforts made to widen and deepen 
transatlantic defense industrial trade were going to be circumscribed. The 
consequences for the British military could have been significant due to its close ties 
with the American defense sector: BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce happened to be the 
biggest Pentagon suppliers.  In September 2004, Britain had also won congressional 
backing for special preferred status when applying to gain access to US military 
technologies, a status that could have been rescinded. Facing those possible sanctions, 
the UK decided to mount a diplomatic offensive aimed at convincing Washington that 
lifting the embargo would not lead to a flood of new exports to Beijing. The effort 
included a three-person UK mission to Washington to explain the British rationale 
and was part of an effort to take account of a variety of views and ensure important 
concerns were considered. The standoff had once again put the UK in the awkward 
role of transatlantic intermediary, a reminder of the Iraqi crisis. British officials 
argued that US backing for a transparent export control regime would stymie French 
efforts to make weapons sales more opaque. Discussions with US State Department 
officials and National Security Council regarding the upgrade of the Code of Conduct 
certainly helped but the strongest opposition came from the Department of Defense, 
where top officials believed China would use European technologies to upgrade 
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capabilities along the Taiwan straits.328Pentagon opponents said the UK-backed 
measures were inadequate, and criticized the British for siding with the Europeans on 
this issue.  
However, despite the tensions with the US on the issue, the British 
government was officially on board in early January 2005. UK Foreign Secretary, 
Jack Straw told a parliamentary committee that it was "more likely than not" that the 
lifting of the 15-year-old embargo would happen before the end of the current 
Luxembourg presidency (June 2005), that “intense discussions" were taking place 
with US officials to convince them it was the right thing to do, 329 and that London, 
Brussels and Washington would have to "manage those differences" in the next few 
months.”330 
Straw acknowledged that the US had a "legitimate and understandable" 
interest in the effectiveness of European arms control practices and reiterated that a 
revision of the current EU Code of Conduct would prevent either a qualitative or 
quantitative increase in the number of arms exported to China.331 An upgraded regime 
would be "stronger than the embargo because it would have force of law and would 
ensure transparency among EU partners not just on denials but also approvals".332 To 
Straw, the arms embargo was merely a presentational problem and that many of 
Washington's objections were based on a "lack of information and understanding" of 
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how export control guidelines worked in EU countries. 333According to Straw, the 
Americans had not yet understood that the cure could be better than the current state 
of affairs.334  
Britain which had shared US reservations about lifting the embargo, had 
finally gotten on board and was determined that British business should not lose 
out.335On an official  visit to China in January 2005, Straw was expected to push 
commercial interests and to assure the Chinese of British support to ending the arms 
embargo on China, in addition to discuss Hong Kong and China's part in the talks on 
North Korea”336 . A month later, Gordon Brown, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer 
,also publicly supported the lift. 337 
However, opposition to the British stance was not only felt in the US but also 
on the domestic stage. There was debate on the floor of the House of Commons 
questioning the ethical basis for removing the ban in the face of China's poor human 
rights record and its missile deployment targeting Taiwan.  A Commons' Foreign 
Affairs committee in March 2005 said the Chinese should first give "strong 
undertakings" to address human rights concerns before any change of policy was 
implemented: "The raising of the EU arms embargo on China would send the wrong 
signal at this time, in the absence of strong undertakings from the Chinese 
government to address human rights issues."  A group which drew together MPs from 
four Commons select committees concerned with arms sales also raised concerns 
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about lifting that embargo. It said such a move threatened "major EU-US trade 
repercussions" and that was also a risk "EU member states enhance China's military capacity 
in a worrying way" and arms exported from Europe could be used for internal repression or 
re-exported to the world arms market”. 338 The MPS wanted a guarantee from European 
Union member states that there would be no increase in arms exports to China if the EU's 
arms embargo were lifted, The group report warned of "major EU-US trade repercussions" 
from an arms export drive to China. The committee was also critical of government cuts to 
the Export Control Organization, which assesses applications to export weapons and 
technology.339 Leaders of human rights organizations charged the British government 
of being forgetful of the Tiananmen Square events. The British Government's 
response to this was to assure the opposition that Britain continued to be concerned 
about the human rights situation in China and would like to see more progress on this 
issue.340 
The Opposition Conservative party, through the voice of Shadow Foreign 
Secretary Michael Ancram also criticized the move, arguing that it could undermine 
NATO as it severely damaged relations with the US and that the British Government 
was caving in to French and German pressures. Michael Howard, leader of the 
Conservative Party, also spoke out against the move to lift the embargo on arms 
exports to China, accusing Prime Minister Blair to appeal to his EU partners at the 
expense of Britain's national interests. The Tory leader attacked the Prime Minister 
for his "obsession" with the EU, said lifting the embargo could jeopardize British jobs 
in the defense industry, and called for the government to adopt an unambiguous 
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stance on the issue. Howard’s animated message was not necessarily the most 
genuine, it was a way to mend fences with the US since he had criticized the Bush 
administration on the war on Iraq, but it was still heavily publicized and echoed the 
concerns for potential repercussions on the British defense sector.341 
The armament industry also started raising concerns. The U.S. campaign to 
lift the embargo specifically targeted the suppliers for whom the US was an important 
customer. U.S. government officials, as well as Congress, had made clear that 
retaliation against European companies would follow if the ban were to be lifted, 
changing the contracting and procurement environment in America.342 British 
companies were not too keen on upsetting U.S. lawmakers since they had been more 
successful in the U.S. defense market than their European counterparts. BAE Systems 
CEO Mike Turner stressed at the time that his company would not do anything to 
jeopardize its lucrative U.S. business. 343 It is interesting to note however that some 
companies favored lifting the embargo on the grounds that it would not alter the 
military balance. In a letter to British defense officials, the Society of British 
Aerospace Companies, the trade association, argued that the UK was not making any 
change to policy with regard to technology transfer to China and was using effective 
domestic controls to restrict the export of sensitive technologies. Some of those 
companies saw US opposition to the embargo as intended solely to prevent China 
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becoming as much of a military challenge to US predominance in the region as it was 
an economic one 344  
During the spring, an intense lobbying campaign took place to woo the US 
ally. In March 2005, British Ambassador to the U.S. David Manning headed a 
delegation to Washington, composed of parliamentary defense committee members 
and representatives of the Confederation of British Industry. US interlocutors were 
frankly opposed to the policy except for a few legislators including the influential 
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John W. Warner (R-Va.), who 
wanted to avoid another transatlantic rift in the field of defense.345But at the end of 
the month, the British diplomacy operated a spectacular 360 degrees turn. On the 20th   
of March, Straw declared on TV that human rights problems and the Taiwan issue 
become ‘more difficult rather than less difficult’. A spokesman for Premier Blair 
added the same week that the anti-secession law that could authorize the use of force 
against Taiwan: “Inevitably…soured the atmosphere somewhat”. The leadership still 
thought that US objections could be met by a strengthened EU Code of Conduct on 
arms sales to third countries. The British government said it continued to support in 
principle but had insisted upon updating a code of conduct which would help regulate 
the kinds of weapons and technology China would receive. It seemed that at that 
moment, the scale was tipping and there were more countries in the anti-lift group 
right now than in the pro-lift group.346  
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From that point on, the UK reallocated its resources to convince its European 
partners, starting with Italy, to postpone the lift, possibly until 2006. Straw was now 
arguing in front of his colleagues for a postponement in particular to Gianfranco Fini, 
his Italian counterpart. Sweden as well as Belgium was also lobbying to delay the 
embargo's lifting.347All of  British diplomacy was changing its tune, claiming now 
that the UK had never been "enthusiastic" about lifting the ban, according to Bill 
Rammell, a junior foreign office minister during a visit in Washington.  "We have 
certainly not been leading the pack on this," he said. Despite the change of heart of 
the British, the EU did not budge but recognized that the issue was now more difficult 
and more complex, both in substance and as regards the timeline."348 Christina 
Gallach, spokesperson for High Representative Solana also declared that the EU 
position had not changed but added that the anti-secession law made the process of 
decision-making more complex. In terms of human rights, the EU had hoped for a 
gesture by Beijing in this area, such as ratifying the UN’s International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. 
France, which had lobbied hardest for the lifting of the embargo, was still 
campaigning for a decision by June, but was beginning to realize that a postponement 
might be necessary. France suspected that the UK was using the anti-secession law 
controversy over China as a ‘pretext’ for meeting the US demands.349But other EU 
members with close defense ties to the US were leaning towards a delay beyond the 
previously agreed timetable of the first half of this year. The Netherlands, the Czech 
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Republic, Scandinavian countries, and Luxembourg are among the countries that 
were having second thoughts about lifting the embargo. There was little enthusiasm 
for lifting the embargo because of hostile public opinion in these countries, and they 
would not be opposed to a lengthy delay. A senior Swedish official said China's 
passing of the anti-secession law aimed at Taiwan had changed EU sentiment.”350 
Western diplomats did, however, play down suggestions that a decision on lifting the 
ban would be delayed until 2006. There was no evidence that the UK government 
would seek to shelve discussion on the issue during the presidency of the EU in the 
second half of the year.  The UK was now a bridge  between the French approach and 
the US demands. On the EU side, Britain wanted member states to notify Brussels 
three months after an export license had been granted. This system would last for 10 
years. France wanted a five-year period. The United States was asking for an "early 
warning system" to be written into the Code of Conduct. This would mean that 
countries intending to sell weapons to China would be required to consult with the 
United States. European diplomats agreed that it was difficult to see how a sovereign 
state should ask permission from the United States to sell weapons. 
Britain also proposed the establishment of a regular strategic dialogue with the 
United States over China and the region, which the French supported. The United 
States kept applying pressure on Britain in the belief that Blair would use his veto to 
stop the embargo from being lifted if the issue was put to the vote among the 25 
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member states. Britain, however, claimed that it would not veto any EU decision to 
lift the embargo, despite pressure by Congress. 351 
The initiative seemed to bear fruit since member states failed to agree at a 
European Council on April 7, 2005, in Luxembourg on lifting the embargo. Britain, 
the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden wanted to retain the arms embargo because of 
China’s shaky human rights record.352 Mr. Solana insisted that the EU still planned to 
lift the ban.353 In a series of councils and summits, no mention of the embargo was 
made, whether it was in June in a EU Council meeting or at the EU China summit in 
September.  
In November, during his three-country European tour, President Jintao 
brought up the issue again but was told by Premier Blair that the timing was not right, 
and he was expected to be told by German Chancellor elect Merkel that she would 
reverse her predecessor’s position. Interestingly enough, there were no economic 
repercussions for Britain and a series of agreements worth 1.1 billion Euros was 
signed.354 The fact that the embargo had moved off the agenda was at the time was a 
diplomatic victory for the Americans.355 Britain agreed not to raise the issue during its 
current presidency of the EU and the upcoming Austrian presidency agreed to steer 
well clear of the issue, emphasizing the lack of progress on human rights.356 
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4.4    Goodness of fit  
The goal is to evaluate the overall pattern of British institutional responses to 
the Europeanization of China policy, the enactment of legal procedures such as the 
embargo, the transfer of competences and the creation of norms and identities, in 
other words as the emergence of European governance and see which stance the UK 
adopted using the Börzel, Falkner et al. and Cowles et al. theories. What is the 
goodness of fit or the mismatch between the EU and the UK on China  sanction 
policy and how did the UK respond to it?  Based on Cowles et al original mediating 
factors, the questionnaire and the response of UK officials to the EU China policy, I 
identified the following factors: veto points, the country’s organizational and 
policymaking culture, human rights, the trade issue and the empowerment of external 
actors. I argue there is a not necessarily a mismatch between the UK and the EU 
China policy but it was not consistent in the case of the lift of the arms embargo.  The 
UK could have applied the lift since its weapons sales are extremely regulated. 
Applying Börzel’s theory, I determine that the UK was a fence-sitter, then a follower 
and then a foot-dragger on the issue by taking the lead on delaying the initiative. We 
shall review the five mediating factors to explain UK’s adaptation pattern. 
The existence of ‘veto points’ in the domestic structure has been identified as 
a major factor preventing structural adaptation357. The main veto point on the issue of 
the embargo actually came from the defense industry. Since the early 2000s, several 
British companies had acquired U.S defense companies. BAE Systems, for example 
was at the time the sixth-largest defense contractor in the United States. A number of 
U.S companies had holdings in British defense industry, including Raytheon, 
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Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics. BAE Systems Chief Executive Mike Turner 
was the ‘spokesman’ against the lift. BAE business in the US is was valued at more 
than £4 Billion. In March 2005, the acquisition of United Defense Technologies of 
the US was announced but there were concerns that the issue of the embargo might 
lead the US government to block the takeover .To reassure US officials and 
lawmakers, Mr. Turner has made clear BAE would not be expanding in China even if 
the ban were lifted. And the opposition from British companies also had an impact on 
other European multinational armament corporations  who had big stakes in the UK 
and were seeking to expand in the US such EADS, the Franco-German group, Thales 
of France and Finmeccanica of Italy. 
‘The country’s organizational and policymaking cultures’ also affects whether 
domestic actors can use adaptation pressures emanating from Europeanization to 
induce structural change. The decision-making regarding the embargo was affected 
by reorganization under the Blair administration and by more structural features of 
British foreign policy. Regarding EU matters, the New Labor’s foreign policy was 
made through the Prime Minister’s office, the FCO and its relevant ministers, the UK 
Permanent Representation (UKREP) in Brussels, the European Secretariat within the 
Cabinet Office (Defence and Overseas Policy DOP and the Subcommittee on 
European Issues).358 In 2001, Premier Blair took major steps to enhance the role of 
Downing Street over both EU policy and foreign policy towards the rest of the world. 
He moved two of the Cabinet Office Secretariats (dealing with overseas and security 
and with the EU) under the control of his two foreign policy advisors, Sir Stephen 
Wall ex head of UKREP and Sir David Manning, ex head of the UK delegation. 
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Moving those secretariats under Downing Street authority ratcheted up the role 
played by the prime minister in foreign affairs and his ‘presidential style’. At the 
same time, it reflected changing patterns in EU policy with the growing number and 
importance of EU summits, the growing political link among European political 
parties, and the need to address European issues at a central level. The FCO has been 
then been sidelined on a number of issues such as the Iraq war, the EU Constitution, 
relations with Washington, and the general overall strategy and justifications behind 
British foreign policy.359 
UK foreign policy had been shaped in large part by a number of aims that had 
the potential to be both contradictory and complementary. On one hand, Britain has 
been supporting the USA and guaranteed the “special transatlantic relationship”. On 
the other, Britain had actively encouraged and engaged in the construction of a 
European foreign policy provided that it remained based on the consensual 
coordination of the foreign policies of the EU member states. 360 Although British 
positions on numerous foreign policy issues show evidence of adaptation to a 
European norm, Britain on a number of occasions refused to be bound by European 
positions while nevertheless doing its utmost to maintain European solidarity over 
issue areas, such as the Middle East, where it calculates that British influence can be 
enhanced by collective European action. As a result there can be no clear or 
consistent sequence to the process by which Europeanization has occurred361. Allen 
and Oliver believe that the nature of CFSP and ESDP makes it possible for national 
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foreign policies to show signs of both accommodating and resisting Europeanization 
at the same time. There are examples of what has been Europeanized in UK foreign 
policy-making: the increasing numbers of staff dealing with CFSP, the increased 
sharing of information through the Correspondent European (COREU) network, the 
regular meetings of Political Directors and their ambassadorial deputies in Brussels 
and the development of the Permanent Political and Security Committee (PSC)362. 
However, respondents to the questionnaire and the sequence, of events showed that 
the Big Three still were able to control the extent, sequence and pace of the uploading 
dimension of Europeanization363, not only in the case of the embargo but in general.  
The Anglo-French St Malo declaration was an example of this, representing an 
uploading of British and French foreign policy interests. One of the goals was to 
further engage Germany on foreign and defense issues by using the framework to 
effectively ‘crossload’ foreign policy concerns.’364  
The trade motivation was the key factor to predict that, even if in the first 
place, the UK was interested in lifting the embargo, it would ultimately abide by the 
US position. It stems  from a contradiction inherent to every member state. The arms 
trade is both the’ fast and slow track’ of Europeanization argues Dover365. Whilst the 
European Commission and arms manufacturers are at the forefront of an increasingly 
Europeanized arms trade, central governments are concerned with protecting 
economic interests that are now anything but state-centered because of the 
internationalization of defense industries through mergers, acquisitions and projects.  
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The legal arms trade in Britain was viewed by government officials as being a core 
function of the state and an indispensable part of the British economy. Moreover, the 
legal arms trade has foreign policy implications.  The British government’s view was 
that they could  expand their influence across the world. Sales to Saudi Arabia since 
the eighties were justified on the grounds of being able to influence a strategically 
important government in the Middle East.366 
The UK uploaded its preferences to the supranational level through the 
establishment of the European Defence Agency, which provides the EU with an 
ability to influence the development of technology and, by inference, the procurement 
and sale of these materials. It was no coincidence that the first Chief Executive of the 
EDA was British (and a former MOD and FCO official). Arms manufacturers had a 
large role in the working groups that designed the EDA: high ranking European 
Commission officials sat with representatives of BAE Systems and EADS as well as 
the President of the European Defense Industries Group to advice on how the new 
institution should operate, providing great access to manufacturers. However, with 
this new diplomatic tool came the tension inherent in individual arms programs. How 
to promote weapons manufacturers on one hand and make sure that human rights are 
respected on the other? The Code of Conduct, aimed at making the trade more 
transparent and less open to claims of corruption, was certainly a great safeguard 
against questionable deals367. But, the primary concern was not whether China was a 
questionable partner, but what other partners might think. That explained how BAE 
Systems and other British companies with large interests in the US declared that they 
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would not sell military equipment to China regardless of the EU position because 
they wanted to keep the US happy. This demonstrated the influence of British arms 
manufacturers on state policy-making and the effect on the European stage, with the 
ban on exports to China remaining.368 
Fourth, the ‘differential empowerment of external actors and learning’ 
mattered, while Cowles et al. and Falknet et al.  considered the domestic level only. 
The possibility of the lift empowered the USA, who strongly opposed the initiative. 
The close relationship between the US and the UK certainly gave a great deal of 
influence to the US. Premier Tony Blair had this view that he and Britain had a 
unique role to serve as a bridge between Europe and the United States. An ambitious 
form of internationalism was developing in Blair’s outlook, whereby he wished to 
reconnect Britain to its European destiny, to help modernize the EU so it would be fit 
for an era of globalization (a Blair mantra), and above all to stay close to the United 
States, as the ultimate guarantor of British security369.  Blair in March 2001 declared: 
“I have been as pro-America as Prime Minister as it is possible to have. There is no 
single issue I can think of in which we have not stood foursquare with America”370. 
At the time, it was said that Robin Cook was replaced as the head of FCO by Jack 
Straw for being too European and not enough pro-American. Mr. Blair was already 
insouciant about opening up a distance between himself and his French or German 
colleagues over foreign policy questions. In part, this was because of the enormous 
self-confidence that the Prime Minister had in his ability to make a personal 
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difference on some of the great international issues. Almost by definition, this implied 
that he would be in competition with his peers, President Chirac of France and 
Chancellor Schroeder of Germany. Bush and Putin in Blair’s mind represented real 
power in the unsafe world outside the ‘postmodern’ European Union, and Blair 
sought to accommodate and to charm them371.  
Just like many prime ministers in the post-war era, Tony Blair became 
increasingly preoccupied with trying to be a mediator between the United States and 
Europe, committed to a multilateral international order and determined to play a 
major positive role in the European and international affairs whilst trying to preserve 
the illusion of Britain as a major power, even if both the European and American 
dimensions of British foreign policy continued to lack domestic support372.  
Behind the ideological rhetoric, the UK was fearful of US repercussions 
especially for its armament industry, and a possible lift gave the US a golden stick to 
punish the British partner. The UK government was stung once by Congress's refusal 
to waive certain requirements of its International Traffic in Arms Regulations for the 
export licensing of certain unclassified military exports from the United States to 
Britain. Lifting the waiver would have helped with interoperability - since shared 
systems by different armies would make it easier for them to fight together373. The 
Americans feared that a China armed with weapon technologies from Europe facing 
American forces in the South China Sea would change the post Cold War geopolitical 
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order.374 Members of the US Congress had warned they would respond to a lifting of 
the embargo by passing legislation restricting US technology transfers to European 
defense companies. 
 Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. Secretary of State, ratcheted up the US rhetorical 
opposition on several occasions, including one trip in China, where she stressed that 
lifting the European Arms embargo could “change the equilibrium” in Asia.375 
Ultimately, the British government had no choice to be a go between the EU and the 
US, and therefore postpone the debate, certainly not wanting to upset the US376.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The attitude of the United Kingdom in the case of the China arms embargo  
reflected the deep attachment to one of the most important premises of British foreign 
policy:  a commitment to serve as a bridge the US and Europe, and ultimately ensure 
the satisfaction of the US partner. The transatlantic bond overcame aspirations for 
political and economic power in China. Britain could have been a pace-setter on the 
issue, given its powerful arms industry looking for markets, the attachment to Hong 
Kong, and the ambition to be a major defense player in the EU. Instead, Britain sat on 
the fence and witnessed France and Germany taking the lead on the issue. Britain 
then jumped on the bandwagon till the US, using a carrot and stick policy, threatened 
the UK to retaliate by cancelling some defense contracts. Britain then switched outfits 
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again to, this time, use its influence to reverse the process and convince other 
members through horizontal Europeanization that the lift was not a reasonable policy. 
The foot-dragging attitude was at its paroxysm when the UK decided not to put the 
embargo issue on the agenda of the second half of 2005.  
The successful pressure applied by the United States on the United Kingdom 
checked the hypothesis according to which a EU sanction policy could not be 
modified unless the US approves it. What makes the UK case interesting is the fact 
that the UK used its influence to block the initiative rather than promote it.  The UK 
used horizontal Europeanization by convincing other members to delay the initiative 
and as EU President used top-down Europeanization by not putting the issue on the 
agenda. 
The empowerment of external actors such as the United States prevented the 
UK to adopt the lift and the impact of the US overpowered the influence of other 
mediating factors that could have led to the adoption of the lift. Trade could have 
predicted the outcome either way: on one hand, the UK sold dual-use equipment 
goods to China and would have certainly benefited from the opening of the market; 
on the other hand, the UK defense market was heavily dependent on the US one. As 
for human rights, the issue was not dramatic enough n=in British public opinion to 
impact the outcome, one way or another.  
In terms of safeguards for weapons exports, there was no misfit between the 
UK and the EU, and the UK could have easily adopted the ban, based on the 
regulation of its defense export market. By reversing itself, the UK diplomacy 
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appeared to have misled the Chinese into complacency and left them wavered in the 
wind.377 
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CHAPTER 5 
The influence of Germany 
 
5.0     Introduction 
While commercial ties have flourished, political ties between China and 
Germany have remained underdeveloped. Most Chinese still see Germany as an 
economic partner. Germany has traditionally tied its foreign policies close to those of 
its fellow EU members. Germany became a model for many member states in the 
1990s with its pragmatic economic approach, outlined in the German Asia Concept in 
1993. The model rested on three principles: silent diplomacy (i.e. avoiding open 
human rights accusations), change through trade “Wandel durch Handel”, (i.e. 
encouraging political liberalization in China through economic development), and 
last, the application of a strict “One China” policy378. Chancellor Schröder (1998-
2002) fully followed this model and visited China more often than any other non-EU 
country during his tenure. Germany’s China policy is a rather odd combination of 
trade promotion, foreign aid – increasingly shaped as trade promotion, too – and a 
certain support for social modernization. Schröder’s strong involvement in the 
German-Franco initiative to lift the EU weapons embargo came under fire from the 
political opposition, the media, the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) and human rights 
activists. The arms embargo issue also caused divisions within the ruling coalition, 
with the Green party vehemently opposed to it, other EU member states and the 
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United States379. First, I will review the track record of the relations between 
Germany and China and Germany’s influence on in EU Asia policy. Then I shall 
focus on the embargo and explain the reasoning of the German diplomacy based on 
the interviews. Equally important, in order to assess the German responses to 
Europeanization of China policy, I will use the classification by Börzel 380 to establish 
that Germany was a pace-setter by convincing the EU to put the issue on the agenda, 
by trying to convince its partners, and then apply the Cowles et al. and Falkner et al. 
theories to show that there was no mismatch between the EU and German sanction 
policy on China but that  there many veto points within Germany’s domestic level 
that weakened the German bid. 
5.1     Relations with the PRC and Track record of Europeanization of China 
policy 
Germany’s relations with China have been far steadier than those of Britain 
and France.  Germany, based on its defeat in World War II, had no colonies and never 
had any ties with Taiwan either381. On the international stage, Germany did not take 
diplomatic initiatives and tended to follow cues from its major Western allies, such as 
the recognition of the PRC in 1972 following the Nixon visit. China had been 
primarily dealing with East Germany since the mid-fifties, from which it imported 
industrial equipment (East Germany was the most important communist trading 
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partner of China. To East Germany,  China represented an alternative model to the 
Soviet Union and the two shared a struggle for international recognition382. 
Trade with West Germany represented the backbone of the relationship. The 
Federal Republic opened its first trade office in 1955, despite the “Hallstein doctrine” 
banning diplomatic recognition to all states that recognized East Germany 383. Even 
today, the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs primarily promotes economic 
relations, which are developing with breathtaking speed into a success story. The 
PRC has become Germany's most important export market in Asia. Germany is 
China's greatest European trading partner and, lately, has also become the greatest 
European investor in the PRC.384 Chancellor Kohl was the architect of the German 
success throughout the 1980s and the 1990s during which he adopted a policy of 
“silent diplomacy” focusing on trade and ignoring the human rights issues. Under 
Helmut Kohl, the focus on economics and the neglect of human rights or Beijing’s 
policy vis-à-vis Taiwan caused criticism from opposition leaders. The so called 
“dialogue behind closed doors” on politically sensitive issues was seen as a way to 
save the Chinese leadership from open criticism and to satisfy German public. In 
general, bilateral relations between Germany and the PRC had intensified during the 
government of Helmut Kohl. Although it supported the EU Council’s sanctions 
policy following the Tiananmen incident, Germany under Kohl resumed trade 
cooperation six months later and never really stopped high-level contacts, breaking 
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away from the economic sanctions before they were officially lifted in September 
1990.  
Germany was always very cautious on issues dealing with sovereignty and 
national unity, unlike the British handling of Hong Kong and the French stance over 
Taiwan. Germany did not maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan on account of 
the ‘One China Policy’ pursued by Germany, along with all the other EU Member 
States. Germany is in favor of Beijing and Taipei coming to a peaceful resolution of 
all the issues of concern385. For example, Chancellor Kohl refused to approve the sale 
of ten submarines and ten frigates to Taiwan in January 1993 and reaffirmed 
Germany’s ‘one China’ stance386. Three principles of German China policy were 
drawn during the Kohl years: silent diplomacy (hence no human rights 
confrontation); change through trade (encouraging political liberalization in China via 
economic development); and a strict “one-China” policy. 
 Vis-à-vis the EU, Germany seemed to have a slightly different approach 
compared to France and Britain with the idea of influencing EU policy rather than 
adopting a unilateral approach. The assumption was that regional and security policy 
developments in Asia were now having a greater impact on European foreign and 
security policy. “Where developments in Asia generate a global impact, that is to say 
directly affect our own interests, we must exercise our influence nationally, within the 
EU framework”387. For instance, German officials are deeply committed to the Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) process. Germany also stresses the importance of 
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multilateral frameworks such as the G7 or the United Nations and other international 
organizations. Germany has been keen on supporting the ASEAN Regional Forum-
ARF) to improve security and confidence building in the region, for example on the 
basis of experiences in the CSCE/OSCE. One of the main tools advocated by 
Germany in its China policy is confidence building and détente in a dialogue on 
security policy rooted in cooperation in the field of military policy, including a 
discussion of arms control policy issues. More generally, the major foreign policy 
concern is to integrate China into the International Community. It is essential to 
convince China that as a rising regional power and member of the Security Council, it 
bears increasing responsibility for world peace, for stability in the Asia-Pacific region 
and for global concerns, including a peaceful resolution of all the differences arising 
on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait388.  
 To Germany, cooperation is inherently linked to the improvement of the 
human rights situation. Relations with the PRC cooled down in 1996 in the aftermath 
of an all-party Bundestag resolution on Tibet accusing China of trying to eradicate 
Tibet's cultural identity389. A planned visit to China by Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel 
was postponed and the matter was not resolved until late September of that year, 
when Kinkel and his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen met in New York390. To this 
end, Germany has engaged bilaterally and within the EU in a dialogue on human 
rights with the Chinese government at expert level. Human rights issues are an 
important part of a political dialogue at Foreign Ministerial level, and in talks 
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between the Commissioner for Human Rights and Chinese Government officials.391 
Human rights also have been an important issue for the German media, the public 
opinion and most prominently the Green Party which was a junior partner in the post-
1998 coalition government.392 In September 1998, Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher 
declared that there would be “no further kowtow towards the ‘Beijing dictatorship’”. 
As a symbolic but strong gesture, Chancellor Schröder invited a prominent Chinese 
dissident to Germany and upset the Beijing leadership. The appointment of a Human 
Rights Representative further emphasized the greater role human rights were 
supposed to play in dealing with the Chinese leadership.  In 1999, the Red-Green 
government initiated a “Dialogue on the Rule of Law” at the bilateral level and within 
the EU framework. 393 The Dialogue on the Rule of Law was meant to offer a long-
term approach to building a state based on the rule of law and implementing human 
rights in China394. It consisted of specific projects to improve legal and judicial 
practices in China. The Dialogue combined elements of careful public criticism, open 
talk behind closed doors, and pragmatic cooperation at the bilateral and the European-
Chinese level. 
 The “Dialogue on the Rule of Law” has often been hailed as one of the major 
innovations of the Red-Green Asia policy, although there had been various similar 
programs in place under the Kohl administration. Most of the cooperation projects 
implemented by state actors as well as by private actors had actually already been 
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under way before the establishment of the Dialogue. Officially arranged symposia 
were the only new element introduced as an additional venue for German-Chinese 
cooperation in the field of law. However, the symposia did not provide an appropriate 
framework for discussing sensitive issues related to human rights and the rule of law 
since they were conducted in a formal, decidedly non-controversial atmosphere. In 
essence, the Dialogue thus only integrated already existing governmental and private 
legal cooperation initiatives under a common heading and a symbolic umbrella. 
 The main function of the Dialogue was not a practical, but a political-
symbolic one. Prior to Dialogue, the German government’s handling of human would 
consist of articulating individual objections, handing over lists of political prisoners 
and asking for their release. In the course of the 1990s, this approach was increasingly 
felt to be humiliating to the Chinese side, politically ineffective and potentially 
damaging to economic exchanges. By initiating the Dialogue, it became possible to 
delegate discussion of the PRC’s human rights record from the official diplomatic 
sphere to the working level involved with legal cooperation programs. With a view to 
appealing  to public sentiment in Germany, the German government could present the 
Dialogue as a comprehensive human rights strategy directed towards the Chinese 
government. The Dialogue thus became a valuable symbolic tool in the hands of the 
German coalition government for deflecting human rights sensitivities among its 
electorate and preventing human rights controversies from disturbing the rapid 
expansion of economic relations with China.395 
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The prioritization of domains has been the key of the German China policy 
and certainly inspired other Member States as well as the European Union in general. 
European states did not develop a unified position towards the PRC despite early 
moves by the UK, France, and the Netherlands to set up diplomatic relations in the 
1950s and 1960s. Attempts by other countries such as Germany and Ireland to create 
individual China policies were quickly abandoned. In 1993, Germany took a 
leadership role by inserting a new programmatic dimension to EU China policies by 
developing the first ‘Asia- Concept’. Germany was a pace-setter and uploaded its 
policy preferences at the EU level in a positive way. It served as a blueprint for the 
first Asia policy program of the European Union which improved the coordination of 
national policies towards PRC. In general, ‘bilateral’ relations between the EU states 
and Asia were conducted within the framework of state-related programs or 
cooperation agreements of the so-called ‘third generation’.396 
The first German Asia Strategy was clearly dominated by the 1990s discourse 
on a potential Asian hegemony due to the rise of Japan, the Asian Tigers and China. 
However, the Kohl and the Schröder governments took some criticism from the 
public opinion and opposition parties for neglecting human rights and systematically 
depoliticizing economic relations with China397. Germany grasped the importance of 
Asian new markets when EC trade with East Asia overtook EC-US trade for the first 
time in 1992, and therefore took the lead in formulating its ‘Asian policy’. The central 
ideas of Germany’s Asian policy were to strengthen economic relations with the 
largest growth region in the world, restore high level visits to Beijing and stop 
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applying pressure on human rights.  In December 1993, Chancellor Kohl returned 
from a visit to China with a pile of contracts and letters of intent.398 A few months 
later, Bonn was the first Western capital to host a visit by Chinese Premier Li Peng, in 
spite of Li’s close association and responsibility for the Tiananmen crackdown. 
Germany continued to assume a leadership position, along with France, in influencing 
EU Asia policy and pushed for stronger involvement in the region.  
The success of the German model prompted other member states in particular 
Britain and France (each had issues with Beijing, over Hong Kong and Taiwan) to 
rethink their post-Tiananmen policies and to also depoliticize a more aggressive 
economic relationship. In the mid-1990s, Germany alone accounted for nearly 40% of 
total EU trade with China, over twice as much as Britain’s. Besides the 
depoliticization, the role of the private sector has been the key factor in German 
economic success. In other member states, the government was the initiator of 
business dealings.  In Germany, the private sector was the initiator and the 
government served as a facilitator.399 Following the German model, French and 
British government delegations to China systematically started inviting business 
leaders. Michael Heseltine, the British Secretary for Trade and Industry visited China 
in 1994 accompanied by 130 businessmen400. The German model also influenced 
French willingness to deal pragmatically with China. Following an era where the 
French socialist government distanced itself from the Chinese regime based on 
human rights records, France-China relations were normalized and a joint France-
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China communiqué was issued in January 1994 during Prime Minister Balladur’s 
visit. 
Germany and France were then the first member states to begin to normalize 
relations with China after the Tiananmen Square crackdown. They went so far as to 
violate EU restrictions on aid and loans to China several months before these 
sanctions were collectively ended.401 This pragmatic stance also impacted the way the 
embargo on weapons was observed, and Germany, like other Member States 
breached it several times.  
The largest share of its 2003 license approvals for China were specialized 
military training equipment or simulators (€528 thousand), electronic military 
equipment (€433.1 thousand), and software items (€134.4 million)402. For example, 
MTU, a DaimlerChrysler subsidiary, built diesel engines, which were not subject to 
licensing requirements and therefore were sold to the Chinese and used in their Song-
A submarines. Chinese Naval war ships were also equipped with MTU engines. Other 
companies such as Deutz built engines used in Chinese tanks. But as mentioned in the 
chapters about France and Britain, the other big two also sold parts that could be used 
in military equipment. Britain's Rolls Royce Spey jet engines are used in Chinese JH-
7 fighter jets and the French  Racal long-range airborne radar systems are used by the 
Chinese Navy Aircraft.403 404 
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5.2    Reasoning of the German diplomacy 
In the next two sections, I will justify the position of the German diplomacy and 
establish the German response to the Europeanization of the China policy. It seems 
appropriate to list here the officials who have been contacted to help in this endeavor. 
As I mentioned in our methodology chapter, I contacted representatives from the 
executive and legislative branches, based on the timeline and recommendations. 
Under Chancellor Schröder’s guidance, the priority in Germany’s policy 
towards the PRC was firmly established: trade promotion first, foreign aid, second 
and issues of human rights and democratization a distant third. Publishing its three 
regional concepts for East Asia, South East Asia and South Asia in May 2002, 
German diplomacy made it official that it had fallen in line with the tradition set by 
its predecessor. The global economic and political integration of the PRC gained 
highest priority while political change and social modernization were moved on to 
various arenas of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.405 The position of the German 
government echoed the French one. The major difference, however, was that the 
position was articulated at the top and at the top only. In the French case, President 
Chirac was certainly a big promoter but was followed by his cabinet, whereas in the 
German case, some of the cabinet members did not necessarily agree with the 
Chancellor, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joshka Fisher.  
 Chancellor Schröder stated that China had changed significantly during the 
last fifteen years and no longer resembled the China of 1989. In the Chancellor’s 
view, political and legal change within China continued to be positively promoted by 
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the “German-Chinese Rule of Law Dialogue” that was initiated in 1999. This 
Dialogue was presented as a substantial and continuous effort at improving the human 
rights situation in China and as proof for the German government’s political and 
moral dedication in its China policy.406 Germany acknowledged the human rights 
deficiencies in China, from freedom of opinion to minority rights and death sentences 
but saw its role more as a supporter of the positive trends rather than a denunciator. 
German diplomacy based its reasoning on the increasing number of concrete cases 
and the legislative initiatives under way in terms of civil and political rights and 
thought that their supportive stance had something to do with such progress.407  
 Increasing sales of weapons was never part of the argument: Germany’s 
national regulations on arms exports were stricter than in most of the EU members 
including France and the United Kingdom. 408 Domestic law prevented most direct 
arms sales to China due to foreign trade law which prohibited the selling of defense 
goods into areas of crisis or potential crisis. At the EU level, the Code of Conduct 
would also prevent sales of high-technology weapons sales to states with repressive 
regimes.409 Ultimately, argued German diplomacy, if the embargo would have been 
lifted, Germany would not have profited very much from it since the sales of goods 
with potential defense use would have been inconsequential.410 
There were also a few geopolitical reasons to justify the lift of the embargo. 
According to German diplomacy, regional and security policy developments in the 
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Asian region also generated a global impact, affected German interests and therefore 
impacted the European foreign and security policy. The Germans must use their 
influence as a state within the EU framework, internationally as in the Asia Europe 
Meeting (ASEM), multilaterally through the UN and the G7 and the G8.411 
During the long period of East-West bipolarity, Asia as a whole and its large 
sub-regions did not identify themselves permanently with either of the two politico-
military blocs.412 China, France and Germany agreed on the concept of multipolarity 
to constrain US influence through the establishment of alternative poles of power, 
such as China, all opposed to a unipolar world. A European pole would mean greater 
influence for Germany and France and both countries shared views when it came to 
defense and foreign policy issues. Moreover, the joint opposition to the 2003 Iraq 
War strengthened France and Germany ties.413 Chancellor Schröder and President 
Chirac had become close and there was a sense in German diplomacy circles that “if 
the French were for it, then the Germans were for it too…” 414 
Finally, regionally, there had been a push by the German diplomacy to 
solidify military policy cooperation with China and India through a trilateral defense 
dialogue. In 1994, consultations had been initiated as a “German-Indian defense 
dialogue" by the Konrad Adenauer foundation of the Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU) in cooperation with India's leading defense policy think tank, the Institute for 
Strategic Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and, since 1997, China. Every year, the 
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discussion partners coordinated the views of Beijing, Delhi and Berlin concerning 
strategic developments in Asia and discussed contingencies for cooperation on the 
continents “defense problems". 415 
 But the main reason behind the desired lift of the embargo was trade 
expansion. France, Germany and Spain had certainly pushed for the lift of the ban 
based on economic considerations. Increasing trade with China at all levels was an 
important part of stimulating economic growth 416. The trade promotion was part of 
Chancellor Schröder’s platform since he had made the economy and employment the 
center of his governing program. The Chancellor  systematically tied the economy to 
foreign policy and therefore could  not turn down the huge opportunities of the 
Chinese market .417The trade relationship between Germany and China was 
characterized by impressive numbers. Within Europe, Germany was China’s leading 
trade partner, accounting for around 30% of total E.U.-China trade418.  Bilateral trade 
between China and Germany reached some € 33,5 billion in 2004 (+31% over 2003), 
and was projected to double again by 2010, Some 2,000 German companies, 
including major banks, operated in China. BASF and Bayer, for instance, were the 
largest chemical firms in China, Volkswagen controlled 30% of the Chinese car 
market, and in 2004 it produced more cars in China than in Germany with Chinese 
sales accounting for 1/3rd of the company's net profits. Germany was also by far the 
largest EU exporter to China, accounting for 44% of the total of its exports. Between 
1997 and 2005 German exports to China increased by almost 300 percent. According 
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to the German Engineering Association, in 2004 China became Germany’s ' second-
biggest export market after the US, taking France’s spot. 419  German investment in 
China also increased ten-fold from just € 800 million in 1995 to € 7.9 billion in 2003, 
making Germany China's seventh largest foreign investor, continues to rise, and 
Germany is  the leader among EU member states in terms of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in China.   France also witnessed significant Foreign Direct Investment growth; 
by 2004 these two countries accounted for approximately 40% of EU foreign direct 
investment in China.420The quality of this economic relationship has also been 
strengthened by Germany’s willingness to provide soft loans to China as well as 
export subsidies for companies doing business in the Chinese market.421 Finally, 
Germany has been the most generous donor to China. In the second half of the 90s, 
Germany alone accounted for more than half of the EU aid to China (at the time 15 
member states), mostly in legal reforms, environmental protection and transport 
infrastructure projects.422 The depth of the economic relationship certainly justifies 
Chancellor Schroeder's enthusiasm for lifting the arms embargo.  
 The importance of maintaining a capable and robust defense industry across 
Europe was shared both by President Jacques Chirac and the German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder. Under normal circumstances, Kogan argued that no top-level 
political leaders would stick their neck out and take a personal commitment to ensure 
the lifting of the embargo, for the sole purpose of actively fostering arms exports423. 
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Rather, what really motivated France and Germany were the consequences that a 
decision to lift the arms embargo might have. It would have led to an expanded 
commercial and industrial relationship between the EU and China in a variety of non-
defense related sectors.  
 
5.3     German response to the Europeanization of German policy: the case of the 
embargo 
 
In early December 2003 on a visit to China, Chancellor Schröder declared that 
China was now considered a responsible partner in world affairs that had little in 
common with the 1989 leadership, implying that the arms embargo could be 
removed. The Chancellor was confident that he could obtain an EU majority to lift an 
arms embargo against China.  
On the same trip, the Chancellor also announced his support for a Chinese 
request to buy a nuclear plant from the Siemens AG in spite of the technology’s 
military potential. Touching upon the nerves of a growing number of Green party 
members this initiative in addition to the attempt by the Chancellot to lift he EU ban 
on arms sales met considerable public opposition. The idea of exporting nuclear 
technology was strongly disapproved by the Green Party, member of the governing 
coalition, with its strong antinuclear tradition, but also by the opposition. The Greens 
were not too keen on lifting the embargo, based on the poor human rights record of 
China but they eventually understood that even if the embargo were to be lifted, 
German export restrictions and the Code on Arms Conduct would still prevent arms 
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sales to China. The issue of the lift would need some explaining but seemed 
winnable. The Chancellor certainly did not expect however, that in a rare case of 
successful involvement in foreign policy-making, the parliamentary fractions of the 
Social Democrats (SPD) and the Green Party would threaten to block the 
government’s export permission of plutonium.424 
In January 2004, Foreign Affairs Minister Fisher, a Green Party member,  
argued that more discussions with the Chinese were necessary concerning human 
rights and the Taiwanese question, but declared that he supported the review as long 
as the Code of Conduct was updated. Later in the spring, the plutonium deal was 
postponed indefinitely, following more domestic criticism in Germany.425 
A few months later, there were still reservations among the members of the 
junior partner of the coalition. In an interview on television, Minister Fischer 
recognized that there had been great progress in China, but there were still reasons for 
having considerable reservations on lifting the embargo based on human rights 
abuses: excessive use of the death penalty, administrative detention, Tibet and  the 
right to political freedom, but also the conflict with Taiwan. Fisher mentioned that he 
stood for the one China policy and at the same time believed the Taiwan question 
should be resolved peacefully. However, Germany was very active in holding 
discussions with the EU regarding the lifting of the arms embargo and wanted to 
make sure that a consensus was reached before this move.426 The press was not 
favorable to the lift and characterized the move as opportunistic and as an attempt to 
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“pick up lucrative Chinese contracts for German business in the pinch of a stagnant 
economy’427 
In October 2004, the parliamentary majority was still not convinced about the 
benefits of the lift and rebuked the chancellor by rejecting his efforts to lift the 
European Union's arms embargo against China. In October 28, the German 
Parliament, including the vast majority of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's own Social 
Democrats and virtually all of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's Greens, passed a 
resolution which called on the German government to make any relaxation of the 15-
year arms trade ban conditional on these measures. 428 On November 19, the 
European Parliament passed a similar resolution 572 votes against 72. And on March 
11, leaders of the four German political parties representing Germany in the European 
Parliament sent an open letter to Schröder urging him to abandon his support for 
China arms sales.429 In the same month, the Bundesrat also adopted a motion urging 
China to ratify a United Nations' treaty on human and political rights, speed up the 
implementation of recent civil rights reforms and grant ethnic minorities additional 
autonomy. 
In December 2004, before the Hague summit, Chancellor Schröder went to 
China for the sixth time with 35 business leaders, on a trip largely dedicated to solicit 
business. More than 150 companies had applied to go.430 A €1bn deal to sell 23 
Airbus aircraft was finalized and Siemens, the engineering group, had already secured 
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a €360m deal on the sale of 180 locomotives. Once again, on the home front, 
Chancellor Schröder’s mercantile approach to foreign policy was criticized, 
especially because he put human rights concerns on the backburner. 431 This was his 
conviction that his country’s economic interests came first, leading him to believe 
that the Tiananmen Square events were a thing of the past.”432 
At the expected seventh EU-China summit on December 8, 2004, in the 
Hague, the E.U. “confirmed its political will to continue to work towards lifting the 
embargo.”433 During the summit, France and Germany pushed for and achieved in 
principle an agreement for the EU towards lifting the partial arms embargo.434 Once 
the Hague Summit decided to review the lift, the US started to voice their opposition 
but mostly pressured the UK as a traditional transatlantic bridge. During the spring of 
2005, both Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President George W. Bush 
visited Europe. The visit was supposed to help mend fences after the Iraq crisis 
following President Bush’s reelection.  Not to throw oil on the fire, the U.S. President 
and the German Chancellor graciously overlooked the China arms issue as well as 
any rows over Iran's nuclear plans. "We have the same goals," the president said, 
putting on a good show.  In Berlin, advisors to Chancellor Schröder believed the 
whole commotion in Washington was being exaggerated since President Bush had 
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not brought up the issue. 435On the other hand, the German Chancellor did not want 
get in another argument with President Bush or with the American Congress.436 
In the meantime, the European Union consensus had seemed to fall apart and 
what was supposed to be a formality turned out to be more complicated. While 
France was still committed to the embargo, the leaders of Britain and several other 
European countries were backing away from making an immediate decision. The 
position of Germany was unclear. The embargo was not on the formal agenda of the 
two-day summit in Brussels; however, it was discussed in private sessions. In 
Germany, domestic opposition kept rising in the Parliament ranks. In April, EU 
foreign ministers met in Luxembourg and could not reach a consensus on the issue 
despite an intense lobbying campaign to convince the US partner.  Officials said 
privately, that the issue might be put off until at least 2006.  Britain was scheduled to 
hold the EU presidency in the second half of 2005 and had just reversed its position, 
and was now opposing the lift. Despite the stunning British reversal, German 
leadership was still cohesive. Foreign Minister Fischer at the time declared that 
ending the ban depended largely "on movement by Beijing, especially on the question 
of human rights and a peaceful resolution" of its conflict with Taiwan. Before the 
German Parliament, Fischer testified that the ban hindered Europe's efforts to boost 
trade with China and that a greater Chinese commitment to human rights would help 
forge an EU consensus on lifting the embargo.437 
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 It seemed that the German leadership was involuntarily losing control of the 
issue. The media, the public opinion and the parties were expressing their strong 
feelings against the lift. 438 The Chancellor was not in a comfortable position since the 
Chinese were keeping the pressure on. In an interview, the Chinese ambassador to 
Germany, Mr. Ma, called the embargo “embarrassing’ and “discriminating”. 
Ambassador Ma clearly stated that the lift would give an impulse to China EU 
relations, but until then, the relationship could not be normal. Ambassador Ma had 
spent much time meeting German politicians from all the political parties in an effort 
to convince them that keeping the embargo served no practical purpose. 439 
In June, some polls showed the Conservative Party, the CDU, well ahead of 
the leading government, the Social Democrats, suggesting a possible change of ruling 
party in the fall. Wolfgang Schäuble, CDU foreign affairs spokesman, told 
Bloomberg that if his party took office after the elections expected in September it 
would not end the ban without US consent. The CDU rejected the approach according 
to which Europe should be a counterweight to the US. Schauble believed that stronger 
co-operation between the large centers was the alternative and only then Germany 
would be more accountable to all of its partners." 440 The CDU was pressuring on 
having a vote at the Bundestag, but Schröder had declared that he would disregard 
any vote because certain foreign policy issues could only be decided by the 
Chancellor.441 
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The general election and change of leadership at the Chancellery in November 
2005 gave the last blow to the initiative.  Both major parties had to form a grand 
coalition. The coalition pact between  the CDU led by Angela Merkel and outgoing . 
Schroder's Social Democrats agreed to pursue a "long-term strategy of partnership" 
with China, but stated that the "dialogue on democracy and human rights would be 
intensified". Ms. Merkel, the upcoming Chancellor, refused to support the lift of the 
embargo until human rights significantly improved and had criticized Mr. Schröder 
for placing too much emphasis on the expansion of business ties with China. Ms. 
Merkel did not even discuss it when Chinese President Hu visited Germany during 
the transition period. Even on the SPD part, there were increasing concerns about the 
trade imbalance between China and Germany. The CDU seemed to have won the 
backing of their partner in the coalition. Wolfgang Clement, outgoing Economics 
Minister in the Schröder cabinet, told his Chinese counterpart that while bilateral 
trade had expanded rapidly in recent years - reaching € 53bn ($ 62bn) in 2004,  the 
balance "was becoming somewhat distorted", with Chinese exports to Germany 
expanding by 26 percent this year, but trade in the opposition direction shrinking 5 
per cent and called on China to open its markets more fully, intensify efforts to end 
product piracy and stop abuses of intellectual property rights. Hu also held talks with 
Schröder who told him, much to the anger of Merkel's Conservatives, that he believed 
the European Union would find a "sensible solution" to its arms embargo on China, 
that  his opinion on the arms embargo had not changed, and that Germany would  
work with France on this issue."442  
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Furthermore, the rifts between the incumbent and previous governments 
within the new coalition were highlighted when the CDU drafted a new strategy 
defining Asia’s rise as a strategic challenge and potential opportunity for Germany 
and Europe. It emphasized several issues with China such as copyrights, economic 
espionage and disadvantages in monetary joint ventures, and called for a shift in 
attention from China to India. This change was not necessarily welcome by the 
minister of Foreign Affairs, a SPD member, who favored the traditional approach of 
Mrs. Merkel’s predecessors Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder. The Chinese 
reaction to this new approach was also harsh. Given the uneasiness of the situation, 
the government publicly emphasized the continuity element in its policies but still left 
aside the embargo.443 
 
5.4 Goodness of fit between EU and German China sanction policy 
The goal is to evaluate the overall pattern of German institutional responses to 
the Europeanization of the European China policy. What is the goodness of fit or the 
mismatch between the EU and the Germany on China sanction policy?  Once again, I 
apply the Börzel, Cowles et al.  and Falkner et al. models to explain the German 
adaptation444.  At this stage, it is already established that there was no mismatch 
between EU policy and German policy on the embargo policy and that German and 
EU policies converged. Germany had no issue reversing the ban and arms export 
regulations were stricter than the Code of Conduct. Using Börzel’s classification and 
based on the previous sections of the chapter, I can also now establish that Germany 
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was a pace-setter along with France. Chancellor Schröder was influential and not just 
a follower of President Chirac. Schröder had at a certain time considered to make a 
proposal to the relevant EU bodies to lift the embargo445.  Regarding mediating 
factors, to be able to compare with the other two countries, Britain and France, I used 
the same factors: veto points, the country’s organizational and policymaking culture, 
the human rights issue, the trade issue and the empowerment of external actors. 
The weight of the veto points was crucial in harming the effectiveness of the 
German leadership and its campaign towards a lift of the ban. The existence of ‘veto 
points’ in the domestic structure has been identified as a major factor preventing 
structural adaptation according to Cowles et al446. The more power is dispersed across 
the political system and the more actors have a say in political decision making, the 
more difficult is to foster the domestic consensus or ‘winning coalition’ necessary to 
introduce institutional changes in response to Europeanization pressures. There had 
been a great deal of domestic debate and opposition, given public opinion, Green 
party and CDU’s objections to perceived ongoing human rights abuses in China. 
447The timing of the issue was also under scrutiny since the lift was not a decisive 
issue for the economic prosperity of the country but certainly a divisive one based on 
the different political leanings within the German government.448The question of 
lifting the EU arms ban has turned into an animated power struggle between the 
Schröder government and members of the coalition. That made the German case 
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unique since there were no such disagreements in the ruling coalitions of France and 
Britain.  
  Schröder’s argument, according to which lifting the embargo had nothing to 
do with selling weapons but a lot to do with normalizing relations 16 years after the 
Tiananmen crackdown, ruffled some feathers in the governing coalition but also in 
the opposition.449The strong reaction to the possible sale of a nuclear plant to the PRC 
was an illustration of the perception of China within the German polity. The German 
Social Democrats' junior coalition partner, the Greens, adamantly opposed lifting the 
embargo, as did the opposition Christian Democrats.  Party leader Claudia Roth 
demanded that the government reconsider its position and criticized the Chancellor 
for putting a strain on the cohesion of the EU. To the Greens, the Chinese record for 
human rights showed more shortcomings than improvements, and the passage of the 
anti-secession law did not serve the Chinese cause. As a possible remedy, one of the 
Greens’ demands was to beef up the Code of Conduct by making it politically and 
legally binding450. The position of the Greens was, however, made difficult by the 
fact that one of their high profile members was actually the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Joshka Fischer. Fischer’s position was not entirely clear. On one hand, he 
told his party he would try to convince the Chancellor to reconsider and on the other 
hand was still supporting the initiative451. Fischer was not recognized as the 
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spokesperson for its party by other party members452. The criticism towards Fischer 
was not necessarily fair. Firstly, he could not publicly disapprove the Chancellor and 
secondly ,he himself half-heartedly supported the initiative, declared in several 
instances that he had an increasingly skeptical attitude,453 and that the embargo 
should only be lifted if Beijing "moves" on human rights concerns and on relations 
with Taiwan.454 The pragmatic approach of the Chancellor did not necessarily match 
the agenda of the Greens. Could the party or the voters put up with a German foreign 
policy that ran counter to the Green agenda, but was connected with the party's most 
well-known figure? This split between ideals and realpolitik could not be good for the 
party in the long term.455   
For the CDU, the lift would have sent the wrong signal. The human rights 
situation in China had improved but not enough to justify a change of course, and the 
passage of the anti-secession law was another issue456. The CDU did not believe in a 
multipolar world and did not want to alienate the U.S. non-governmental human 
rights groups who were also displeased by the idea.457 
The press denounced the contradictions of the rationale for a lift and raised 
some questions about the place of China in the world. Would the lift really further the 
integration of China into the international community or contribute to stability in East 
Asia?  The press was particularly adamant on the Taiwanese issue and the blatant 
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human rights abuses in China.458 Minister Fisher’s ambivalent position on the subject 
also got literally lots of bad press. The media played a role of ‘watchdog’ by pointing 
out the cracks in the foreign policy-making of the governing German coalition foreign 
policy, especially with upcoming elections.  
The country’s organizational and policymaking culture, seen as a third 
mediating factor, also affects whether domestic actors can use adaptation pressures 
emanating from Europeanization to induce structural change. The episode of the 
debate of the lift of the arms embargo highlighted the predominance of the Chancellor 
in foreign policy-making. It is interesting to note that the German Basic Law does not 
stipulate who or what is the vehicle for the conduct of foreign policy in the German 
polity. The only stipulation is that “the Federation shall have exclusive legislative 
jurisdiction in respect of foreign affairs” (article 73). Consequently, the controversy 
over whether foreign policy is to be regarded as the sole responsibility of the 
executive or as a competence to be jointly exercised both by the executive and 
parliament is raised often459. The extent to which the Chancellor exercises his 
constitutional authority and uses it for conducting a consistent foreign policy depends 
on many factors, ranging from his personality and his ministerial appointments to 
coalition maintenance and party cohesion. For several years, Germany’s China policy 
had been the Chancellor’s task where the influence of the Foreign Ministry’s 
influence had been reduced and was focusing on economic cooperation.   The fast 
pace of modernization of China and the personality of  then Chinese Prime Minister 
Zhu Rongji  impressed the German Chancellor who soon established his  office as the 
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strategic actor in Germany’s policy vis-à-vis China.  The Foreign Ministry did not 
obstruct the ambitions of the Chancellor, and certainly did not mind leaving the 
Chancellor responsible for the tricky relationship with the PRC. Bilateral relations 
have thus reached a great level of political and personal closeness; Schröder visited 
China six times during his incumbency.  Under Schröder leadership, the office of the 
Chancellor became the main promoter of German trade and left other members of the 
cabinet with the displeasure of criticizing China for poor human rights records.460 
Throughout the debate, Chancellor Schröder argued the case that lifting the 
embargo would economically benefit Germany and went over the objections of his 
coalition partners; he became a bully by persistently promoting the line to lift the 
embargo, positioned himself against his own Social Democratic Party (SPD) and 
against Joschka Fischer, the Foreign Minister and the leader of the junior coalition 
partner, the Greens. Schröder insisted on several occasions on the predominance of 
the Chancellor and that irrespective of any voting in the Bundestag, the final authority 
of foreign policy making laid with the federal government. This kind of stance by 
Schröder was often termed by the German opposition as Alleingang (go-it-alone 
policy).461 Critics even dubbed Schröder the "Panzer Kanzler" (or "tank chancellor") 
for his eagerness on the issue.462Schröder’s authoritarian style of leadership was 
decisive to override partners in the governing coalition and within his own party463. 
His assertive personality helped him in international negotiations as he was conscious 
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of the role that a unified and fully sovereign that Germany was playing on the 
European stage and on the world stage and differently than the early Germany.  
The stance on human rights was a key factor to determine how a country 
would react to the embargo. In the case of Germany, the issue fluctuated between the 
background or in the forefront. Human rights never seemed the priority of the 
Chancellor but improving the human rights situation in East Asia was officially a 
central concern of the Federal Government. Like his predecessor, Schröder claimed 
that his government was conducting the Human Rights Dialogue with China behind 
closed doors, rather than in public. Germany continued to voice at the UN Human 
Rights Commission HR concerns over human rights abuses in China almost on an 
annual basis.464 Joschka Fischer, in his speech to the 61st Session of the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in March 2005, depicted the 
human rights situation in China as a source of concern.465 But this strategy seemed to 
have had very limited success beyond the symbolic release of a small number of 
political prisoners by the Chinese leadership in advance of state visits. This limited 
record explained the constant pressure by the Green Party, the opposition and the 
media towards better results and the general opposition to the lift of the embargo. 
Even within the Chancellor’s own party, there was a consensus that the embargo 
should be lifted only if the human rights situation improved. The vote to uphold the 
embargo was initiated by the parliamentary groups that supported Schröder.466 The 
debate in Germany was much more centered on symbolic issues such as human rights 
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and the timing of the issue. How could Germany have clear conscience selling 
weapons to China, who had made so little progress inhuman rights?  The tone of the 
debate was not so much about the factual outcome of lifting the embargo. Such a 
decision would require preparing the public for at least five or six years argued Andre 
Brie, a German member of European Parliament.  
The trade motivation remained the principal explanation to Germany’s 
positive response to further Europeanization of China policy. The pragmatic trade 
relationship clearly distinguished itself from the political one. In practice it meant 
avoiding controversies and downplaying criticism of China’s human record. Germany 
always regarded the PRC as economically and politically more important then and 
therefore did not want to risk its good relations to Beijing by undermining the One-
China principle or being too critical on human rights. Trade has been a defining issue 
of Sino-German relations but to public opinion and to other parties, the trade ambition 
had to have limits boundaries. And in the case of the Hanau nuclear plant and the 
arms embargo, political parties and public opinion had a clear impact on Schröder’s 
ambitious trade promotion agenda. The sale of a plutonium plant was not acceptable 
and neither was the lift of the arms embargo.  
Fourth,   the empowerment of external actors and learning mattered. The 
possibility of the lift empowered the USA who strongly opposed the initiative. The 
general context was certainly not favorable to a lift,467 especially based on the nature 
of the transatlantic relationship at that time due to the Iraq issue. We exposed in 
previous chapters the reasons why the U.S. opposed the lift of the embargo so 
vehemently.  On the one hand, Congress feared that a better equipped China would 
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threaten the safety of Taiwan, and on the other hand, there was the fear that American 
technology or weaponry sold to Europe could leak out and end up again facing 
American forces in the Asia Pacific region. In February 2005, the U.S. House of 
Representatives adopted a resolution stating that it deplored increased E.U. sales and 
moves to lift the embargo, and declaring that those moves “place European security 
policy in direct conflict with U.S. security interests.” The resolution passed by a vote 
of 411-3.  It warned that, if Europe did not change course, Congress would have to 
consider “limitations and constraints” on transatlantic defense-industrial ties.  
The US lobbying offensive was at its peak in 2005 but originated mostly from 
Congress rather than the administration. Despite the reservations of the Bundestag 
about the lift of the embargo, there was a consensus in German diplomacy that there 
was a lack of understanding in the U.S. about what the arms embargo was about and 
that there was a certain degree of hypocrisy at play, when the U.S. delivered sensitive 
technology to China through presidential waivers. 468 The U.S. became part of the 
debate but did not necessarily tip the scale in Germany. 469 
Germany was a pace-setter of Europeanization of China policy for almost 
forty years but Germany’s success in China was mostly trade related and the realities 
of German-Chinese relations often did not live up to the expectations created by the 
ambitious rhetoric of the German government. The German trade promotion crusade 
managed to keep human rights critics at bay by allowing policies such as the 
Dialogue on Human Rights, the creation of the office of a Human Rights 
Representative that had little effect. Every German policy vis-à-vis China could be 
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perceived as a way to improve bilateral trade, even foreign cultural affairs. The lift of 
the embargo fitted that ambition and was the gateway to a more strategic dimension 
to the relationship. The role of Chancellor Schröder was decisive in bringing the issue 
to the fore, given a close relationship with the other ‘leader’ on the initiative, 
President Chirac of France, and with the Chinese President. 
  
5.5 Conclusion 
Germany had been a pace-setter of Europeanization of China policy for 
almost forty years but Germany’s success in China was mostly trade related and the 
realities of German-Chinese relations often did not live up to the expectations created 
by the ambitious rhetoric of the German government. The German trade promotion 
crusade managed to keep human rights critics at bay by allowing policies such as the 
Dialogue on Human Rights, the creation of the office of a Human Rights 
Representative that had little effect. Every German policy vis-à-vis China could be 
perceived as a way to improve bilateral trade, even foreign cultural affairs. The lift of 
the embargo fitted that ambition and was the gateway to a more strategic dimension 
to the relationship. The role of Chancellor Schröder was decisive in bringing the issue 
to the fore, given a close relationship with the other ‘leader’ on the initiative, 
President Chirac of France, and with the Chinese President. One may argue that 
traded its habits of pace-setter in the trade area to a more political outfit. The German 
diplomacy was active in convincing their European partners and the might of the 
Franco-German engine was expected to conquer. The Franco-German alliance had 
been successful in major integration initiatives including some foreign policy related 
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ones (creation of Franco-German brigade Eurocorps in 1991 or creation of European 
Council summits in 1974 on the initiative of the French President and the German 
Chancellor). There was no misfit between a change in EU policy and Germany. 
The wheels of the ‘Panzer Kanzler’ were however, blocked by a strong 
opposition not only within government coalition ranks, but also by the Conservative 
Party (in the opposition), the press and public opinion. Despite his supremacy on 
foreign policy-making, the Chancellor underestimated the diversity of foreign policy 
within the coalition and in the opposition. There were too many differences and it was 
then impossible to reach a consensus. The domestic struggle was the Achilles’ heel of 
the German attempt. The more the issue was dragging, the less likely it would be 
resolved. The year 2005, with the anti-secession law on Taiwan and the pressure by 
the United States to withdraw the initiative, combined with an election campaign 
witnessed the slow death of the initiative. Germany had been successful in clearly 
communicating about preferences uploading at the EU level but neglected the impact 
of the domestic level.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion: Was there any European China Policy in the case of the embargo? 
 
6.0 Introduction 
To sum up our findings and conclude on the significance of our research, we did need 
the point of view of the EU institutions themselves. I contacted representatives from the 
European Council, the European Commission and Members of Parliament (see Appendix): I 
obtained thirteen positive responses and ten were interviews. I organized the review of the 
findings and the significance of our study in the following fashion: how did the hypotheses 2 
and 3 checked and how significant the influence of the Big Three on EU sanction policy was; 
how well the theories about domestic responses to Europeanization on community method 
policies (formerly Pillar 1) by Börzel, Falkner et al. and Cowles et al. applied to foreign 
policy by reviewing the various veto points. 
In a similar fashion as Germany, the EU has experienced a less problematic 
relationship with China than had Britain and France470. Since an EC delegation was 
established in Beijing in 1988, a political dialogue was started in 1994, and an annual summit 
began in 1998 (meetings at the ministerial level started in 1995), the EU as an actor began to 
challenge the traditional dominance of London, Berlin and Paris in Europe’s relations with 
China471. Initially though, the development of China-EU relations was progressive. One can 
identify three periods in EU-China relations472. The first period, from 1975 to 1988 is 
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motivated by business cooperation; the second period 1989-1995, with 1989 as a milestone in 
the relationship when Europeans strongly condemned the Tiananmen massacre and 
suspended dialogue with China. Since 1990, the EU has sponsored resolutions critical of the 
PRC in the UN’s Geneva Human Rights Commission. From 1995, the relation shifted from 
an only economic relation with criticism on political matters to a much more comprehensive 
and  elaborate cooperation. Nineteen Ninety-five marked the beginning of the real European 
policy towards China. 
 The Chinese were actually the ones who pointed to the difficulties the government in 
Beijing had in dealings with the EU and individual member states at the same time. While 
China was seeking to establish itself as a global and coherent foreign policy power, the EU’s 
foreign policy agenda did not necessarily follow those of its individual member states. There 
were areas in which the EU was not yet a coherent actor in foreign and security policy, which 
made it difficult for Brussels to formulate and implement a common position and common 
policies. Beijing was faced with the dilemma of balancing its policies towards the EU and 
towards the individual member states.  
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6.1 The case of the embargo: an aberrant or normal issue for EU foreign policy? 
The debate over a common approach to the rise of China has become one of the most 
controversial and contested issues across the Atlantic and within Europe itself. 473The lift of 
the arms embargo was at the core of it. One may wonder why the issue would provoke so 
much passion and intrigue whereas the measure itself never had a solid basis in EU law. The 
embargo was based on a political Declaration on China made by the European Council 
meeting in Madrid on 26 and 27 June 1989 and was never legally binding. This embargo 
occurred before the creation of the European Union and before its Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, which would establish policy later on legal instruments giving expression to 
CFSP decisions, including embargoes. The arms ban on China then was an ‘empty shell’, 
only a political declaration, and there was never a decision to revise its form.474 All other 
sanction measures that pre-dated the creation of new EU legal instruments have either been 
discontinued or have been renewed and given a different legal form.475 
The arms embargo on China is unique in this regard.  Since it was a political decision, 
it never fell into the Commission sanctions portfolio. The European Council was the one 
deciding to review it, not the Commission, which traditionally oversaw the application of 
sanctions by working with the Council476. In its essence, the China sanction policy could only 
be affected by Member States themselves. From this it can be argued that from a legal 
perspective there is not one arms embargo against China but a series of member state 
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embargoes established under country laws and regulations.477 It ultimately comes down to 
the fact that once again the Member States have the last word when it comes to foreign 
policy. The Europeanization of foreign policy regarding China remains more bottom-up and 
horizontal than top-down. France and Germany, and at some point the UK, based on their 
close ties with the PRC and their commercial and strategic interests in the region, pushed for 
the lift, by setting the agenda and influencing other member states. The issue was ,moreover, 
symbolic and major European countries wanted to send a symbol to return to normalcy to 
Beijing by lifting the weapons embargo. The lift of the embargo fitted a bigger EU plan vis-
à-vis China.  The EU wanted to be China’s main partner and supply this huge market with 
commercial goods and participate in infrastructure projects, such as high-speed trains, civil 
engineering projects, and the construction of nuclear power plants. 478 
 
6.2      Response to the embargo by other member states  
Some member states did not know how to react when the issue was brought up by 
France and Germany and were certainly not keen on lifting the ban479. The Netherlands, 
Finland, Belgium, Portugal and Sweden voiced concerns over lifting the embargo without 
significant improvements in China’s human rights. Despite the concerns, the Netherlands and 
Denmark demonstrated willingness to agree to lift the of the weapons embargo if it was the 
will of the majority. The opposition parties and public opinion in Northern European 
countries were strongly opposed to the lift but could bear it as long as significant human 
rights improvements were noticeable. In January 2004, Prime Minister Blackened, while the 
Netherlands was the six-month acting EU President, stated that it would be detrimental for 
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‘political and diplomatic relations for the Netherlands’ upcoming presidency if they were the 
only country in favor of maintaining the embargo.480 The consensus was that to upgrade the 
Common Position and beef up the Code of Conduct.481 
When the U.S. started expressing their opposition to the measure, some member states 
did start revising their position. The United Kingdom was the first to do so, based on its 
special relationship with the United States. The new member states, also loyal to the United 
States and grateful to have joined NATO, would follow.482 The creation of the strategic 
dialogue on Asia between the United States and the EU did not soften the US stance. 
 
 
6.3 Comparison of the influence and responses of the Big Three and their impact of 
bilateral relations. 
   Throughout history, while the EU-PRC relationship was evolving, the Big Three the 
uploaded their policy preferences to promoted their own relationship with China: a the trade 
relationship for Germany, a political one for France, and the issue of Hong-Kong for the 
United Kingdom,483 no matter what was happening at the EU level. 
Although the UK became a foot-dragger on the issue of the embargo, by not putting the issue 
on the agenda of its EU presidency in the second half of September 2005, the UK still used 
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the Presidency medium to hold bilateral meetings between British and Chinese ministry 
delegations… 
In the questionnaire, I asked whether the bilateral relations helped or harmed in 
developing a coherent EU China policy. It was established in the previous chapters that big 
Member States pursued their own interests rather than a EU one. The UK made the choice to 
abandon the ship, in order not to upset the US and lose them as a partner in its defense sector. 
Did the French and Germans pursue the greater good, that is the EU one? The vision of a 
multipolar world fits the aspirations of the EU to become a stronger political player. There 
was no misfit between the German and French policies on one hand and with the proposed 
EU policy on the other. The French and the German had a heavily  regulated weapons sales 
export system and a removal of the lift coincided with French ,German and EU interests. 
Both countries qualified as pace-setters in their readiness for the policy but above all were 
pace-setters in setting the agenda, formulating the policy and convincing other member 
states. The greater good was to improve the China EU relationship, which fitted the vision of 
a multipolar word; the short-term interest for France, Germany and their followers (Italy and 
Spain were big proponents) was to increase their market share in China.484 Since there was 
no true single common foreign policy, it was easier for member states to upload their state 
interests through the EU, as Williams illustrated it with Zimbabwe485 and Britain or in the 
case of Chad and France486. The British position was very fluid and did impact the outcome. 
Britain contributed to confirm the second hypothesis that the Big Three had an influence on 
EU sanction policy. Britain had an influence in maintaining the status quo and favoring the 
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transatlantic bond over rising China and a coherent EU policy. Britain as a big power had the 
capacity to tip the scale though very discreet and limited lobbying. 
Germany, France and the UK undoubtedly played an important role in agenda setting, 
policy formulation, exchange of ideas with Member States.487  The three Member States were 
key players in the debate and exerted strong influence, but other countries such as Italy were 
part of that group as well. Its Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, spoke against the embargo 
on several occasions.488 
    The influence of the Big Three was naturally more important at the European 
Council level since the EU sanction policy on China was intergovernmental. One of the 
questionnaire interviewees at the European Parliament, Silvestro Latella, political advisor 
PSE-secretariat China delegation (group of European socialist parties), estimated that 
sanction policy was intergovernmental in strategic issues but supranational for economic 
issues.489 As suggested in the introductory chapter, the arms embargo did not qualify as a 
sanction per se, since it was a declaration, loophole which needed to be addressed by an 
updated sanction policy vis-à-vis China.490 
Based on the fact that the decision emanated from the Council and was not legally 
binding, there was some resentment even within European institutions about repealing the 
embargo. The European Commission, originally, seemed divided over the review decision. It 
appeared that the office of Commission President Romano Prodi was more in favor of lifting 
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the embargo than the Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten. Following the China 
summit in October 2003, President Prodi declared that the Chinese request for removing the 
embargo had a great chance of success, and when the decision about the review of the 
embargo was taken in December 2003, Prodi officially supported the measure.491During the 
early months of 2004, Commissioner Pattern and the External Relations office got on board 
and concluded that the Code of Conduct might be a better method of restricting arms sales to 
China.492 
The European Parliament was much more vehement on its opposition. In that case, 
there was a mismatch with France and Germany. The only democratically elected body never 
supported the decision to lift the embargo and passed several resolutions stating its 
opposition; the EP’s stance reflected frustration in domestic opposition parties and in the 
public opinion as already mentioned in Chapter 2, The European Parliament always had a 
strong human rights culture493. The Members of the European Parliament had an issue with 
the fact that the Code of Conduct was not legally binding and therefore did not really make 
countries comply with human rights obligations. 494 
 
6.4      The place of China in the world and the aspirations of the EU as a global actor 
The last question in the interview was about International Relations and asked about 
possible increasing role of China in the international security sphere. Annalisa Giannella, 
Personal representative of the High Representative on Non Proliferation at the European 
Council, stated that, on her ‘campaign’ trip in Washington D.C. to convince the US partners,  
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the embargo was an issue of adequacy in terms of the relationship with the PRC495. The 
European Union wanted to develop a true partnership, and scrapping the restriction would 
symbolize the increasingly positive tone of EU-China relations and the role of China in the 
world. The rapid growth of Sino-European trade has coincided with the development of the 
European Political union and of a common European political identity. The draft European 
Security Strategy Paper stated that “a stronger Europe with a common strategic vision is also 
a Europe capable of consolidating relationships with the other great partners” like China, as 
“a pillar of the organization of the new world”496. Europe was trying to raise its profile in the 
region and saw Beijing as an essential counterweight to US dominance in world affairs.’497 
The relationship is also simplified by the fact that China is neither a military threat 
nor geographically adjacent to Europe.498From the Chinese point of view, the European 
diplomacy is not confrontational on human rights and respects national sovereignty. Thus, 
the security concerns that dominate China’s relations with Washington do not hinder China’s 
dealings with Europe.499 David Shambaugh goes further by identifying the Sino-European 
relationship as an emerging “axis” in international relations based on three pillars: engaging 
China through multilateral institutions that enhance its participation in international affairs; 
intensifying bilateral Sino-European ties; and improving China’s “domestic capacity” to 
govern.500 Both the EU and China aspire to play a greater role in international affairs, and 
both promote a multipolar world, each representing one pole.   
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The debate about the lift coincided with the ‘upgrade’ in EU-China relations to a 
‘strategic partnership’. The concept implied a smooth relationship and an cooperation in an 
increasing number of domains, including strategic ones501. Over time and especially since 
1995, both EU and China agreed that their relation had not only expanded but also deepened 
The EU Council’s secretary-general/high representative Javier Solana added that, as partners, 
the EU and China had ‘significant global strengths, capabilities and responsibilities’. To 
Solana, China was rapidly emerging as a world leader and positive actor on the global 
stage’.502 
The strategic partnership entailed that global solutions could not be found without 
China. The PRC should play a more important role in international security. It is a global 
player, member of the UN Security Council and there have been convergences on non 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and on Darfur, Burma or North Korea503. The 
EU believed that by treating China as a respected interlocutor, it could encourage Beijing to 
act as a partner on issues of global governance. The Chinese, though, saw the embargo as 
discrimination, and it seemed difficult to expect leadership from China with an EU embargo. 
The EU  also expected Beijing to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, one of the main United Nations human rights treaties, in the near future.”504 China 
could not be treated like pariah states such as Burma, Sudan and Zimbabwe, the only other 
countries subject to EU arms embargoes. The EU leadership admitted there has not been 
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enough progress on human rights but they maintain that China today is a more liberal country 
than it was in 1989.505 
In the words of EU External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner: “Both 
the EU and China have changed beyond recognition in 30 years and so has our relationship. 
Our existing trade and economic cooperation agreement simply does not live up to the 
dynamism of today’s partnership. It’s time to reflect the vibrancy of our relations with an 
ambitious new agreement that will help us move to a fully-fledged strategic partnership.”506 It 
was agreed that the meaning of strategic would have to go beyond the traditional definition and 
encompass a comprehensive partnership including economic and trade relations, civil society 
exchanges and  political relations.  
However, despite the fact that the term “strategic partnership” was not defined by the 
European Union, yet few have questioned the decision to include China as a strategic partner. 
The EU’s objective should be to help China to be a peaceful, stable democratic (although not 
necessarily in the full Western sense), internationally responsible country, internally consensus 
seeking and externally multilateral, sharing broadly similar values and goals. The 
intensification of bilateral ties between EU and China_ as well as between China and 
individual member states _does not mean either the weakening of EU-US relations or the 
guarantee that both want to establish a multipolar world.507  
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6.5 Applicability of adaptation theories on foreign policy 
 
 The methodology was innovative by applying theories of adaptation to 
Europeanization used for community method policies (formerly Pillar 1) to foreign policy. 
Using Börzel, Falkner et al., and Cowles et al. theories, I intended to see how the three 
member states of our study would respond to EU rule. The approach was challenging since 
when it comes to foreign policy, member states are the ultimate decision-makers versus 
community method policies where member states must comply. The members states 
influence then the policy formulation at the EU level by uploading their policy preferences. 
Using Börzel turned out to be easy to transpose to a foreign policy issue given the changing 
attitude of Britain for example. Britain was first a fence-sitter, “watching” France and 
Germany take the lead on the issue, wondering if it would correspond to its interests, before 
it decided to jump on the bandwagon.  Then, based on the strong reaction from the United 
States, Britain became a foot-dragger and ended up tanking the initiative by convincing 
other member states in the spring 2005 that the timing was not right and by not putting the 
issue on the agenda of its EU presidency in the second half of 2005. France and Germany 
were pace-setters from the beginning to the end, and even after 2005, French diplomacy 
would still bring up the issue while traveling to the region Börzel’s classification could 
apply to other foreign policy cases and translates how member states might change their 
opinion as an opinion evolves.  
  The Cowles et al. and Falkner et al. theories were more difficult to transpose to 
foreign policy since  foreign policy does not only follow one type of Europeanization but 
several. I had to adjust their models to my needs. Mismatch or misfit meant that there was 
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either disagreement between a member state and the EU or unreadiness as for pursuing a 
certain option. Match or fit meant that there was agreement between the Member State policy 
and the EU proposed policy and readiness (export control regime) to adapt to the new policy. 
I adjusted the mediating factors to predict and explain the responses of the member states to 
Europeanization of EU China policy. Their models were complementary to my 
questionnaire: the importance of external actors was not mentioned in the questionnaire but 
was brought during interviews and turned out to be an important mediating factor. The model 
was also a noteworthy tool to test the hypothesis of the influence of the ultimate impact of 
external factors (H4). 
As for future applications in foreign policy, with a reinforced High Representative, 
We may see more top-down Europeanization of foreign policy and a stronger grip from 
Brussels. Reinforced European foreign policy institutions will certainly require adjustments 
in national political and administrative structures. In addition, this ‘national adaptation’ 
might well be supplemented by a process of ‘identity reconstruction’. The mere presence of 
the high representative and his service are likely to increase expectations of a common EU 
policy, thus constraining national policy choices and further enhancing the ‘coordination 
reflex’ among capitals. This will matter all the more since the coordination process will 
henceforth be led by genuine European actors rather than member state Council 
presidencies508. Then, adaptation models such as Falkner et al. or Cowles et al. should be 
easier to transpose. Let us now review three mediating factors that struck  out and were 
decisive in making the issue fail. 
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6.6 The empowerment of external actors 
6.6.1 The impact of the United States 
The involvement of the US was decisive in sabotaging the initiative of the lift and 
was another mediating factor to explain the goodness of fit with the policy.  The pro-active 
stance of the US, we might even call the US as an ‘external’ foot-dragger, confirmed the 
hypothesis that any policy initiative changing the EU sanction policy on China needs to be 
approved by the US, whether the lobbying for the proposal was successful or not.  
The US animosity was probably underestimated by the Europeans and not necessarily 
understandable given the US record regarding weapon sales to China. Indeed, the U.S. 
previously sold both dual use technologies and arms to China509. The frenzy about a potential 
conflict in the Taiwan Strait puzzled the Europeans. The PRC would not engage Taiwan in a 
war while the island was one of the largest foreign investors in the Chinese economy. The 
issue seemed more a turf brawl where the US might feel threatened by the emerging Sino-
European Axis and by the economic and geopolitical rise of China, which might threaten the 
ability of the U.S. to act as a unique balancing power in the region and  marginalizing its 
regional influence.510  
Although the arms embargo issue introduced yet another serious dispute into U.S.-
European relations, it led to the creation of dialogue between the U.S. and Europe to 
coordinate their policies in Asia and have a strategic discussion about how China 
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development can contribute to international security.511The EU was the initiator of those 
forums with a view to avoid further misunderstandings about policies. These dialogues were 
conducted by the so-called troika, consisting of the senior official in charge of East Asia at 
the foreign ministry of the incumbent presidency and the ones of the previous and the next 
presidency. Their interlocutor on the US side was the assistant-secretary of state for Asia-
Pacific Affairs, Chris Hill. Main themes on the agenda were global issues such as the Middle 
East, Iran, North Korea, terrorism etc., where the US and the EU have common concerns. 
The focus was no longer on the lifting of the arms embargo: the proposal had been removed 
from the EU agenda due to a lack of consensus within the Union.512 
6.6.2 Taiwan 
The EU’s official policy with regard to Taiwan was consistent with that of the 
Chinese government’s “one-China” principle. On Taiwan, there is no mismatch between 
France, Germany, Britain, and the EU: they all recognize the government of the People’s 
Republic of China to be the sole legal government of China, they do not acknowledge 
Taiwan as a sovereign country, and they have no established diplomatic relations with the 
island. On the other hand, as the EU’s third largest trading partner in Asia, Taiwan is an 
important economic partner; therefore, its interests cannot be completely ignored.  The EU’s 
main objective in managing these relationships has been to try balancing economic relations 
with Taiwan while maintaining good political relations with Beijing. For the most part, the 
EU has employed a cautious approach toward Taiwan that has caused little friction, but has 
not been completely without controversy.  Following passage by the Chinese government of 
an anti-secession law directed at Taiwan, the EU Commission voiced its concern over an 
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explicit reference that was made to the use of “non-peaceful means” to resolve the issue and 
warned against unilateral action. The Commission stressed that “any arrangement between 
Beijing and Taipei could only be achieved on a mutually acceptable basis, with reference 
also to the wishes of the Taiwanese population” (Commission of the European Communities 
2005).513 The EU; however, did not associate the anti-Secession Law issue with the lift of the 
arms embargo, unlike the United States. Given the poor record on human rights, the timing of 
the Chinese was disastrous and showed that the Chinese authorities did not make any 
connections between the two, and as expected, the Taiwan issue remained more important to 
the US than EU-China relations, even when it comes to arms sales. Secondly, it is worth 
noticing that the EU and Member States do no seem too alarmed by the security 
considerations in the region of Asia when they conceive of their relations with China, since 
they are not directly involved, which might have explained the neutral reaction at the 
announcement.514 This attitude differs with the US which is involved in the region.515  
 
6.7   A main veto point: The weight of domestic opposition 
Domestic opposition was the other main veto point that tipped the scale in several 
countries. It seemed that there was almost a consensus among the Member States’ 
governments that the embargo should be reviewed and possibly removed, while the national 
political oppositions in most of the member states were against the process regardless of 
political affiliation. For the Big Three, the level of opposition was the most vociferous in 
Germany, then followed by the UK and somehow under control in France since there was not 
                                                 
513 Glen and Murgo.336 
514 Richard Balme and Brian Bridges. Europe- Asia relations: Building Multilateralism (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan 2008),  137 
515 Balme and Bridges,  139 
 194
so much of a public debate. Even though this opened up a chance for debate on EU foreign 
policy, this divide between those in power (on the "inside") and those in opposition (on the 
"outside") created a strange political landscape and reinforced the idea of ‘democratic deficit’ 
where national voters and citizens had no control whatsoever about the decisions made in 
Brussels. This criticism was not necessarily fair since most of those decisions were actually 
taken by Member States themselves and specifically by the Executive Branch. The European 
Parliament, as the only democratically elected European body could only reject the decision 
affecting the outcome of the policy since it only had a consultative role in foreign policy. In a 
sense, the consequence of insider-outsider politics is that the EU acquired a foreign policy 
but not a debate on foreign politics. This might create a lack of confidence in the EU as a 
security provider, both among the member states and among the citizens, which would make 
it harder to implement some of the objectives in the European Security Strategy.516 
 
 
6.8 The thorny issue of human rights  
The status of human rights was a scale-tipping issue not only within the EU but of 
course outside the EU. Human rights were a mediating factor that prevented the proponents 
of the repeal to succeed in their enterprise. The EU showed some progress made by the PRC 
on this issue, as far as permanent dialogue, participation in some conventions and other 
benchmarks. Giannella insisted though that ‘the West’ was expecting some strong signals 
such as the release of political prisoners from the Tiananmen events, which never 
materialized517.  
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The issue was that the embargo has been ineffective in improving human rights. In 
response, European Member States have ceased to link political and human rights dialogues 
to possible sanctions on trade or security issues.518 The EU has not reached consensus on 
those issues, whether it is between member states or between institutions. Bilateral relations 
have then gained ground in the recent period.  
Tibet is just one key example key issue that has poisoned political relations between 
the EU and China. The EU regularly raises the issue of Tibet in its bilateral dialogues with 
China and has asked for a Chinese ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) as part of the solution. The ratification of the ICCPR and its 
application to Tibet, and elsewhere in China, is viewed as an important benchmark of 
progress in the EU-China dialogue. However, despite years of pressure on this issue, the 
Chinese government has not ratified the covenant, and the EU continues to voice its concerns 
over religious freedom, cultural rights, and what has been called “ethnic dilution” in Tibet.  
6.9  Conclusion and agenda for future research 
The debate surrounding the arms embargo on China highlighted some important 
problems regarding the development of EU foreign policy. It also revealed some indication 
of the potential the EU carries as a political actor. The EU seemed to have a hard time to find 
a right balance between its economic and security interests in its China policy and struggled 
to define its own identity, often overshadowed by the Big Three. The Big Three significantly 
Europeanized the EU China policy through uploading their preferences. At the same time it 
appears that European countries have not, either individually or collectively, made a 
systematic assessment about China, or despite their influence on EU institutions, strived to 
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develop a coherent China policy. Thinking about China has been driven by political and 
commercial considerations rather than an evaluation of the security environment in East Asia 
and China’s place within it.519 
The Member States of the EU must also recognize the critical importance of speaking 
with one voice on China. Their habit of focusing on short-term interests has to be questioned. 
EU Member States, acting together, can play a vital role in bringing progress to China and 
other developing nations. The Union’s soft-power “toolbox” (trade, finance, technical 
assistance, etc.) should be used to demonstrate to Beijing the importance of regional 
cooperation and the fact that a strategic partnership with the EU should be a clear “win-win” 
for both sides.520  
Furthermore, the European Security Strategy states that strategic concerns and human 
rights are important objectives for EU foreign and security policy. There is, however, no 
indication as to which of these two is considered more important. It seems that the EU as a 
political entity should be able to bring some leadership on conflicting issues characterizing 
foreign policy, without waiting on indications coming from Member States. Continuing to 
link the lifting of the arms ban to progress in China’s human rights improvement for instance, 
will be increasingly difficult to sustain and indeed may become an irritation as the EU begins 
to implement its comprehensive strategic partnership with China. There is an opportunity, 
entirely novel that the EU should seize. The fact that the High Representative for Foreign and 
Security Policy is now the Commissioner for External Relations should indicate how human 
rights, trade and strategic interests will affect one another.  
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Finally, it would be interesting look at other regions to see whether the EU sided with 
human rights or trade, or whether the EU chose a pioneering road. In the case of EU 
leadership in sanctions, it could be interesting to expand our case to others and assess the 
status of member states’ sanctions legislation, investigations and prosecution of alleged non-
compliance and enforcement.  
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APPENDIX 
Questionnaire 
 
 
 General Questions 
 
  
    Strongly Agree   Agree  Neutral  Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree   
No Opinion / 
Do not Know 
Should the 
European Union lift 
the arms embargo 
on China? 
               
Does any EU 
Member State 
influence EU China 
sanction policy? 
               
Would you agree 
that the arms 
embargo on China 
is a necessary 
policy? 
               
Is the expression 
‘strategic partner’ 
a good 
characterization to 
qualify the EU 
partnership with 
China? 
               
Would you agree 
that when it comes 
to defense and 
security issues, 
Britain, France and 
Germany have the 
reputation to play 
a significant role in 
moving issues in 
the European 
Union? 
               
Would you agree 
that the leadership 
of one or more 
heads of states 
within the EU has 
been determinant 
in the debate to lift 
of the arms 
embargo on China? 
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3. Role of EU Member States 
Please answer from your office's official perspective. 
  
    Very Significant   Significant  Neutral  Insignificant  
Very 
Insignificant   
Don't 
know 
What kind of 
influence does 
Britain, France or 
Germany have on 
EU China sanction 
policy? 
               
What kind of 
influence does 
Britain, France or 
Germany have on 
EU Sanction 
policy? 
               
What role has 
Britain, France or 
Germany 
generally played 
in the debate of 
the lift of the arms 
embargo in China? 
               
What level of 
success has 
Britain, France or 
               
2.  Institutional Questions 
 
  
    Strongly Agree  Agree  Neutral  Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree   
No opinion / 
Do not know
Generally would you 
say that the EU 
sanction policy is 
more supranational 
than 
intergovernmental? 
              
Would you say that 
there has been 
influence coming 
from both Brussels 
and the Member 
States regarding EU 
sanction policy vis-à-
vis China? 
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Germany obtained 
in having its views 
on EU sanction 
policy adopted at 
the EU level? 
What level of 
success has the 
European Union 
obtained in having 
its views adopted 
at the Member 
States’ level 
regarding China 
sanction policy? 
               
What level of 
success has 
Britain, France or 
Germany obtained 
in communicating 
or sharing ideas 
with other 
Member States 
regarding EU 
China sanction 
policy? 
               
What role did 
Britain, France or 
Germany play in 
helping formulate 
policies at the EU 
level regarding 
China sanction 
policy? 
               
How significant 
has Britain, France 
or Germany's 
leadership been in 
the debate 
regarding sanction 
policy vis-à-vis 
China? 
               
How significant 
has the leadership 
of Britain, France 
or Germany's 
head of state been 
in the debate to 
lift the arms 
embargo on 
China? 
               
 
 
 
4.  Would you agree that France, Britain and Germany have been key players played in the debate 
to lift the arms embargo on China? 
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  Strongly Agree  Agree  Neutral  Disagree  Strongly Disagree   
 
 
5.  If you agree, in which capacity did those states play a significant role?  
 
  I do not agree with Question #4.  Agenda-setting  Policy 
formulation  Exchange of ideas with other Member States   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.  Bilateral Relations 
 
  
    Strongly Agree  Agree  Neutral  Disagree   
Strongly 
Disagree 
Would you agree that 
the bilateral relations 
of Britain, France or 
Germany with China 
helped the EU 
develop a unified 
policy on the PRC?  
            
Would you agree that 
Britain, France or 
Germany has a 
special relationship 
with the PRC? 
            
Would you agree that 
China should play a 
more important role 
in international 
security? 
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EU Declaration on China Arms embargo - European Council: Madrid, 26-27 June 1989 
The European Council, recalling the declaration of the twelve of June 6, strongly condemns the brutal 
repression taking place in China. It expresses its dismay at the pursuit of executions in spite of all the 
appeals of the international community. It solemnly requests the Chinese authorities to stop the 
executions and to put an end to the repressive actions against those who legitimately claim their 
democratic rights.  
The European Council requests the Chinese authorities to respect human rights and to take into 
account the hopes for freedom and democracy deeply felt by the population. It underlines that this is 
an essential element for the pursuit of the policy of reforms and openness that has been supported by 
the European Community and its member states.  
The twelve are aware that the recent events have caused great anxiety in Hong Kong. 
In the present circumstances the European Council thinks it necessary to adopt the following 
measures:  
 raising the issue of human rights in China in the appropriate international fora: asking for 
the admittance of   independent observers to attend the trials and to visit the prisons,  
 interruption by the member states of the community of military cooperation and an embargo 
on trade in arms with China,  
 suspension of bilateral Ministerial and High Level contacts,  
 postponement by the community and its member states of new cooperation projects,  
 reduction of programmes of cultural, scientific and technical cooperation to only those 
activities that might maintain a meaning in the present circumstances,  
 prolongation by the member states of visas to Chinese students who wish it.  
Taking into account the climate of uncertainty created in the economic field by the present policy of 
the Chinese authorities, the European Council advocates the postponement of the examination of new 
requests for credit insurance and the postponement of the examination of new credits of the World 
Bank.  
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Table Contacts United Kingdom 
 
The color code corresponds the following: green means a positive response (correspondence, documents or interview), yellow means a 
suggestion to another contact, red means not available or not competent, blank means no response. 
 
 
UNITED 
KINGDOM     
Name Position / Affiliation Status 
yrossr@parliament.uk British MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
stuartg@parliament.uk British MP / Com For Affairs 11/20 short answer 
kenpurchasemp@parliament.uk British MP / Com For Affairs   
popegj@parliament.uk British MP / Com For Affairs   
osbornes@parliament.uk British MP / Com For Affairs   
mossm@parliament.uk British MP / Com For Affairs   
mackinlaya@parliament.uk British MP / Com For Affairs   
keetchp@parliament.uk British MP / Com For Affairs 12/11 meeting in London / House of Commons 
illsleye@parliament.uk British MP / Com For Affairs   
horamj@parliament.uk British MP / Com For Affairs   
heathcoat-amoryd@parliament.uk British MP / Com For Affairs   
hamiltonf@parliament.uk British MP / Com For Affairs   
gapesm@parliament.uk 
British MP / Chairman Com Foreign Affairs / House of 
Commons no time but attached a speech 
smithj@parliament.uk British MP / Com Defense   
renniew@parliament.uk British MP / Com Defense   
kevanjonesmp@parliament.uk British MP / Com Defense   
jenkinsb@parliament.uk British MP / Com Defense   
hollowaya@parliament.uk British MP / Com Defense   
havardd@parliament.uk British MP / Com Defense   
portsmouthldp@cix.co.uk British MP / Com Defense   
hamiltonda@parliament.uk British MP / Com Defense   
gilroyl@parliament.uk British MP / Com Defense 11/12 too busy 
Robert Key British MP / Com Defense 
11/12 cannot help me, the Foreign Affairs Com has the lead on 
this 
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Name Position / Affiliation Status 
crausbyd@parliament.uk British MP / Com Defense   
borrowd@parliament.uk British MP / Com Defense   
arbuthnotj@parliament.uk British MP / Chairman Defence Com House of Commons 11/13 too busy 
timothy.kirkhope@btinternet.com British MEP / Delegation China   
glyn.ford@europarl.europa.eu British MEP / Delegation China   
charles.tannock@europarl.europa.eu British MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
emma.nicholson@europarl.europa.eu British MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
richard.howitt@geo2.poptel.org.uk British MEP / Com Foreign Affairs 11/9 Email_ No 11/22 too busy to meet 
ratsmep@sir-robertatkins.org British MEP / Com Foreign Affairs + China delegation   
connartym@parliament.uk British MP / Chairman european scrutiny Committee   
baileya@parliament.uk British MP / Com European Scrutiny   
borrowd@parliament.uk British MP / Com European Scrutiny   
clappisonj@parliament.uk British MP / Com European Scrutiny   
William Cash British MP / Com European Scrutiny   
clarkk@parliament.uk British MP / Com European Scrutiny   
dobbinj@parliament.uk British MP / Com European Scrutiny   
heathcoat-amoryd@parliament.uk British MP / Com European Scrutiny   
mail@greghands.com British MP / Com European Scrutiny   
hillk@parliament.uk British MP / Com European Scrutiny   
hopkinsk@parliament.uk British MP / Com European Scrutiny   
wilsonp@parliament.uk British MP / Com European Scrutiny   
laxtonb@parliament.uk British MP / Com European Scrutiny   
robertsona@parliament.uk British MP / Com European Scrutiny   
yrossr@parliament.uk British MP / Com European Scrutiny   
steena@parliament.uk British MP / Com European Scrutiny   
Name Position / Affiliation Status 
reidj@parliament.uk MP House of Commons / former Defense Secretary response 11/30, too busy, suggested to contact Des Browne 
contact@geoffhoonmp.co.uk MP House of Commons / former Defense Secretary   
camerond@parliament.uk Leader Conservative Party UK saw him in DC  and gave the letter / questionnaire 
Tessa Harris First Secretary RELEX Counselor, UK Rep to the EU no response 
Andrew Jelfs WMD Proliferation, UK Rep to the EU no response 
Anna.Durham@fco.gov.uk  
Second Secretary Asia and COASI Representative, 
UKREP too buy that week_retry? 
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Deputy Ambassador Barow deputy ambassador UKREP sent an email but no response 
Ambassador Darroch UKREP  the asst forwarded my request to Ana Durham 
Jim Murphy Minister for Europe (Gordon Brown Cabinet) gave a letter to his staffer when he came to Washington 
Des Browne Minister of Defense gave a letter to his staffer when he came to Washington 
haguew@parliament.uk Shadow Foreign Secretary / Conservative Party UK   
Roger Liddle     
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Table Contacts European Union 
 
The color code corresponds the following: green means a positive response (correspondence, documents or interview), yellow means a 
suggestion to another contact, red means not available or not competent, blank means no response. 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION     
Name Position / Affiliation Status 
evelyne.gebhardt@europarl.europa.eu German MEP / Subcom Security And Defense 
11/28  suggested two contacts Boden and 
Latella 
jorgo.chatzimarkakis@europarl.europa.eu German MEP / Subcom Security And Defense   
daniel.cohn-bendit@europarl.europa.eu German MEP / Subcom Security And Defense   
wahlkreisbuero@christian-ehler.de German MEP / Subcom Security And Defense   
alexandergraf.lambsdorff@europarl.europa.eu German MEP / Subcom Security And Defense   
info@wogau.de German MEP / Chairman Subcom Defense and security   
mail@bernd-posselt.de German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
tobias.pflueger@europarl.europa.eu German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
cem.ozdemir@europarl.europa.eu German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
vural.oeger@europarl.europa.eu German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
helmut.kuhne@europarl.europa.eu German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs 11/13 very detailed answer on his position   
klaus.haensch@spd.de German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
elmar.brok@europarl.europa.eu German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
alfred.gomolka@europarl.europa.eu German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
michael.gahler@europarl.europa.eu German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
André Brie German MEP / Committee Foreign Affairs Meeting Brussels 12/17 at 4pm 
Gerrard Quille Specialist Security and Defence Policy Department, EPP meeting dec 17 
Tim Boden  interparlemientary delegation fOr non eur countries meeting dec 17 
Mr Latella political advisor PSE-secretariat China delegation   
Raul Romeva Spanish MEP / Rapporteur Com. Foreign affairs meeting january 2008 but need to reschedule 
Franz Jessen 
DG External Relations, DH 2 (China), European 
Commmission met may 15 
Michalis Rokas     
Annalisa Gianella EC / High Representative Non Proliferation   
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Ambassador Abou Ambassador to the EU delegation in Beijing   
dietmar.nickel@europarl.europa.eu Director for External Relations at the EP  oriented me towards Gerrad Quille f 
jean-luc.dehaene@europarl.europa.eu Belgian MEP / Vice Pres China Delegation   
Name Position / Affiliation Status 
michel.rocard@europarl.eu.int French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
martine.roure@europarl.eu.int French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
anne.laperrouze@europarl.europa.eu French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
jhenin@europarl.eu.int French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
francis.wurtz@europarl.europa.eu French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
Helene Flautre French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs suggested to contact Raumeva, rapporteur 
beatrice.patrie@europarl.europa.eu French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
paulmarie.couteaux@europarl.europa.eu French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
pmorillon@europarl.eu.int French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs  recommended China delegation 
avatanen@europarl.eu.int MEP / Com Foreign Affairs met dec 17 2007 
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Table Contacts France 
 
The color code corresponds the following: green means a positive response (correspondence, documents or interview), yellow means a 
suggestion to another contact, red means not available or not competent, blank means no response. 
 
 
FRANCE     
Name Position / Affiliation Status 
Bureau Hubert Vedrine Former Minister Foreign Affairs France meeting 11/22/2007  
e.sallenave@senat.fr Staff Senate Defense Commission meeting dec 2007 
s.dassault@senat.fr  French Senator / Delegation PRC   
s.lagauche@senat.fr  French Senator / Delegation PRC / Rapporteur   
j.faure@senat.fr  French Senator / Delegation PRC / Vice Chairman suggested contacted E. Sallenave 
p.brisepierre@senat.fr  French Senator / Delegation PRC / Vice Chairman   
jl.dupont@senat.fr  French Senator / Delegation PRC / Vice Chairman   
besson.jean@wanadoo.fr  French Senator / Delegation PRC / Chairman l'administrateur, Mr Benoît Chadenet au 01 42 34 26 70 
bdepierre@assemblee-nationale.fr Frenc Representative / My district meeting sept 12 
jp.plancade@senat.fr French Senator / Vice Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense   
p.nogrix@senat.fr French Senator / Vice Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense meeting 12/12 French Senate 
robert.hue-senat@wanadoo.fr French Senator / Vice Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense   
r.delpicchia@senat.fr French Senator / Vice Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense suggested contacted E. Sallenave 
m.cerisier-ben-guiga@senat.fr French Senator / Vice Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense   
jacques.blanc@senat.fr French Senator / Vice Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense   
j.francois-poncet@senat.fr French Senator / Vice Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense   
s.vincon@senat.fr French Senator / Pres Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense   
Name Position / Affiliation Status 
Chirac Jacques Former French President / Member Constitutional Council Recommended Francois R. Elysee + Asie Oceanie Foreign Affairs 
Douste-Blazy Philippe Special Advisor Pdt Sarkozy / Former Minister Foreign Affairs France  letter sent, no response 
Levitte Jean-David National Security Advisor Pdt Sarkozy / Former Ambassador in China Meeting with Mr. R. @Elysee 12/12 
Marc Abensour Under director Industrial Issues and Sensitive Exports,  Foreign Affairs   
Laurent Delahousse First Secretary French embassy gave me a few contacts 
Raffarin Jean-Pierre Former Prime Minister France / Senator Letter and email sent, responded recommended me Senator Vallade 
Pierre Lellouche French MP / Com Defense been treying to meet did not work out, one last try this fall? 
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Pierre Selal Ambassador for French Permanent Delegation in Brussels 1/4 h d'entretien telephonique durant sejour 
pmoscovici@assemblee-
nationale.fr Member of French Parliament recommended by Michel Rocard, sent an email but no response 
Christophe Parisot Counselor RELEX COARM and CODUN   
Ambassador Ladsous French Ambassador to China   
christine.roger@diplomatie.gouv.fr French ambassador to COPS   
jean-rene.legoff@diplomatie.gouv.fr Counselor Armament / COPS   
nicolas.demetriades@diplomatie.gouv.fr Associate Counselor Armament / COPS   
Christophe Viprey DGTPE General Direction of the Treasury and the Political Economy need to contact him, recommended by Vivet 
Emmanuel Vivet French Permanent Representation in Brussels   
Jean Louhest Asst Assoc director Asia Desk / Minsiter for Foreign affairs France suggested by French embassy in DC, but too busy 
Louis de Broissia French Senator / My district could not meet in September or try December 
Michelle Alliot-Marie Minister of Interior France / Former Defense Minister suggested I send my questions by mail 
Juppe Alain    responded that his former chief of staff would get back to me, never did 
Gerard Bonnardot Army controller / Advisor to the Pdt of the Defence Committee / French Parl. meeting 12/14 @ National Assembly 3pm 
Camille Grand 
Director Non Proliferation Ministry Foreign Affairs, Former Advisor Ministry of 
Defense met dec 19 2007 
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Table Contacts Germany 
 
The color code corresponds the following: green means a positive response (correspondence, documents or interview), yellow means a 
suggestion to another contact, red means not available or not competent, blank means no response. 
 
  GERMANY     
Contact 
Date Name Position / Affiliation Status 
Dec 4_ Ulrike Merten, SPD  Chairman Defence Com / Bundestag 8-Mar 
De 5_ 
 
Dr. Karl A. Lamers (Heidelberg), 
CDU/CSU   Vice Chairman Defence Com / Bundestag 8-Mar 
8-Mar 
 
Ulrich Adam  |    German MP / Defence Com no too busy 
8-Mar Ernst-Reinhard Beck (Reutlingen) German MP / Defence Com   
8-Mar Monika Brüning German MP / Defence Com Contact Heinrich Kreft at the CDU/CSU party 
8-Mar Jürgen Herrmann German MP / Defence Com   
8-Mar Robert Hochbaum German MP / Defence Com   
8-Mar Henning Otte German MP / Defence Com   
8-Mar Hans Raidel German MP / Defence Com   
8-Mar Kurt J. Rossmanith German MP / Defence Com   
8-Mar Anita Schäfer (Saalstadt) German MP / Defence Com   
8-Mar Bernd Siebert German MP / Defence Com   
8-Mar 
 
Rainer Arnold  |   *)  German MP / Defence Com recommended to call Dr. Uwe Stehr for an appointment 
8-Mar Dr. Hans-Peter Bartels German MP / Defence Com / SPD   
8-Mar 
 
Petra Heß  German MP / Defence Com / SPD   
8-Mar 
 
Gerd Höfer  German MP / Defence Com / SPD   
8-Mar 
 
Rolf Kramer  German MP / Defence Com / SPD   
8-Mar 
 
Ursula Mogg  German MP / Defence Com / SPD   
   German MP / Defence Com / SPD   
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Maik Reichel  
Dec 5_ 
 
Jörn Thießen  German MP / Defence Com / SPD 8-Mar 
8-Mar 
 
Hedi Wegener  German MP / Defence Com / SPD response 3/14 
8-Mar 
 
Andreas Weigel  German MP / Defence Com / SPD   
8-Mar 
 
Elke Hoff  |    German MP / Defence Com / FDP   
10-Mar Birgit Homburger German MP / Defence Com / FDP   
10-Mar 
 
Dr. Rainer Stinner  German MP / Defence Com / FDP   
14-Mar 
 
Inge Höger  |    German MP / Defence Com / Die Linke March 18 Contact Ottfried Nassauer, BITS  
14-Mar Dr. Gesine Lötzsch German MP / Defence Com / Die Linke   
14-Mar 
 
Paul Schäfer (Köln)    long response from a staffer 
16-Mar 
 
Alexander Bonde  |    die grunen April 1, can send questions and also attached speeches 
16-Mar Winfried Nachtwei die Grunen   
16-Mar 
 
Gert Winkelmeier       
16-Mar 
 
Gunther Krichbaum, CDU/CSU   Chairman Affairs of the European Uniion Com   
16-Mar Kurt Bodewig, SPD  Deputy Chairman not  
18-Mar Peter Albach  CDU / CSU   
18-Mar Thomas Bareiss  CDU / CSU   
18-Mar Veronika Bellmann  CDU / CSU   
na Carl Eduard von Bismarck  CDU / CSU na 
18-Mar Dr. Stephan Eisel  CDU / CSU 4/23 termin 
18-Mar Bernhard Kaster  CDU / CSU 03/19 gave me four contacts: think tanks and scholars 
18-Mar Eduard Lintner  CDU / CSU 3/28 ok for an appointment 
18-Mar Thomas Silberhorn  CDU / CSU   
  Michael Stübgen  CDU / CSU   
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18-Mar Hans Peter Thul  CDU / CSU   
18-Mar 
 
Dr. Lale Akgün  |    SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU contact Gert Weisskirchen Arbeitsgruppe Aussen Polkitik 
Contact 
Date Name Position / Affiliation Status 
18-Mar 
 
Clemens Bollen  SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU   
18-Mar 
 
Hans Eichel  SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU   
18-Mar 
 
Rainer Fornahl  SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU   
18-Mar 
 
Lothar Ibrügger  SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU 4-11 recommends Wirtschaft und technologie 
18-Mar 
 
Josip Juratovic  SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU no was not in office at the time 
18-Mar 
 
Steffen Reiche (Cottbus)  SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU   
25-Mar 
 
Michael Roth (Heringen)  SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU   
25-Mar 
 
Axel Schäfer (Bochum)  SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU 4-1 ok for a meeting but needs to set it up 
25-Mar 
 
Ottmar Schreiner  SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU 
3-28 redirected me towards Axel Schaefer europapolitischer 
Sprecher der  
SPD-Bundestagsfraktion  
25-Mar 
 
Dr. Martin Schwanholz   SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU   
NA 
 
Michael Georg Link (Heilbronn)  |    FDP German MP / Com Affairs of the EU NA 
25-Mar Markus Löning FDP German MP / Com Affairs of the EU 4/16 responded by email and sent some literature 
25-Mar 
 
Florian Toncar  FDP German MP / Com Affairs of the EU   
na 
 
Dr. Diether Dehm   Die Linke German MP / Com Affairs of the EU na 
na Dr. Hakki Keskin  Die Linke German MP / Com Affairs of the EU na 
25-Mar Alexander Ulrich  Die Linke German MP / Com Affairs of the EU   
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25-Mar Omid Nouripour  DIE GRÜNEN German MP / Com Affairs of the EU Contact kerstin mueller, spokeswoman for the Greens 
25-Mar Rainder Steenblock  DIE GRÜNEN German MP / Com Affairs of the EU contact Trittin oder or kerstin  mueller 
25-Mar Jürgen Trittin  DIE GRÜNEN German MP / Com Affairs of the EU   
25-Mar Ruprecht Polenz, CDU/CSU  Chairman Foreign Affairs   
25-Mar Hans-Ulrich Klose, SPD  Vice Chairman Foreign affairs set up an appoointment, but had to  reschedule 
25-Mar 
 
Anke Eymer (Lübeck)  |    CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr Erich G. Fritz CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Dr. Peter Gauweiler  CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Hermann Gröhe  CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Manfred Grund  CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Dr. Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu 
Guttenberg   CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Joachim Hörster  |    CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr Eckart von Klaeden CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Eduard Lintner  CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Ruprecht Polenz  CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Bernd Schmidbauer  CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Karl-Georg Wellmann  CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Willy Wimmer (Neuss)  CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Niels Annen  |    SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr Detlef Dzembritzki SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Monika Griefahn  SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs 4-28 response 
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27-Apr 
 
Brunhilde Irber  SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Johannes Jung (Karlsruhe)  SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Hans-Ulrich Klose  SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs meeting set up, could not go, refused phone interview 
27-Apr 
 
Markus Meckel  SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Dr. Rolf Mützenich  SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Johannes Andreas Pflug  SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Otto Schily  SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Dr. Ditmar Staffelt  SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Gert Weisskirchen (Wiesloch)  SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Uta Zapf  SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs Johannes Pflug verantwortlich fir china 
27-Apr 
 
Dr. Wolfgang Gerhardt  |    FDP German MP / Com Foreign Affairs no nicht in Berlin 4/28 
27-Apr Dr. Werner Hoyer FDP German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Harald Leibrecht  FDP German MP / Com Foreign Affairs ok to respond,  need to send questions 
27-Apr 
 
Marina Schuster  FDP German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
24-Apr 
 
Wolfgang Gehrcke  |   *)  Die Linke German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr Monika Knoche Die Linke German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Dr. Norman Paech   Die Linke German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr 
 
Marieluise Beck (Bremen)  |    DIE GRÜNEN German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
27-Apr Dr. Uschi Eid DIE GRÜNEN German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
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27-Apr 
 
Kerstin Müller (Köln  DIE GRÜNEN German MP / Com Foreign Affairs   
15-May Klara Maria Flint  press section  too short notice, try again 
15-May Valerie Karadelnizli press section  tried but no response 
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European Union Code of Conduct for Arms Exports 
'European Union Code of Conduct for Arms Exports,' agreed by European Union (EU) 
Foreign Ministers on 25 May; formally adopted at the EU Council of Ministers, 8-9 June 
1998  
"The Council of the European Union, 
Building on the Common Criteria agreed at the Luxembourg and Lisbon European Councils 
in 1991 and 1992, 
Recognising the special responsibility of arms exporting States, 
Determined to set high common standards which should be regarded as the minimum for the 
management of, and restraint in, conventional arms transfers by all EU Member States, and 
to strengthen the exchange of relevant information with a view to achieving greater 
transparency, 
Determined to prevent the export of equipment which might be used for internal repression 
or international aggression, or contribute to regional instability, 
Wishing within the framework of the CFSP [Common Foreign & Security Policy] to 
reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of conventional 
arms exports, 
Noting complementary measures taken by the EU against illicit transfers, in the form of the 
EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms, 
Acknowledging the wish of EU Member States to maintain a defence industry as part of 
their industrial base as well as their defence effort, 
Recognising that States have a right to transfer the means of self-defence, consistent with the 
right of self-defence recognised by the UN Charter, 
have adopted the following Code of Conduct…: 
Criterion One 
Respect for the international commitments of EU Member States, in particular the 
sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the Community, 
agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international 
obligations 
An export licence should be refused if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia: 
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a) the international obligations of Member States and their commitments to enforce UN, 
OSCE and EU arms embargoes; 
b) the international obligations of Member States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons 
Convention; 
c) their commitments in the frameworks of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology 
Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement; 
d) their commitment not to export any form of anti-personnel landmine. 
Criterion Two 
The respect of human rights in the country of final destination 
Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by 
international human rights instruments, Member States will: 
a) not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used 
for internal repression; 
b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and 
taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human 
rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by 
the EU. 
For these purposes, equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, inter 
alia, equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar equipment for internal 
repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the equipment 
will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. In line 
with operative paragraph 1 of this Code, the nature of the equipment will be considered 
carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression 
includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, 
summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international 
human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Criterion Three 
The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of 
tensions or armed conflicts 
Member States will not allow exports which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or 
aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination. 
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Criterion Four 
Preservation of regional peace, security and stability 
Member States will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended 
recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by 
force a territorial claim. When considering these risks, EU Member States will take into 
account inter alia: 
a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country; 
b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past 
tried or threatened to pursue by means of force; 
c) whether the equipment would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national 
security and defence of the recipient; 
d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way. 
Criterion Five 
The national security of the Member States and of territories whose external relations are 
the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries 
Member States will take into account: 
a) the potential effect of the proposed export on their defence and security interests and those 
of friends, allies and other Member States, while recognising that this factor cannot affect 
consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and 
stability; 
b) the risk of use of the goods concerned against their forces or those of friends, allies or 
other Member States; 
c) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer. 
Criterion Six 
The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards 
in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for 
international law 
Member States will take into account inter alia the record of the buyer country with regard 
to: 
a) its support or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime; 
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b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, 
including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-
international conflicts; 
c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in 
particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and 
disarmament conventions referred to in sub-paragraph b) of Criterion One. 
Criterion Seven 
The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-
exported under undesirable conditions 
In assessing the impact of the proposed export on the importing country and the risk that 
exported goods might be diverted to an undesirable end-user, the following will be 
considered: 
a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including 
any involvement in UN or other peace-keeping activity; 
b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment; 
c) the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls; 
d) the risk of the arms being re-exported or diverted to terrorist organisations (anti-terrorist 
equipment would need particularly careful consideration in this context). 
Criterion Eight 
The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the 
recipient country, taking into account the desirability that States should achieve their 
legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human 
and economic resources 
Member States will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such 
as UNDP, World Bank, IMF and OECD reports, whether the proposed export would 
seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. They will consider in 
this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking 
into account also any EU or bilateral aid." 
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Armament Industry Data 
 
European Union Arms Export Licences to China, 2001-2004 
 
 
Country / Year 2002 2003 2004 
France €105,341,246 €171,530,641 168,900,766 
Germany 10 1,096,261 882,890 
UK 76,500,000 112,455,000 147,600,000 
EU Total 209,794,157 415,820,913 340,664,219 
 
Source: Stockholm Institute of International Peace 
http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/annrep.html 
 
Major armament companies sales in 2003 and market share from armament only. 
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The top 20 arms exporters: 
1. USA 
2. Russia 
3. Germany 
4. France 
5. United Kingdom 
6. Netherlands 
7. Italy 
8. Sweden 
9. China 
10. Ukraine 
11. Spain 
12. Israel 
13. Canada 
14. Switzerland 
15. Poland 
16. Uzbekistan 
17. South Korea 
18. South Africa 
19. Belgium 
20. Denmark 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Institute
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The top 20 arms importers: 
1. China 
2. India 
3. United Arab Emirates 
4. Greece 
5. South Korea 
6. Israel 
7. Egypt 
8. Australia 
9. Turkey 
10. USA 
11. Pakistan 
12. Chile 
13. Japan 
14. Poland 
15. United Kingdom 
16. Italy 
17. Taiwan 
18. Singapore 
19. South Africa 
20. Spain 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Institute 
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